RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Spatial effects and strategic behavior in a multiregional transboundary pollution dynamic game
A1 Frutos Baraja, Francisco Javier de
A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar
AB We analyze a transboundary pollution differential game where pollution control is spatially distributed among a number of agents with predetermined spatial relationships. The analysis emphasizes, first, the effects of the different geographical relationships among decision makers; and second, the strategic behaviour of the agents. The dynamic game considers a pollution stock (the state variable) distributed among one large region divided in subregions which control their own emissions of pollutants. The emissions are also represented as distributed variables. The dynamics of the pollution stock is defined by a parabolic partial differential equation. We numerically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium of a discrete-space model that still captures the spatial interactions among agents. We evaluate the impact of the strategic and spatially dynamic behaviour of the agents on the design of equilibrium environmental policies
SN 0095-0696
YR 2019
FD 2019
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/39095
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/39095
LA spa
NO Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 97, 182-207, 2019
DS UVaDOC
RD 24-abr-2024