2024-03-28T08:40:15Zhttp://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/requestoai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/214982021-06-23T10:05:54Zcom_10324_1146com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1262
Llamazares Rodríguez, Bonifacio
Peña García, María Teresa
2015
Producción Científica
Positional voting systems are a class of voting systems where voters rank
order the candidates from best to worst and a set of winners is selected using the
positions of the candidates in the voters’ preference orders. Although scoring rules
are the best known positional voting systems, this class includes other voting systems
proposed in the literature as, for example, the Majoritarian Compromise or the
q-Approval Fallback Bargaining. In this paper we show that some of these positional
voting systems can be integrated in a model based on cumulative standings functions.
The proposed model allows us to establish a general framework for the analysis of
these voting systems, to extend to them some results in the literature for the particular
case of the scoring rules, and also facilitates the study of the social choice properties
considered in the paper: monotonicity, Pareto-optimality, immunity to the absolute
winner paradox, Condorcet consistency, immunity to the absolute loser paradox and
immunity to the Condorcet loser paradox.
application/pdf
http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/21498
eng
Springer Verlag
Voto - Matemáticas
Positional Voting Systems Generated by Cumulative Standings Functions
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
TEXT
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