RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Enforcing regulatory standards in stock pollution problems
A1 Arguedas, Carmen
A1 Cabo García, Francisco José
A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar
K1 Pollution standards
K1 non-compliance
K1 dynamic regulation
K1 Stackelberg differential games
K1 prices versus quantities
AB We analyze optimal pollution standards and enforcement strategies in settings where environmental damages depend on accumulated pollution, and enforcement is socially costly. We assume that a regulator and a representative polluting firm interact in a Stackelberg differential game, and we specifically allow the firm to pollute above the limit, and pay the corresponding fine.  A crucial element is how progressive the fine is with respect to the degree of non-compliance. Some of our results contradict the related literature on the control of stock pollutants under full-compliance.  In particular, we find that setting standards dependent on the pollution stock (setting quantities) is preferred if fines are sufficiently non-linear; while setting fines dependent on the pollution stock (setting prices) is preferred if fines are linear or almost linear, and specially when the environmental problem is particularly harmful
PB Elsevier
YR 2020
FD 2020
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/41006
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/41006
LA eng
NO Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, March 2020,  vol 100, 102297
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 19-abr-2024