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Cultural Rhetoric. Rhetorical Perspectives, Transferential Insights

Edited by

VLADIMER LUARSABISHVILI

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This book demonstrates the main peculiarities of Cultural Rhetoric as a new discipline developed and based on the textual, discursive and cultural possibilities of both general textual Rhetoric and the cultural peculiarities of different literary and non-literary systems, forms an integral part of Cultural Studies along with other lines of research. Possessing a critical tool that enables it to analyze texts at different levels, that is, at the syntactic, semantic-intensional and semantic-extensional levels, Cultural Rhetoric offers to researchers the possibility of highlighting cultural characteristics and values, in order to find similarities and differences in the structure and development of different cultures.

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Contents

The Universality of Culture and Art in the Face of Racism and Xenophobia

Alfonso Martín-Jiménez

Abstract: Racist and xenophobic movements tend to highlight cultural differences, and to endow their own culture with greater value whilst deriding that of others. Yet beneath the apparent diversity of cultures and human behaviours (including artistic behaviour) is to be found a fundamental anthropological unit, based on a common genetic inheritance, which binds all human beings and their cultures together, and which belies discriminatory prejudices. Yet racism and xenophobia are also fed by the very nature of human beings, who instinctively tend to take care of themselves and their loved ones, whilst ignoring those who are not close to them. Some scientists believe that genetic manipulation or education might be able to counteract the most selfish and pernicious human instincts, and encourage altruistic behaviour and cooperation.

Keywords: cultural universality, original cultural traits, cultural differences and similarities, rejection of other cultures

In the current era of globalisation, where forced migrations favour intercultural contact, there are conflicting feelings towards immigration. While certain people and social groups are understanding towards the situation of those forced to leave behind their homeland and loved ones in order to seek out a means of survival, and who adopt towards them an altruistic and welcoming attitude, other people and groups strongly reject immigration, and see the foreigners who come to their country as a veritable threat to their well-being. This latter group tend to stigmatise immigrants and try to link them to crime, seeing them as a menace to the fundamentals of their own culture. In interracial societies, it is also common for certain members of a given race to harbour feelings of superiority towards other races, whom they look down on as inferior. Both racism and xenophobia are based on an attempt to highlight supposed differences between societies or races, whilst ignoring those features which bind all human beings together.

Yet beneath the apparent diversity of cultures and human behaviour lies a common anthropological component which, by itself, should be sufficient to dispel any discriminatory prejudice. I have referred to this component in a forthcoming publication entitled *The Universality and*

Originality of Literature and Art. Symbolic Imagination (Martín in press), in which I explore the fundamentals of the universality of literature and art, and where I set out a series of arguments that underpin the universal nature of human behaviour as a whole and of literary and artistic creation in particular. By way of a starting point for this work, I shall now sum up some of the arguments put forward in the book.

The existence of universal human emotions and reactions has been supported by the most recent neurobiological studies into the behaviour of the brain. The neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux (1999) has studied a specific type of emotion; fear. Through experiments conducted with animals, as well as through the study of humans beings suffering from brain damage, and by exploring the brain using magnetic resonance nuclear functional techniques, LeDoux has been able to locate the cerebral pathways related to manifestations of fear (which include two areas at the base of the brain, the sensory thalamus and the amygdala nuclei, and the sensory cerebral cortex). He has shown that, regardless of their culture, the cerebral response mechanisms related to this emotion are common to all human beings as well as to a good number of animal species.

The universal nature of emotions has also been highlighted by Marc Jeannerod (2002, 2009) in his studies into the anatomical structure and functioning of the brain. Jeannerod points out that, despite cultural differences, emotions are recognisable in individuals who belong to different cultures and that such emotions are universal in nature. Jeannerod insists on the importance of anatomical and neurophysiological singleness to ensure the functioning of social life. In his view, the social character of humankind is only possible given the single nature of the brains of all its members since, if our brains were built differently, it would be impossible for us to understand the emotions and reactions of others (Jeannerod, 2002: 19). As Jeannerod explains, social behaviour is determined by the brain's anatomy and by the type of conduct it triggers, which to a large degree is common to all human beings, and that there is an innate predisposition towards acquiring language and towards understanding the expressions of others.

In this regard, it is worth recalling the ideas of Noam Chomsky on the innate capacity to acquire language (Smith, 2001: 116-117). Chomsky asked how it is possible for children to acquire their first language so

quickly and so easily. In Chomsky's view (1988), when a system as rich and complex as language develops more or less in the same way based on highly restricted stimuli, it is to be assumed there is an extremely powerful innate component, which leads him to conclude there is an innate predisposition to acquire language. In his opinion, speakers' linguistic competence is determined genetically and is the same for all children, although the development and action thereof require a particular cultural context in which explicit language stimuli are received (in other words, one or more specific languages). As a result of human evolution, there would therefore be a universal grammar that is handed down genetically and that does not need to be learnt, and to which all languages are subject. Language acquisition is to a large extent driven endogenously, and is not merely a reaction to external stimuli (although these are necessary –but never sufficient, due to the «poor stimulus»–).

Edward O. Wilson (2018: 93-94) also refers to a genetic predisposition towards language acquisition: «The instinctual animal sounds of our ancestors evolved […] into human speech. The vocabularies came to differ among groups, but the capacity and driving impetus to talk remained genetically programmed». The notion of an innate language knowledge is supported by Marc Jeannerod, who insists on the fact that new-borns prefer the sound of language to any other kind of noise, and that they are able to determine whether the intonation of a statement is correct. This evidences that new-borns possess some kind of innate language knowledge, and that language, the social sign *par excellence*, is rooted in the human brain from birth (Jeannerod, 2002: 198).

The experimental cognitive psychologist Stanislas Dehaene (2018: 19-21), after analysing the brain circuits involved in the reading process, insists in his book *Reading in the Brain* that writing and reading are also a universal part of the brain. As Dehaene explains, *Homo sapiens* was not initially programmed to read and write, and yet has learnt to do so. This might lead us to believe that the human brain possesses an infinite plasticity that enables it to learn anything in an unlimited fashion, even those things for which it was not initially prepared. Yet Dehaene, by empirically studying the brain circuits involved in reading, has shown that this notion is mistaken, and insists that the anatomy and functionality of the human brain is common to all mankind throughout all eras and all cultures. The brain is able to learn, and this enables it to adapt to the specific norms of reading English, Chinese or Russian,

although this learning is very firmly restricted by mechanisms that are specified by our genes. Cerebral architecture is similar in all human beings, and indeed differs very little from that of other primates. In all human beings and in all cultures, the same areas of the brain are activated to recodify writing. Whatever the language being read, reading travels along a genetically determined circuit (Dehaene, 2018: 20), with the brain managing to adapt parts of itself to the new uses required of it. When we need to learn a new skill, we recycle some of our old primate brain circuits insofar as these circuits are able to tolerate change (Dehaene, 2018: 21). In the case of reading, all human beings in all cultures, despite the differences in the way we write, have recycled the same area of the brain so as to understand writing (a region situated in the temporal-occipital lateral sulcus of the left hemisphere, previously devoted to visual analysis). This has led to a process of «neuronal recycling», such that one area of the brain, which had a specific function related to visual perception of objects, has come to be used to interpret writing. Dehaene maintains that our genome imposes limits on what we can learn, such that new cultural creations can only occur if we adjust our brain structure (Dehaene, 2018: 181).

Dehaene expands his concept of «neuronal recycling» to the domain of culture. In his view, the cultural manifestations of different societies have a universal core, based on the common anatomy of the brain. The structure of the brain exerts close control over cultural creation. Human capacity for invention is not infinite, but is restricted by our limited neuronal organisation. If human cultures seem to evidence enormous diversity, it is because an exponential number of cultural forms can spring from the myriad combinations of a limited selection of fundamental cultural features.

Dehaene asks why man is the only primate capable of developing a culture, and reaches the conclusion that the human brain displays a plasticity which is far greater than that of other primates. The prefrontal cortex is far more developed in man and has strong long distance connections to other parts of the brain, such as the temporal lobes and the occipital lobe, some of which are specific to human beings. These connections form a common cortical work area that is linked to the evolutionary appearance of reflexive conscience and to human competence for cultural invention, and which enables an infinite number of ideas and thoughts to be merged and recombined at will to create new inventions (Dehaene, 2018: 374).

The discovery of *mirror neurons* (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2006; Iacoboni, 2010) accounts for our ability to understand the intentions and emotions of others. These neurons are a kind of motor neuron, located in specific areas of the frontal lobe and parietal lobe of our brain, which are not only activated when we perform a certain action, but also when see someone else do so. They help us to see others' intentions when they are carrying out a specific movement. When we see somebody else performing an action, our mirror neurons simulate in our own brain that same action, albeit without actually performing it, maintaining it as a potential action (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2006: 55) or as an internal motor representation (Jeannerod, 1994; 2009), which helps us to understand what purpose we ourselves would have if we were to carry out the same action in that context, thereby enabling us to comprehend the intentions of others. Marco Iacoboni explains that our own movements are almost always associated to specific intentions. When seeing other people act, the same neurons that we use to perform our own movements are activated in our brain, which helps us to understand the intentions of others (Iacoboni, 2010: 37).

Mirror neurons, which are activated automatically and unconsciously, without this involving any rational or deductive effort, and which respond both to visual as well as auditory stimuli, are also related to the perception of language and to the gestures we make when speaking (Iacoboni, 2010: 83-107). When we hear and see someone speak and gesticulate, they trigger a specular reflection in our brain which allows us to understand what we ourselves would wish to express if we were to use those same gestures and expressions.

Moreover, mirror neurons also fire in order to recognise the feelings of others, enabling us to understand their emotional states. When they observe someone else's feeling, mirror neurons trigger an internal simulation of the other person's gestures and facial expressions. This simulation of others' emotions in our brain allows us to experience, without any effort, what we ourselves would feel when making the same facial expressions we see the other person making. This is why mirror neurons are key to favouring an empathy and understanding of the intentions, language-gesture expressions and emotions of others, thereby facilitating social interaction.

Mirror neurons therefore allow all of us to be interconnected, thus evidencing that we are social beings programmed to share our

experiences. In this regard, Marco Iacoboni insists on the universal nature of our brain, which brings all human beings together, over and above historical or cultural differences. In his view, the existence of mirror neurons demonstrates that we are not alone, but that we are connected biologically and are designed in evolutionary terms to interconnect in a deep and mutual way (Iacoboni, 2010: 256). This is the case despite the fact that, much to Iacoboni's dismay (2010: 260), religious and political beliefs continually deny the fundamental neurobiology that interrelates us. Likewise, xenophobic tendencies need to ignore this deep-rooted sameness that exists amongst all human beings, and tend to value their own culture as being superior to the one they seek to belittle, when in fact all cultures are the product of a common cerebral system.

The brain systems that are related to mirror neurons, and which respond to visual and auditory stimuli, not only allow us to explain the reactions we experience when perceiving the emotions or thoughts of others in real life, but may also shed light on human reaction to literary and artistic works.

It is thus possible to understand the infectious nature of the emotions conveyed by actors on stage or on screen (Iacoboni, 2010: 14): when we see good actors performing, our mirror neurons simulate inside us the same emotions, enabling us to comprehend their moods and thereby favouring our empathy towards them. Iacoboni (2010: 97) has also shown that when reading a novel, mirror neurons simulate in our brain the actions described therein, as if the readers themselves were performing them. As a result, literary and artistic works include emotional elements and descriptions of actions which trigger cerebral responses that are designed to allow us to understand their feeling, and these are responses which have a universal nature. We may therefore conclude that literary and artistic works, at least with regard to the actions of the characters and their emotions, generate common relations that underpin the universality of art.

The universal nature of the intentions, emotions and thoughts perceived by mirror neurons not only confirms the social behaviour of human beings, but also that of their artistic behaviour, which is also universal in character (Wilson, 2018: 91). It is not difficult to see how the emotions or ideas expressed and felt when seeing a film or a play or when reading a novel can be transposed, in one way or another, to the

general nature of creative forms and artistic reception, which underlines the universal nature of art and the existence of universal aesthetics. If the processes which make culture and social communication possible— such as the acquisition of language, learning to read, and understanding the intentions, expressions of language, the emotions and thoughts of others— are grounded on a universal foundation, it seems logical to think that artistic communication also possesses such a universal grounding.

In this regard, Yuri M. Lotman (1988: 9-10) reminds us that all human societies create and consume art. Although this is not necessary, either from the standpoint of vital needs or in terms of essential social relations, art is present in all cultures, indicating that it is a universal need. This is the case because, according to Lotman, it enables a particular kind of communication or artistic information, the essence of which lies in the inherent particularities of artistic texts, whose complexity determines a communicative capacity which is superior to that of normal communication texts.

It seems reasonable to assume that not only do creators draw on literary or artistic texts to express their ideas or emotions with greater intensity, but that those who receive them can also do this in their interior. If our brain is programmed to understand the linguistic-gestural expressions of others through internal simulation, it would seem logical to assume that such expressions can also facilitate that special form of communication provided by works of art, such that the content thereof may be recognised through an equivalent process of simulation, albeit far more complex in the case of artistic communication. Just as we comprehend the expressions of others because we understand what we ourselves would wish to say when uttering such expressions, it seems logical to think that we comprehend and value the content of works of art because we perceive in them what we ourselves would have wished to convey had we created them.

There is, however, one essential difference between normal communication and artistic communication. Whereas the phrases that we hear others utter in everyday conversations are very similar to those which we ourselves use and which tend to express a single meaning, works of art tend towards multiple meanings and can surprise us with their artificial, intricate and unexpected nature, with their complexity and originality proving challenging and appealing to us. Yet at the same

time, if we are to identify with them, they must be the bearers of universal elements that are related to us. The effectiveness of art thus depends on its ability to convey in an unusual manner something with which we can identify, expressing it in a way that is different to how we could or would do so.

This is why I feel that the position of those who defend the universal nature of art, such as Antonio García Berrio (1994), to be such a tenable one. For García Berrio, the successes and achievements of the formal expressivity and sensitive beauty of artistic texts are insufficient for explaining the profound appeal which certain works have, but are instruments that provide support for the anthropological foundations which are common to all human beings. And it is that very universality and capacity of each text to suggest this which ultimately determines the artistic value of a work. In the case of literary texts, their poetic nature relates to the enthralling elements which they can express and convey about ourselves. The formal artifices, however ingenious they may be, would prove inconsequential were they not the foundation for anthropological universalities (García Berrio, 1989: 440-441). When a work of art expresses a series of anthropological universalities with which those receiving it can easily identify, and when it also does so by correctly drawing on expressive or fictional resources, it can achieve an aesthetic value that will not only depend on the social conventions of each moment, on the subjective aesthetic judgements of the receiver (Genette, 1997, 2000), and on the value which certain people or institutions may attach to it, but also on the anthropological substance which it conveys in artistic terms.

Works of art not only embrace the actions and emotions of their characters, but also a series of symbols that are universal. A belief in the importance of the anthropological roots that are common to all human beings, and which are determined by genetic inheritance, led Gilbert Durand (2005) to establish a classification of the symbols of imagination, based on the assumption that, beneath the apparent diversity of the products of cultural imagery (myths, rites, ideas, religions, culture, art…) lies a series of universal architypes. According to Durand, basic psychobiological reflexes, which are common to all human beings, lead to the appearance of these architypes which, when coming into contact with the material and social environment, give rise to a series of symbols that are apparently different, but which may be reduced to a series of groups that can be classified.

Durand's architypes and symbols are common to all the arts, and their classification, beyond what may be improved or contradicted in certain aspects, provides proof that it is possible to systematize the products of human imagination and the symbols displayed in works of art. If human communication is based on the existence of a common brain that enables interactivity and an understanding of the intentions and emotions of others, it also seems logical to think that the artistic products and symbols which appear therein possess an anthropological root that is common to all human beings.

As we have seen, Stanilas Dehaene (2018: 355-380) highlights the universality of cultural forms, which are determined and limited by the capacity of the human brain. From a neuro-anthropological perspective, Dehaene contends that cultural features are related to well-defined neural circuits, the collective combinations of which account for the variety of cultural representations (2018: 359-360). In his view, the origin of culture is situated in the human capacity to develop new combinations of ideas. As mentioned, said capacity is grounded on the strong neuronal connection (specific to *Homo sapiens*) which exists between the different areas of the human brain, and which make up a large-scale «area of neuronal work» that is able to deal with, synthesise and distribute all of the information received. The genetic make-up of the brain imposes certain restrictions, given that any invention must adjust to the functional possibilities of the neural circuits. Yet the overall work space allows ideas to be merged and recombined so as to create new inventions. In other words, the common architecture of our brains ensures the universality and uniformity of its functioning, establishing limits, while at the same time allowing for a wide array of ideas and inventions to be envisaged and imagined.

These considerations may easily be linked to the postulates of the poetics of imagination, which are grounded on the universal and at the same time original nature of architypes and symbols. The products of the imagination and cultural creations (which include art and literature) encounter limitations based on the common structure of the human brain, although this does, however, allow for a wide range of manifestations.

It may well be that aesthetic value resides in achieving an attractive and original way of presenting universal elements. The latter are present in literary and artistic works as a whole (Martín, in press), which seek to

present them in an original manner so as to make them attractive to recipients. Art entails a complex process of communication, and those involved in its creation and reception are endowed with brain structures that enable mutual understanding. Privileged works are undoubtedly those which are able to convey in an appealing manner a series of ideas, emotions or experiences with which recipients immediately identify, even when they are not aware of what causes this empathy. Those works of art which possess the greatest power of communication may come to enjoy a privileged position somewhat later (which may take some time), through the recognition of cultural institutions, which highlights their power of seduction. Yet their value need not depend exclusively on the recognition they receive, with this recognition possibly stemming from their value.

These considerations on the nature of literature and art can easily be extended to other aspects of the human condition, which is also universal, although it may adopt different manifestations in each culture. Nevertheless, beneath this apparent cultural diversity always lie certain anthropological constants that bring all societies together, and which endow all individuals, regardless of the culture they belong to, with the same rights, stemming from their intrinsic condition as human beings, and which are essentially the same as those of the other members of the species. Although racist or xenophobic movements tend to exaggerate cultural differences, it is clear that underlying these are certain anthropological constants which identify all human societies and all their members, endowing them with the same values and rights.

Nevertheless, and despite the universal oneness of all cultures, love of one's own country and a rejection of all those who do not form part of it also has an anthropological basis. In this regard, Antonio Damasio (2018: 311) reminds us that our social and individual life is ultimately governed by *homeostasis*, which constitutes a form of self-regulation by organisms designed to maintain their internal properties and to ensure their survival, well-being and proliferation. Homeostasis determines affections to a large extent, and these tend to limit pain and to enhance pleasure, particularly at an individual level, such that we pay little attention to other individuals, even those who form part of our group. As Damasio explains, attempts to establish harmony between cultures are faced with a difficulty stemming from human nature itself, since the principal concern of basic homeostasis is to maintain the life of an individual organism within its borders. This endows homeostasis

with a *provincial* character, since it is basically concerned with the self. This concern may extend to the family as well as to a small group of those who are closest and even to larger groups, when there is the prospect of general benefit. However, homeostasis does not tend to concern itself with very large groups, and particularly with heterogeneous groups, and much less so with cultures or global civilisations. This is why to expect that any concern for survival and well-being will naturally extend to large groups is to expect the improbable (Damasio, 2018: 299).

Although «societies», «cultures» or «civilisations» incorrectly tend to see themselves as large living and unique entities, they do not possess the same unity as individual organisms, since they tend to be fragmented and to be made up of individualised organisms. This is why homeostasis usually concerns itself solely with each individualised cultural organism, leading each one to pursue its own interests, which only include the immediate circle of those closest to them and which extends to their cultural group (Damasio, 2018: 312). As a result, cultural organisms display no natural tendency to merge, which explains the disaffection felt by the wealthiest members of humanity towards their fellow humans from other cultures who are barely able to survive or who in fact fail to do so. The natural tendency of human beings is to only worry about their own well-being and that of their loved ones, and to ignore the problems of others.

The various societies, depending on their geographical environment, have created refined forms of regulating cultural life. Yet Damasio points out (2018: 301) that this rich diversity gives rise to frequent conflicts, since it heightens the differences within groups and between groups, stirring hostility. Given that the natural tendency of each individual or cultural group is to satisfy its own well-being, conflicts sparked by rival interests are almost bound to emerge. Emotional conflicts even occur within each individual, since each organism, as a result of evolution, puts into play diverse emotions designed to safeguard homeostasis, such as sadness, grief, fear, and repulsion. Another emotion, anger, has withstood the passage of evolution since it offers certain advantages (such as persuading an adversary to back down), but it comes at a high price, particularly when leading to anger and violence. In Damasio's view (2018: 303), anger or rage are negative emotions whose benefits have gradually diminished through evolution, as has also occurred with envy, jealousy, and contempt.

Damasio (2018: 304) reminds us that extreme greed, rage and contempt have led to extraordinary cruelty being perpetrated by certain human beings towards others throughout the ages since prehistoric times. In this regard, we resemble our ape cousins, who are capable of tearing apart the bodies of their rivals. Yet human refinement has taken the way we inflict cruelty to extremes. Chimpanzees have never crucified other chimpanzees, whilst human beings have proven themselves capable of inventing crucifixion and of crucifying other human beings. Human creativity is able to devise new methods of torture and death, such that rage and malice are fortified by knowledge, by the capacity to reason and by the power which technology and science have endowed human beings with.

A possible future ability to manipulate our genes, doing away with those which drive us to anger, aggressiveness and destruction might solve the problem, as pointed out by Stephen Hawking (2018) who, nevertheless, feared that those in power might acquire such a capacity for genetic manipulation and use it for their own ends. Antonio Damasio, who does not support genetic manipulation, but advocates that each human being should forge their own destiny by using their willpower to control the virtues or defects with which they were born (Damasio, 2018: 270), feels that the only reasonable solution to the conflicts that arise from human nature can be achieved by increasing efforts to civilise people through education, so that societies can overcome their differences and work together on basic aspects which affect everyone, favouring cooperative behaviour. Damasio's idea leads us to think that education should first and foremost foster cooperation rather than competitiveness. Through education, the idea is to prevent our genetic inheritance from exercising absolute control over our destiny.

For his part, Edward O. Wilson argues for two types of selection in the evolution of species, which come about through genetic mutation: selection at the individual level and selection at the group level. The former affects the survival and reproduction of a *member of the group*, while the latter affects the features that interact with the group members, such that the success of an individual's genes partly depends on the success of the society they form part of (Wilson, 2018: 101-102). In his view, human beings are located half way between the selection of the individual and that of the group. Individual selection drives the selfishness of those who are only concerned with themselves and with

their immediate family members, whereas group selection encourages altruism and social cooperation. Mankind is faced with an eternal conflict between these two tendencies, and it is this that makes humanity unique (Wilson, 2018: 102).

The notion of «group selection» has been strongly contested and there are many wide-ranging opinions that seek to explain what lies behind the altruism observed in human societies (Pérez, 2015). Nevertheless, and whatever the evolutionary origins of altruism, it seems clear that human beings are capable of perpetrating not only the greatest cruelties, atrocities and evils, but also of behaving altruistically towards others, as Antonio Damasio also reminds us (2018: 309), insisting that the majority of people can be cruel, selfish and foolish, as well as noble, innocent and charming. This leads him to pin his hopes on the positive effects of education, since to date no sufficiently long-term and coherent educational project has ever been carried out to show that this would not lead to an improvement in the human condition which we so desire (Damasio, 2018: 309-310). For his part, Edward O. Wilson proposes the advent of a "third enlightenment", to add to the two enlightenments described by Anthony Gottlieb (2016), each of which lasted some 150 years: that of the Athens of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle (spanning from the mid fifth century BC to the late fourth century BC.), and that which spread through northern Europe from the 1630s until just before the French Revolution, and in which figures such as Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Hume, Rousseau and Voltaire figured prominently. The third enlightenment requires close cooperation between science and the humanities, which could provide answers to the great questions posed by philosophy throughout history.[27] Faced with the pessimism which stems from the genetic determination of our most selfish and sinister emotions, Damasio and Wilson concur in the idea that education, cooperation and the development of knowledge can offer humanity a lifeline.

[27] In Wilson's view, only the *consilience* or unity of knowledge between the sciences and the arts is able to resolve doubts such as: why do we exist instead of never having existed; why did life originate and proliferate; why are there two sexes, and why does sex exist when it would be easier to reproduce by parthenogenesis, or by making descendants emerge from our body; why must we die of age if not of anything else, and why are we guided by a growth and deterioration plan that is programmed genetically (Wilson, 2018: 197-198).

It is here worth remembering the words of Diogenes of Oenoanda with which Wilson (2018: 198) closes his book *The Origins of Human Creativity*:

> Not least for those who are called foreigners, for they are not foreigners. For, while the various segments of the Earth give different people a different country, the whole compass of this world gives all people a single country, the entire Earth, and a single home, the world.

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