2024-03-28T10:24:11Zhttp://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/requestoai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/405262023-04-21T10:42:39Zcom_10324_1146com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1262
Martínez Panero, Miguel
Arredondo Luna, Verónica
Peña García, María Teresa
Ramírez, Victoriano
2020-02-25T10:41:04Z
2020-02-25T10:41:04Z
2019
Economies 7(1), 17
http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/40526
10.3390/economies7010017
17
1
Economies
7
2227-7099
In this paper electoral disproportionality is split into two types: (1) Forced or unavoidable, due to the very nature of the apportionment problem; and (2) non-forced. While disproportionality indexes proposed in the literature do not distinguish between such components, we design an index, called “quota index”, just measuring avoidable disproportionality. Unlike the previous indexes, the new one can be zero in real situations. Furthermore, this index presents an interesting interpretation concerning transfers of seats. Properties of the quota index and relationships with some usual disproportionality indexes are analyzed. Finally, an empirical approach is undertaken for different countries and elections.
application/pdf
spa
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
CC0 1.0 Universal
A New Quota Approach to Electoral Disproportionality
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/draft
SI