RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Does Flexibility Facilitate Sustainability of Cooperation Over Time? A Case Study from Environmental Economics
A1 Frutos Baraja, Francisco Javier de
A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar
AB In this paper we present nonlinear incentive strategies that can be applied toa class of differential games that are frequently used in the literature, in particular,  in  environmental economics literature. We consider a class ofnonlinear incentive functions that depend on the control variables of both players and on the current value of the state variable.The strategies are constructed to allow some flexibility in the sense that, unlike the common literature on the subject, the optimal state path evolves close to the cooperative trajectory. As a consequence of this flexibility,  the incentive equilibrium is credible in a larger region  than the one associated with the usual linear incentive strategies.
YR 2015
FD 2015
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27721
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27721
LA eng
NO Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 165(2), 657-677, 2015.
DS UVaDOC
RD 19-abr-2024