2024-03-28T10:24:02Zhttp://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/requestoai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/214932021-09-21T12:41:36Zcom_10324_1146com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1262
Llamazares Rodríguez, Bonifacio
Pérez Asurmendi, Patrizia
2016-12-09T10:02:23Z
2016-12-09T10:02:23Z
2015
Information Sciences, 2015, Vol. 299, p. 209–220
http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/21493
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2014.11.049
209
220
Information Sciences
299
Producción Científica
In this paper we study to what extent majorities based on difference in support leads to triple-acyclic collective decisions. These majorities, which take into account voters’ intensities of preference between pairs of alternatives through reciprocal preference relations, require to the winner alternative to exceed the support for the other alternative in a difference fixed before the election. Depending on that difference, i.e., on the threshold of support, and on some requirements on the individual rationality of the voters, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for avoiding cycles of three alternatives on the collective decision.
Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (ECO2012-32178)
Junta de Castilla y León (programa de apoyo a proyectos de investigación – Ref. VA066U13)
application/pdf
eng
Elsevier
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Voto - Matemáticas
Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://www.sciencedirect.com/
SI