RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Interaction and imitation in a world of Quixotes and Sanchos
A1 García González, Ana
A1 Cabo García, Francisco José
K1 Two-population evolutionary game Heterogeneous preferences Symmetric and asymmetric games
AB This paper studies a two-population evolutionary game in a new setting in between a symmetric and an asymmetric evolutionary model. It distinguishes two types of agents: Sanchos, whose payoffs are defined by a prisoner’s dilemma game, and Quixotes, whose payoffs are defined by a snowdrift game. Considering an imitative revision protocol, a revising agent is paired with someone from his own population or the other population. When matched, they observe payoffs, but not identities. Thus, agents in one population interact and imitate agents from their own population and from the other population. In this setting we prove that a unique mixed-strategy asymptotically stable fixed point of the evolutionary dynamics exists. Taking as an example the compliance with social norms, and depending on the parameters, two type of equilibrium are possible, one with full compliance among Quixotes and partial compliance among Sanchos, or another with partial compliance among Quixotes and defection among Sanchos. In the former type, Sanchos comply above their Nash equilibrium (as they imitate compliant Quixotes). In the latter type, Quixotes comply below their Nash equilibrium (as they imitate defecting Sanchos).
PB Springer
SN 1432-1386
YR 2019
FD 2019
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37880
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37880
LA eng
NO Journal of Evolutionary Economics,  Julio 2019, Vol 29, Issue 3, p. 1037–1057
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 26-abr-2024