A THEORY OF IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS

(METALEPSIS)\(^1\)

ALFONSO MARTÍN-JIMÉNEZ

UNIVERSIDAD DE VALLADOLID

From the 1960s, amidst a few currents in literary theory, there emerged the idea that literature is identifiable with fiction, in a manner which all literary texts, independent of the genre to which they belong to, are fictional (Martínez Bonati, 1960, 1992; Gabriel, 1975: 28; Searle, 1975; Ohmann, 1987: 33; Levin, 1987: 71-72; Pozuelo, 1988: 91, 1993; Schmid, 1991: 213; Aguiar, 1990: 223). I will attempt to oppose this idea and explain that not all literary genres are always necessarily fictional but that there are works and literary genres that are not, proving that literature cannot always be identified as fiction. For this reason and as a point of departure, I have developed a model of a general literary text capable of integrating all literary genres, existing or imagined. The said model will allow the development of a joint theory of literary genres and of fictionalization, showing that there are fictional and non-fictional types of literature, and proving that a same genre, such as lyric poetry, can adopt fictional or non-fictional forms.

On the other hand, I will attempt to expand the theory of possible worlds with a complementary theory of impossible worlds (Rodríguez Pequeño, 1997), capable of explaining cases of a rupture

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in fictional logic, a phenomenon Gérard Genette (2004) refers to as *metalepsis*. Such cases cannot be explained as a simple creation of an unbelievable fictional universe, considering the theory of possible worlds, thereby making it essential to propose a theory of impossible worlds referring to the said cases. Finally, utilizing the proposed textual model, I will attempt to explain and represent graphically the mechanisms brought into play when impossible literary universes are created, and which come into contact in some instances or parts of literary text which, logically speaking, should be independent and autonomous.

1. TEXTUAL MODEL OF LITERARY GENRES AND THE THEORY OF POSSIBLE WORLDS

The contemporary theory of literary genres has established a clear distinction between theoretical or natural genres and historical genres (Todorov, 1972: 22-23; Guillaümé 1985: 163; García and Huerta, 1992). Natural genres, also referred to as *modes* (Hernadi, 1972: 156-157; Genette, 1986; Agüiar, 1990: 339-401), constitute basic, unalterable and generic categories. The historical genres are concrete forms that have been inscribed and which evolve in time, proving to be valid at a particular stage throughout history (such as the picaresque novel, swashbuckling comedies, or the science fiction novel). The historical genres are potentially limitless, while the natural genres are usually reduced to three: poetry, drama and narration.

As it is well known, the first attempt to create a classification of natural genres appears in Book III of Plato’s *Republic*, which is based on the modes of formulation in establishing a generic system that considers three possibilities. These possibilities are based on who speaks in the literary works: the poet, the characters, or both the poet and the characters (Platón, 1988: 160-163). The advantage of such a classification resides in its timeless and integrative character, since it is not only capable of taking into account the literary forms of Plato’s era but also to include whichever form of literary expression from whichever historical era, even other types of imaginable works that

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still haven’t been produced. But its limitations are also evident, in that to determine the responsibility of formulation is not sufficient in explaining completely the nature of literary works, since the same mode of formulation can be utilized in works which in other aspects are very different. Based on Plato’s classification, Hegel wanted to establish a generic system that maintains its advantages and which strengthens the most revealing criteria of contents, by establishing a three-part system based on the confrontation between a characterized thesis of objectivity (epic), an antithesis of subjective nature (lyric) and a synthesis of both objective and subjective (drama) (Hegel, 1986; Abrams, 1975: 415 425; Genette, 1986: 120 124; Aguiar, 1990: 361). Nonetheless, Hegel’s classification turned out to be inadequate in explaining all forms of literary expression since it didn’t include some literary forms that have been consolidated at present (such as the so-called essayistic-argumentative genres); neither did he clarify the true nature of other complex literary forms.

In my view, it is possible to establish a classification of natural forms that maintains the timeless and integrative character of Plato’s classification and which overcomes Hegel’s shortcomings, taking into account all forms of literary expressions, existing or imaginable. For this reason, it would be enough to substitute the enunciative criteria of Plato’s classification for another kind of criteria based on identity and otherness, establishing a classification that considers not who is speaking in the literary works but who is being talked about. Upon substituting the speech of the author or characters for the representation of the author or characters we would encounter two basic categories and a third resulting from a mix of both: either the author is being talked about, or the characters, or the author and the characters are both being talked about at the same time. If we make use of the terminology provided by the theory of possible worlds (Albaladejo, 1986, 1992), we can take into account that three basic, natural categories exist: the development of the world of the author, the development of the world of the characters, or the joint development of the world of the author and of the world of the characters. The totality of possibilities of literary expression would thus be represented and fall into one of these generic timeless categories, that would be related to the expression of the author’s own identity or with the representation of inhabited universes by autonomous characters.
In the attempt to establish a classification of the forms of natural genres, it would be explanatory to consider the existence of a general literary text, or *emic* (Pike, 1967: 37-38), of a potential nature, capable to include the proposed categories and, in consequence, all the possibilities of literary expression. Therefore, the said model would consider the extratextual categories of the *author* and of the *recipient*, empirical or real, and would include as well the intratextual categories of the *world of the author*, the *world of the characters* and the joint representation of both types of worlds, organizing itself as a natural system with capacity to contain all ethical texts, created or imaginable.

![Textual model of literary genres](image)

*Figure 1: Textual model of literary genres*

In other places I have proposed, by reasoning extensively, a model of *emic* literary text that covers the mentioned generic categories as well as the implied instances of literary communication (Martín-Jiménez, 1993, 2004). The said model is represented in *figure 1*.

Situated on the exterior of the text is the *author* (Fr. *auteur*; Sp. *autor*) and the *recipient* (Fr. *récepteur*; Sp. *receptor*), both able to be plurals. Within the text, strictly speaking, the enunciated is formed by the *world of the author* and the *world of the characters*, two categories that appear united in the graphic by a horizontal line representing the possibility that both may appear together in the same text. The enunciated can be expressed by an intratextual *enunciator* (Fr.
énonciateur; Sp. enunciador) and which can be directed to an intratextual addressee (Fr. destinataire; Sp. destinatario), both required by contemporary critics (Benveniste, 1966; Greimas y Courtés, 1979; Genette, 1989; Martín-Jiménez, 2004: 64-65).³

Moreover, essential to the model is the category of peritext proposed by Gérard Genette to refer to the set of elements that surround a text, and which appear in the same volume, such as the title, the preface, the titles of the chapters or notes, and which, together with the epitext, or conjoined with the related messages of the work in a place exterior to the book (interviews, correspondence, personal diaries…), constitute the paratext (Genette, 1987: 10-11). The intratextual categories of the enunciator and of the addressee affect the peritext as much as the text, since the intratextual enunciator can be responsible for the enunciation of the text itself and of other peritextual elements such as the prologue or the notes. The addressee can be situated in the text itself or in the peritext (Aguiar, 1990: 304-313). The said categories can be plural (for example, there can be various enunciators from diverse prologues), or can be absent or diminished in specific works (thus, the intratextual addressee may be nonexistent or the enunciator can fulfill a limited or useless role in the text of dramatic works without theatre notes regarding stage direction).

On the interior of the world of the characters there appears the possibility, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs, that the characters create a new inserted text. It has to be specified that the inserted text in the world of the characters possesses the same characteristics as the original text, and, just as the inserted text, considers the categories of the inserted author (A₀), the inserted recipient (R₀), the inserted enunciator (E₀), the inserted addressee (Ad₀), the inserted peritext (PERITEXT₀), the inserted text (TEXT₀), the inserted world of the author (WA₀) and the inserted world of the characters (WC₀).

The distinct literary genres can frame themselves within any one of the model categories but it should be pointed out that the designations of the said genres do not define completely their nature.

³ It is not necessary to include in a textual model of natural genres the categories of “implicit author” (Booth, 1961) or “implicit reader” (Iser, 1972) since despite them being important in order to explain respectively the image of the author and reader that is projected onto the text, they do not possess an equivalent generic relevance to the rest of referred instances.
As we will see, the terms poetry, drama or narration are usually utilized to classify diverse types of texts that, considered from the point of view of the proposed categories, show substantial differences which show that the said categories appear to be necessary to explain the truth of the nature of distinct types of literary works.

In this sense, it is necessary to mention that the world of the author extends from the perceptive-emotive pole, with its own poetic manifestations of the intimate character, more or less (from lyric poetry more emotive and sentimental to the elegiac –either in the form of a lament resulting from a mournful tragedy or celebrations–, or the satire or laudatory), until the rational-argumentative pole, characteristic of essayistic-argumentative works and the majority of the forms that we can designate as thematic (Hernadi, 1978: 122-129) or argumentative (Arenas, 1997). We can designate these two basic possibilities as poetry and argumentation, respectively. The poetic-lyrical forms serve as objects through which the author’s subjectivity is expressed. The argumentative forms manifest the vision of the author about the objects themselves. Both types of expression are constituents of the author’s world.

Similarly, narrative and dramatic texts can be included in the world of the characters. The essential difference between both is that in the former greater importance is placed on the enunciator (which in this case we can designate narrator), while in the latter, due to the characters being responsible for expressing the enunciated, the enunciator (which we can designate as the dramatizer) fulfills a much smaller role, limited to exhibiting by chance peritextual elements and theatre notes in the margins. Also, in the world of the characters there can be whichever type of real or imaginable form neither dramatic nor narrative, as in the case of all the other texts in which appear characters without having a place in the plot’s development similar to the novel or drama.

There exists also the possibility of representing together the world of the author and of the characters (shown in the model by means of a horizontal line that unites both types of worlds) where, in certain works considered narratives, for example, they do not only develop the universe of the characters, but also present a significant development of the world of the author through frequent commentary of the narrator. This fact should prevent us from being tempted to identify the narration with the world of the characters, since many narrative works develop significantly the world of the author,
generally the thematic-argumentative aspect, as it occurs in Der Zauberberg (The Magic Mountain) by Thomas Mann, in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (The Man Without Qualities) by Robert Musil, or in many works by Milan Kundera, in which not only are the characters’ histories narrated, but there also appears the expanded discourse of the enunciator of the essayistic type (Martín-Jiménez, 1993a).

Also, there is the possibility that specific dramatic works develop exceptionally the world of the author through theatre notes in the margins belonging to the enunciator (although the said possibility is only concerned with the written text and would be lost in the representation, undoubtedly determining its limited development).

There exist specific literary texts which Mario Benedetti designates as “entreveros” constituted by diverse fragments of a varied nature, that are very difficult to define from the perspective of traditional classification, but which turn out to be easily explained upon placing their diverse fragments in the categories of the world of the author and of the world of the characters and considering that the text in its totality develops together in both categories.

Lastly, in order to explain the generic forms designated as mixed or hybrid (García and Huerta, 1992: 147-150), as in ballads, eclogues or dialogues, it is essential to consider the possibility of including a new text on the interior of the world of the characters. The classification difficulties of these forms appear to be solved upon considering, in the same manner the empirical author develops the original text, a fictional character which can produce a new inserted text on the interior of the original text. The designated mixed forms are explained by the initial creation of a fictional character that creates a new text afterwards, in other words, an inserted text in the world of the characters.

Thus, the dramatic-lyric character of ballads is due to the initial creation of a fictional character who creates afterwards an inserted text in which the character develops the inserted world of the author in his

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4 In the “Envío” or prologue of his work Despistes y franquezas, Mario Benedetti writes the following: “this book […], is something like an entrevero: realist stories, humorous vignettes, police mysteries, fantastic stories, autobiographical fragments, poems, parodies, graffiti” (Benedetti, 1992: 13).

5 Although the model only shows an inserted text within the principal text, it should be made clear that it fits the possibility of introducing new texts in inserted texts permitted by the limits of intelligibility.
poetic aspect. Something similar occurs in eclogues (although in this case various characters are created which construct a text altogether) or in other forms of lyric poetry enunciated by fictional characters, like in Galician-Portuguese ballads, characterized by the creation of a fictional female character who enunciates an inserted text which develops just as in the inserted world of the author in his emotional aspect. Also, in the case of “heteronyms” by Fernando Pessoa (Martín-Jiménez, 1993b), which become patently clear in his personal correspondence (in other words, the epitext), they are granted characteristic biographical features which are fictional characters who create inserted texts and in which the inserted world of the author develops in its lyric-intimate facet. Although, the difference in protagonist between ballads and eclogues is because Pessoa’s heteronyms jump out to the first page of the volume and become a part of peritext.  

The dramatic-essayistic character in forms as in dialogues yields to a similar mechanism, although the characters create an inserted text in which the inserted world of the author is developed in his argumentative aspect.  

Another associated form without much distinction to the narration, as in the so-called novel in first person, presents a fictional character or homodiegetic narrator (Genette, 1989: 299), and is based on the same mechanism of the initial creation of a character which subsequently constructs an inserted text, developing in this case fundamentally the inserted world of the characters. Thus we provide evidence that stories exposed by a heterodiegetic narrator, or a third person, are essentially distinct to the enunciated by a homodiegetic narrator. If the heterodiegetic narration allows for the reflection of the original author’s world through the narrator’s commentary, then the homodiegetic narration will exclude the said world to a greater extent than the dramatic works themselves, which,

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6 Thus, on the cover of one of the Portuguese editions of Álvaro de Campos’ poems (one of the heteronyms” –not “pseudonym”– of Pessoa), the name of the real author does not appear but only can be read as follows: The Poetry of Álvaro de Campos (Campos, 1986).

7 The difference between dramas and forms such as dialogue is that in the former the characters do not speak with the purpose of creating text but only their speech is fundamentally a part of the same vital performance –in other words, “they make things with words” (Austin, 1971)–, while the rational effort of dialogues can consider all the ownership as a voluntary creation of a new argumentative text.
at least, would develop through the stage directions of the enunciator (dramatizer). 8

In this regard, it is necessary to determine the nature of the world of the author and of the world of the characters, so that the theory of possible worlds could be put into practice (Mignolo, 1984: 133-152; Harshaw, 1984; Bruner, 1986; Allén, 1989; Hintikka, 1989; Doležel, 1979, 1985, 1985a, 1989, 1998, 2010; Maître, 1983; Ryan, 1991, 1992, 1998; Ronen, 1994, 1996; Semino, 1996; Divers, 2002; Rodríguez, 2008; Álamo, 2012: 312-316), and, especially for the concept developed in Spain by Tomás Albaladejo (1986, 1992). Conforming to the theory of possible worlds by Albaladejo, there exist three types of models of the world which govern all narrative works. Albaladejo has classified them as real, verisimilar fictional and non-verisimilar fictional:

The type I model of real is one of what is true, corresponding with the models of the world whose rules are of the real world objectively existing.

The type II model of verosimilar fiction is a believable, credible or plausible fiction, similar to the real, and correspond to the models of the world whose rules, without being from the real objective world, are constructed in accordance.

The type III model of non-verisimilar fiction correspond to the models of the world whose rules involve a transgression from the norms of the real objective world (Albaladejo, 1986: 58-59).

Since in literary works there can appear elements of various types of the models of the world, Albaladejo establishes a law of maximum semantics, according to which the model of the world of the text corresponds to a maximum semantic level achieved by whichever of the elements. This occurs in such a manner that there appear, for example, type I and type II elements, with the said story pertaining to type II; and if in a work there appear type II and III elements, they would pertain as a whole to type III (Albaladejo, 1986: 58-63).

8 The homodiegetic narrator can develop also his own inserted world of the author with commentary made in the moment of narration, but the said world is alien to the empirical author.
Nonetheless, the theory of possible worlds, in this respect, carries out an exactness that shows to be of great interest, upon considering that the general world of the work is composed of several subworlds as characters form a part of them and which each one of those subworlds is susceptible, at the same time, of being divided into effective real subworld and a series of imaginary subworlds (figure 2).

**Figure 2:** Worlds and subworlds of a literary work.

The effective real worlds, which conform to the real objective world effectively realized in the work, integrate beings that have a real existence as characters into events played out in space and time. Such worlds act like articulatory subworlds with respect to worlds which organize themselves and situate the distinct types of mental processes of characters (knowledge, simulation, desire, fear, etc.) to make up the imaginary subworlds. Same as it occurs in real life, the said mental processes determine the character’s behavior, since they act as they see fit because they fear, desire, imagine, know... all which are determined elements that form part of the imaginary subworlds. Thus, the development of the plot’s drama depends on the interaction between the effective real subworld and the imaginary subworlds of each character, in a manner which some elements of the imaginary subworlds can become integrated into the effective real subworld, while others cannot be but they are still important as mental

*Castilla. Estudios de Literatura, 6 (2015): 1-40*
experiences. Taking into account this distinction, it is necessary to outline the law of maximum semantics mentioned earlier as it only concerns the effective real subworlds of the characters. Thus, although a character of a realist novel pretends, imagines, or dreams something unbelievable, the work continues to be a type II, since the experience of the character does not correspond to its effective real subworld but only to its imaginary subworlds (Albaladejo, 1986: 69-74).

The classification of the three types of models of the world proposed in order to explain narrative works can be applied without difficulty to the category of the world of the characters, in such a way that the said category can include these three possibilities. In this sense, it can be said that a literary autobiography develops fundamentally the world of the characters following the type I model of the world, and that a dramatic-realistic work develops the world of the characters conforming to the type II model of the world. Returning to the case of fictional stories with homodiegetic narrators, we can specify that in the initial creation they are made of a fictional character in agreement with the type II or type III model of the world, which constructs afterwards an inserted text that develops fundamentally the inserted world of the characters according to the type I model of the world. In other words, as if the character were narrating his autobiography, in a manner which the fictional character of the work comes from the fictitious nature of the character.

In the world of the characters there are the effective real subworlds and the imaginary worlds that interact with one another; and although the theory of possible worlds has been developed in order to explain fundamentally the narrative text (namely, the type of text that develops fundamentally the world of characters), we are able to transfer over its principles to the world of the author. In this respect, it is to warn that the world of the author is composed of imaginary subworlds. In effect, the world of the author does not need a temporal structure to sustain itself, and, for this reason, does not need the effective real subworld which, as mentioned, gathers the occurred events in time and constitutes the temporal base of the plot in stories or drama. This does not mean, logically, that in a poem or an essay real life events cannot appear that have provoked the lyric emotion or reflection; but, when in a poem or an essay there appear references to real life events it is usually pretext through which the subjectivity of the author can be developed (Aguiar, 1990: 582-587) or his thoughts with respect to the said events.
Therefore, an essential difference between the world of the author and the world of the characters is that the former develops the imaginary subworlds while the latter displays the effective real world as much as the imaginary subworlds. Consequently, if a text apparently shows a predominantly lyric or essayistic nature and has an abundant presence of elements of the effective real subworld, we would be able to consider the joint development of the author’s and of the characters’ worlds which would be established in accordance with the type I model of the world. A text of this type would probably be understood as lyric according to traditional classifications, but in order to explain its true nature one would have to consider the joint development of the author’s and characters’ worlds, in a way that would distinguish the other types of texts also considered lyric that only develop the author’s world.

2. LITERATURE AND FICTION: PRETENDING AND CREATING FICTIONS

As I tried to explain in a previous work (Martín-Jiménez, 2004), and will try to show in more detail in a forthcoming book (Martín-Jiménez, 2015), the establishment of the textual model proposed allows us to refute the idea adequately discussed in contemporary literary studies, that literature is fiction and that without fiction there would not have been literature. In this respect, I consider it essential to distinguish between the act of pretending and of creating fiction. The term pretending is related to European languages (Fr. feindre; Sp. fingir; Port. fingir; It. fingere…) as much as the act of pretending or lying in real life as a creation of fictional works, but both are radically different requiring a precise and clear definition. It is one thing for an author to pretend to feel something that he doesn’t feel and another to create fiction. For this reason, we could consider that an author pretends when exposing something false or made up without developing the characters’ world, while creating fiction when showing a world of the characters governed by the type II and III models of the world.

In fact, is quite common that literary authors pretend in their works without creating a fictional world inhabited by characters. Thus, a poet can pretend that he is in love in order to write an affectionate sonnet or can imagine a situation that he hasn’t experienced himself. But, in such cases, there’s not anything else but to develop the pretended subworld or the imagined subworld of the author himself, worlds which form part of the author’s world.
In this respect, one should consider, although only briefly, the evolution of the lyric genre throughout history. As it is known, Aristotle did not include lyric poetry in his *Poética* (Martín-Jiménez, 1993: 26-35) and so the said genre had many difficulties to be considered as a literary genre comparable to the others, even in the Renaissance and Baroque eras where there was an abundance of lyric poetry being produced. But until the Romanticism, with the generic formulation of Hegel’s triad formed by the lyrical, narrative and drama, lyric did not purchase a generic category comparable to the drama and narrative (Martín-Jiménez, 1993: 51-57).

Nonetheless, the Romantic authors defended a restricted concept of the lyric. For the Romantics, the lyric is a result of introspection which enables the poet to be conscious of himself and to express directly the subjective feelings of the author (Combe, 1999: 129).

Other authors which appeared subsequent to Romanticism reacted against this restrictive concept in the lyric genre. Nietzsche defended that the artist should be able to liberate himself from subjectivity and for this reason he proposed to develop the “impersonal I”. The French symbolist poets such as Baudelaire, Rimbaud and Mallarmé, also defended a type of poetry based on the separation between the author and the lyric enunciator in a manner which the “I” who speaks in the poem had to adopt an impersonal nature, reminding us of Rimbaud’s famous quote “Je est un autre” (‘I is someone else’) (Combe, 1999: 133).

Throughout the twentieth century and up until the present, the tendency to disassociate the contents of lyric texts from the author has been strengthened, based on the belief that on the interior of the lyric text there exists a category responsible for the enunciation of the text, the “I lyric”, whose fictional character would prevent the category to be related directly to the author (Martínez Bonati, 1960, 1992; Combe, 1999: 133). Thus, at the opposite pole of the Romantic authors we also find that what constitutes a restrictive vision of the lyric genre.

In effect, the creation of the impersonal lyric enunciator is unable to change himself, however many times he tries, into the sole viable form of lyric expression, since he is not more than the development of one of the existing possibilities. One can thus make the case, as the Romantic authors had tried, that the author expresses his true feelings. Also, the case could be made, as sustained by Nietzsche and the Symbolist poets, that the “impersonal I” exists which expresses feelings pretended or imagined. Both possibilities
form part of the literary system and contribute to enriching it, resulting unjustifiably the pretension of converting whichever of the possibilities into the sole form of a feasible lyric expression.

But even in the cases where the author attempts to create an impersonal poetry, and never succeeds in creating a character that enunciates an inserted text, the enunciated must be attributed to the author himself, since they constitute the pretended subworld or the imagined subworld of the author, therefore forming a part of the world of the author.

In this way, the category of the author’s world in his poetic aspect integrates as much the possibility of creating a type of lyric poetry as expressing the author’s true feelings as in impersonal poetry that does not reflect, but is a manifestation of the pretended or imagined subworlds. In one or another case, that what is expressed in the text must be attributed to the author. The only way that a lyric text turns out to be fictional is if it is attributed to a fictional character that creates an inserted text, developing the inserted world of the author.

On certain occasions it is clear that it isn’t easy to distinguish if what is developed in a lyric text is the author’s world of the original text or the inserted world of the author. But ambiguity is a part of literature and at least we are able to establish the two poles with respect to those which produce this ambiguity.

On the other hand, it is necessary to comment on the nature of the genre essayistic-argumentative, of which I prefer to call the *genre argumentative* (Arenas, 1997). At the moment of evaluating if this genre can be considered literary, heterogenous criteria are usually brought up, for example, if the author composes other types of works clearly literary, or if he possesses a style that can be considered literary. In my view, nonetheless, the argumentative genre can and should be defined by thematic criteria that make it comparable with other genres. In the same way that the narrative and dramatic genres are defined by the beginnings of occidental poetry by thematic-referential criteria, related to their capacity to represent men who act, and to which the lyric genre has been defined from Romanticism and by other thematic-referential criteria, bound by their capacity to express the author’s emotions, the argumentative genres also can be defined by a thematic-referential genre.

In order to establish this thematic-referential criteria, we can return to classical Rhetoric, since rhetorical discourse has something in common with the argumentative genre, and that is persuasion. The

specific field of classical Rhetoric was the field of persuasion over that what is debatable. This concept can also be extended without difficulty to the argumentative genre appropriately literary (Albaladejo, 2013: 11). Moreover, I agree with Aron Kibédi Varga (2000: 22-23) to sustain the universal character of the three rhetorical genres established by Aristotle: the judicial, which judges past events; the political or deliberative, that aims to influence future decisions, and the demonstrative, which besets praise or vituperation. For this reason, I believe that the characteristics of the rhetorical genre can be applied to the definition of the thematic criteria of the argumentative genre, characterized by developing a type of persuasive argumentation over that what is debatable related to past judgments, with the intent to influence future decisions or with praise or vituperation.

One of the principle components of the argumentative genre is the essay. Since its development in 1580 by Michel de Montaigne, the essay has taken on notable development in occidental culture but is not always considered literary, at least when it appears in its pure and autonomous form. Nonetheless, it can be considered literary when accompanied by other components that are literary. As already mentioned, as in some contemporary novels such as The Magic Mountain, or The Man Without Qualities, the judgments of the narrator are abundantly developed which we could then consider a mix of essay and narration. In such cases, the argumentative component can be considered properly literary.

Other times, the argumentative component is enunciated through fictional characters, as it occurs in Cartas Marruecas by José Cadalso. In the said work, two Moroccan characters, Gazel and Ben-Beley, mutually write letters to each other and collaborate in creating an inserted text which develops the inserted world of the author in his argumentative aspect. In the cases in which the argumentative component is developed by fictional characters, there is no doubt over its literary nature, which is indicated by the fact that Cartas Marruecas has always been considered literary.

For this reason, the argumentative genre forms a part of literature since it is developed through the author’s world, who isn’t fictional, or when it is displayed through the inserted author’s world posing then as fiction.

As a result of everything mentioned, it is necessary to conclude that there exist fictional and non-fictional literary works (figure 3).
Figure 3: Fictional and non-fictional literature.

Literary works that exclusively develop the author’s world of the original work, as it occurs in some types of poems and essays, are not fictional. Literary works that develop the characters’ world are governed by the type I model of the world, as in autobiographies, are also not fictional but they are if they are novels or dramas that are governed by the type II and III models of the world. All the other works in which there exist fictional characters that are responsible for creating an inserted text are also fictional. Therefore, there can be fictional and non-fictional literary works, indicating that literature cannot be identified with fiction.

3. THE RUPTURE OF FICTIONAL LOGIC (FICTIONAL METALEPSIS): THEORY OF IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS.

In this part I will refer briefly to the cases in which a rupture is produced in fictional logic, with the following creation of “impossible worlds” (Rodríguez Pequeño, 1997).

In this sense, the proposed model can serve to explain the nature of specific literary or artistic works that present a rupture in fictional logic, a phenomenon which Gérard Genette designated as metalepsis, or, to be more exact, fictional metalepsis.
Genette proposed the concept of narrative metalepsis in his work *Figures III* (1973) and insisted the same idea in *Nouveau discours du récit* (1983). Subsequently, he developed on a greater scale the concept of metalepsis in his work *Métalepse. De la figure à la fiction* (2004). In this work, Genette attempted to improve his analysis of fictional transgressions occurring in the simple rhetorical figure of *metalepsis of the author* (which occurs, for example, when the self-narrator guides the reader with phrases like “we leave such a character and look in on what the other is doing”, or when it is presented as a creator of characters in the history of its story) in the vast field of fiction, that is to say, *fictional metalepsis*, that takes place when there is a rupture in fictional logic (for example, when an author introduces himself in the fictional action of the story or when a character mixes himself in the extradiegetic existence of the author or reader). Genette justifiably believes to speak of metalepsis in both cases, considering that *fictional metalepsis* constitutes an expanded mode of the figure, justifying this movement in the fact that some figures (as in metaphor, antiphrasis, litote or hyperbole) can consider themselves “fictions in miniature”, and in which the fictional character of the *metalepsis of the author* authorizes to use the term *metalepsis* to designate specific literary manifestations that subvert fictional logic.

Genette devotes his work *Métalepse* to comment on and exemplify both cases of metalepsis with a good number of literary or cinematographic works. Although he distinguishes clearly the *metalepsis of the author* from *fictional metalepsis*, it is convenient to insist that they are resources substantially different and that only the latter constitutes an authentic rupture of fictional logic.\(^9\)

I will concentrate on the cases that Genette included in *fictional metalepsis*, specific to literary works that have an illogical or contradictory construction, or, are impossible, so to speak, and not because they can’t be themselves literally realized but because of their own internal universe which turns out to be incoherent. These works would constitute the literary equivalent of “impossible objects” (Rodríguez Pequeño, 1997), as in “Penrose’s triangle”, which can be drawn in two dimensions but cannot exist in a three-dimensional reality (figure 4).

\(^9\) In my book *Literatura y ficción. La ruptura de la lógica ficcional* (forthcoming), I will comment in further detail the distinct cases of *metalepsis* proposed by Genette, explaining the differences between the cases in relation to the textual model proposed.
Also are famous the inhabited worlds surrounding impossible objects created by M.C Escher, such as Belvedere, which represents a building of an impossible structure (figure 5).
In the literary field there exist works that present a rupture comparable to the laws of fictional logic creating impossible worlds. For example, in the novel *Niebla*, the protagonist, Augusto Pérez, establishes an impossible dialogue with the author himself, Miguel de Unamuno. Another case of rupture of fictional logic is produced in the story entitled *Continuidad de los parques* by Julio Cortázar. In the said story, a man sitting on a green silk sofa is reading a novel in which there is a couple in love who agree on killing the husband of the woman. The male lover then stabs the victim who turns out to be the man sitting on the green silk sofa reading the novel.

In the *Rāmaiaṇa*, a Hindu epic, the protagonist, Rāma, disowns his wife, Sītā, who then finds refuge in a hermitage belonging to the sage Vālmīki. Meanwhile, she gives birth in the hermitage and Vālmīki teaches the exact story of the *Rāmaiaṇa* that he himself has composed to Sītā’s children. Thus, Vālmīki is the author of the work but comes in contact in an impossible way with the fictional characters Rāma and Sītā.

In this respect, Genette considers that the cases of fictional metalepsis would correspond to the genre of fantasy or the magical (Genette, 2006: 19-20). This concept can result in deception. The fantastic or magical genre, in conformity with the approach of the theory of possible worlds, is governed by the type III model of the world of non-verisimilar fiction, but the mechanism that is produced in the cases of rupture of fictional logic do not correspond to the type III model of the world. For this reason, it’s necessary to point out the following: although there is a certain tendency to assimilate cases of rupture of fictional logic with type III universes, fictional and non-verisimilar, one must insist that they are clearly distinct. The works in which a rupture of fictional logic is produced cannot be explained through the type III model of the world, since the said type is a characteristic of non-verisimilar fiction, though still is logical. The works that subvert fictional logic are incoherent, that is, they propose an impossible world. Moreover, impossible worlds can exist in works whose universe is governed by the type II model of the world as well as type III. The *Rāmaiaṇa* belongs to the type III model of the world, since frequently in the work there appear fictional elements that are not believable, such as armies of talking monkeys. In *Niebla* by Unamuno, or *Continuidad de los parques* by Cortázar, the stories are governed by type II models of the world.
Furthermore, the textual model proposed can help to explain the nature of the said impossible worlds. Specifically, an impossible world is produced when logical limits are transgressed that mark distinct categories of the textual model of which some of them are put in contact in an incoherent manner.

In the case of *Niebla*, the character of Augusto Pérez, existing in the world of the characters, he goes to visit the author (represented by the direction of the arrow in figure 6), and comes in contact in an impossible way with Miguel de Unamuno, who exists on the exterior of the work but who partially incorporates himself into the character’s world, converting into a fictional being.

![Figure 6: Rupture of fictional logic in *Niebla* by Miguel de Unamuno](image)

In a similar way, Vālmīki is the author of *Rāmaianā* but introduces himself in an impossible way into the world of the characters coexisting with them (figure 7).
Moreover, it would be possible to consider, on the interior of the work, an impossible identification that is produced between the primary text and the inserted text. In effect, it is said that the Rāmaiaṇa is created after Vālmīki meets Rāma and Sītā and takes her in to his hermitage, converting himself into an inserted author of an inserted text. Too, he teaches the Rāmaiaṇa to the twins Lava and Kuśa, the children of Rāma and Sītā, and asks of them to sing it in front of Rāma “in its entirety”. Logically, the twins would be able to learn and sing the Rāmaiaṇa as an inserted text but it is suggested that they learn and sing the original Rāmaiaṇa. The twins are not able to learn and sing it in its entirety, as they form a part of the entire work as characters within it.

So, an impossible identification is established between the original text and the inserted text, since the act of teaching the Rāmaiaṇa as an inserted text to the twins forms a part of the narrated history in the world of the characters but it is suggested that it is not an inserted text but the completed original work, the one the twins learn and sing. Therefore, not only the real author, Vālmīki, is introduced in an impossible way into the world of fictional characters.
of the primary text, but is also converted into the inserted author of an inserted text who tends to identify himself with the primary text. This also turns out to be impossible, as they cannot be one and the same things. The real author as much as the real Rāmaiaṇa appear in an impossible way in the fictitious universe of the work, and the real text (or primary) and the inserted text are identified as impossible. This is what is represented in figure 8, in which the lines that are shown make up the primary and the inserted text.

Figure 8: Impossible identification between the real Rāmaiaṇa created by Vālmīki as the real author and the inserted text of the Rāmaiaṇa created by Vālmīki as an inserted author

In the case of Continuidad de los parques, the reader that reads the novel situates himself in the world of the characters in the original text, and the novel he reads constitutes the inserted text (whose inserted author is no specified) and in whose world of the inserted characters are situated the lover-murderer. The lover-murderer jumps out in an impossible way to the world of the characters of the original text in order to kill the reader reading the novel (figure 9).
In order to explain these cases and similar ones, I propose to build on the theory of impossible worlds, elaborating on a complementary theory of impossible worlds which considers three types of models of the world of the impossible:

Type I model of a real-impossible world: to this type correspond the models of the world constructed in conformity to a type I model of the world, but which transgress the limits of what is possible since some textual or peritextual categories come into play (author, recipient, enunciator, addressee, world of the characters, inserted author, inserted recipient, inserted enunciator, inserted addressee and the inserted world of the characters), which logically, should be kept independent, or have the primary text identified with the inserted text.

Type II model of a verisimilar and fictional-impossible world: to this type correspond the models of the world constructed in conformity to a type II model of the world, but which transgress the limits of what is possible since some textual or peritextual categories come into play (author, recipient, enunciator, addressee, world of the characters, inserted

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author, inserted recipient, inserted enunciator, inserted addressee and the inserted world of the characters), which logically, should be kept independent, or have the primary text identified with the inserted text.

Type III model of a non-verisimilar and fictional-impossible world: to this type correspond the models of the world constructed in conformity to a type III model of the world, but which transgress the limits of what is possible since some textual or peritextual categories come in to play (author, recipient, enunciator, addressee, world of the characters, inserted author, inserted recipient, inserted enunciator, inserted addressee and the inserted world of the characters), which logically, should be kept independent, or have the primary text identified with the inserted text.

Although in the case of Niebla or the Rāmaiana clear contact is made between the author and a fictional character, there are other types of works in which there appear a similar relation, though not so direct, originating in the impossible world created which turns out less striking. It is a frequent resource that the author of the fictional work pretends in the prologue that the history he will tell was not invented by him, but that he found it written in a manuscript in an old trunk or in a bottle that was thrown into the sea. Thus, the author does not have direct contact with the fictional character but with the manuscript that was written by this character.

This type of prologue has been designated as a *denegative prologue* by Gérard Genette (2001: 157), occurring when the author denies being the authentic creator of the work and attributes his authorship to another person that has written the letter discovered in the trunk or the bottle. The purpose of this is to provide a sense of believability in the story, presenting it as something the author himself has discovered in real life.

Other times, it isn’t in the prologue (peritext) where the author pretends to have discovered the manuscript but in the body of the novel (text). This is the case in the story *From the Tidless Sea* by William Hope Hodgson, where in the first chapter the captain of a boat finds a manuscript inside a barrel which has been thrown into the sea by a man trapped in the Sargasso sea. In the second chapter is the text’s author, Hodgson, who reveals that he has found a second manuscript from the same man. In one case or the other, whether the
pretending of the author is produced in the prologue as in the body of the text, we find amongst other forms of a rupture of fictional logic, that the author himself comes in contact in an impossible way with the fictional world of the characters which he himself fictionalizes. Upon pretending that the manuscript forms a part of his own world, an impossible fusion is produced between the author and the fictional world of the character that has written the manuscript.

Something similar occurs in the first part of *Don Quijote*, in which the author, Miguel de Cervantes, comes in contact in an impossible way with the fictional universe of its characters. The case of *Don Quijote* is rather complex: in the first chapter of the work, the narrator appears telling directly the story of don Quijote: “En un lugar de la Mancha, de cuyo nombre no quiero acordarme” says a heterodiegetic narrator, “vivía un hidalgo de los de lanza en astillero...”. Thus, we encounter the narrator telling the story of don Quijote, whose world pertains to the type II model of the world, and this would be considered a normal heterodiegetic narration, as shown in figure 10.

*Figure 10: First chapter of the first part in Don Quijote*

However, in the second chapter, we are told that the story comes from the annals of La Mancha, in other words, that it wasn’t the
heterodiegetic narrator of the first chapter who originally composed it. Finally, in the eighth chapter and the beginning of the ninth, we are told that there is a first author of the story whose name is Cide Hamete Benengeli, and a second author, Cervantes himself. In the ninth chapter, the heterodiegetic narrator that appeared in the first chapter is identified as Cervantes himself, who tells us that he found the manuscript written by Cide Hamete Benengeli while at a market in Alcaná de Toledo, telling the true story of don Quijote. Thus, Cervantes reproduces in a burlesque form the structure of the chivalric romance, in which there appears a historian that tells the true story of the hero. That is, Cide Hamete Benengeli presents himself as the biographer of Don Quijote to which both belong to the same universe.

Although Cervantes does not come in direct contact with don Quijote or Cide Hamete, he indeed encounters the manuscript via Cide Hamete by which he introduces himself in an impossible way into the world of the characters, converting himself into a fictional character.

![Figure 11: Chapters 2, 8 and 9 of the first part of Don Quijote](image)

The story of don Quijote is left belonging to, as in the first chapter, the characters’ world of the original text and becomes presented as an inserted text written by Cide Hamete (figure 11). In other words, it is Cide Hamete who inhabits the world of the
characters of the original text, and who is converted into an author of an inserted text whose inserted world of the characters narrate the story of don Quijote.

Moreover, the story of don Quijote becomes a type I model of the world since it is his true history and in this way a fictional character of the work depends on Cide Hamete himself who is fictional. The work thus belongs to the type II model of the world because Cide Hamete is a believable fictional character, and although he writes a biography that is real to him (belonging to type I), though he himself is fictional, the story he tells is also fictional.

As Cervantes himself is presented as the person who finds and buys the manuscript from Cide Hamete, he is introduced in an impossible way into the fictitious world of characters subsequently producing the rupture in fictional logic.

But the version that the reader comes in contact with is not the version written by Cide Hamete, since Cervantes does not know Arabic. In other words, he cannot be the inserted recipient of the text from Cide Hamete, and hence in figure 11 his name appears in brackets to indicate that he is the purchaser of the manuscript but that he cannot read it directly. For this reason, he has to ask a Moor to translate the work (figure 12).

Figure 12: The Moor translates the text from Cide Hamete for Cervantes

Thus, the Moor is the inserted recipient of the work from Cide Hamete and is converted afterwards into a new inserted author of the translated story by don Quijote. Cervantes then becomes the inserted recipient of the translation by the Moor. On the other hand, the Moor does not limit himself in reproducing literally what Cide Hamete says but comments on or remakes the work.  

But the matter complicates itself even further since what is finally presented to the readers is not the translation completed by the Moor (Albaladejo, 2008: 67-82), but a newly created text completed by a second author, in other words, by Cervantes himself. In effect, the definitive text that we the readers read, this second author does not reproduce literally the translation of the Moor, but only creates commentary about the translation itself.

Therefore, the definitive text that is presented to the author is not the text by Cide Hamete nor by the Moor, but of Cervantes himself, who remade the writing basing it on the Moor’s translation. Cervantes then becomes converted into an inserted author who writes the definitive version of the work. That is no obstacle to consider that a good part of Cervantes’ version is a literal reproduction of the Moor’s translation, but, in whichever case, Cervantes remakes the translation at least in some aspects, converting himself into the definitive narrator of the story. We thus receive the definitive configuration of the text presented to the readers (figure 13).

10 Chapter 18 of the second part he decides not to translate and ignores it, for appearing too prolix, the description that Cide Hamete was completing at don Diego’s house; chapter 24, he refers to the annotations written in the margins (in other words, the peritext) by Cide Hamete Benengeli, and in chapter 27 of the same part, the translator ridicules Cide Hamete for being a moor but swearing like a catholic Christian.

11 For example, the second author, Cervantes, tells us that the translator reproduced the annotations in the margin by Cide Hamete: “Dice el que tradujo esta grande historia del original, de la que escribió su primer autor Cide Hamete Benengeli, que, llegando al capítulo de la aventura de la cueva de Montesinos, en el margen del estaban escritas, de mano del mismo Hamete, estas mismas razones: «No me puedo dar a entender, ni me puedo persuadir, que al valeroso don Quijote le pasase puntualmente todo lo que en el antecedente capítulo queda escrito [...])”.

In whichever case, one must keep in mind that there are two inserted texts more than implicitly believed: the text written by Cide Hamete and the Moor’s translation, on which Cervantes bases his writing of a definitive version of the work presented to the reader.

In conclusion, given that Cervantes is introduced into the fictitious world of don Quijote, of Cide Hamete and of the Moor, converting himself into a fictional character, we can believe that *Don Quijote*, considered as a whole, does not belong to the type II model of verisimilar fiction, but to the type II model of a verisimilar and fictional-impossible world.

There are other forms of ruptures of fictional logic that occur in literary practice, not only within the field of narration, but also in theatre. We’ve already seen, in the story of *Continuidad de los parques* by Cortázar, a character in the inserted world of characters jumps out in an impossible way into the world of characters of the original text. Something similar occurs in the dramatic work *Six Characters in Search of an Author*, by Luigi Pirandello. In this work there coexist two distinct universes: the universe of the actors who rehearse *Il giuoco delle parti*, belonging to the world of the characters in the original text, and the universe of six characters in search of the author, who belong to the inserted world of characters. In effect, the

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characters in search of the author are fictional with respect to the universe in which the actors are situated, which we can then suppose the creation of the inserted text, of the dramatic type, to be on the part of the inserted author, and precisely it is him who has disappeared, as represented in figure 14.

The author who has disappeared from this dramatic text would become a part, as the actors who rehearse *Il giuoco delle parti*, of the world of characters of the original text. In this said world the characters jump out from the inserted drama in search of the author who in figure 14 is placed in brackets to indicate his disappearance. The good judgment on the part of Pirandello consists of suppressing the fictional author-character which should have written the inserted text, creating a double transgression: on one hand, a text is created that does not have an author which in and of itself would be impossible anyways; on the other hand, the characters of the inserted text depart and enter the universe of the original text. The actors who are rehearsing *Il giuoco delle parti* as much as the six characters in search of the author are fictional believable types, resulting in the work being governed by the type II model of a verisimilar and fictional-impossible world.
The impossible worlds can also affect the poles of reception. For example, in some dramatic works, the fictional characters address the audience members creating a different type of rupture in fictional logic, since the theatrical characters and the audience belong to distinct universes. These are called “asides” in which a theatrical character stops talking to the rest of the characters and turns to the audience. And as they constitute a theatre convention assumed by tradition, it is not usually perceived clearly to be a rupture in fictional logic by the following creation of an impossible world. These “asides” are favorable by the fact that the actors and the audience members are present in the same physical space, which appears to facilitate a character belonging to a fictional world to interact momentarily with the spectators of the real world.

Derived from theatre, this also occurs in cinema where the actors on screen and the viewers also share the same physical space, which allows the actors to interact with the viewers. For example, in the movie Annie Hall by Woody Allen, the characters directly turn to the camera to “speak” in an impossible way with the viewers. This occurrence is less employed in the novel because the narrative characters and the readers are unable to share the same physical space.

Figure 15: “Asides” in theatre.
In this respect, it would be necessary to clarify, in reality, and as represented in figure 15, that theatre characters do not interact with real individuals from the public as much as the addressees in the work. In other words, the character interacts with an intratextual addressee, rather than specific individuals, who can change with each showing. In fact, in such cases dialogue is not produced between the actor and the audience members, but a one-way message given by the actor to the addressee without any response expected in return.

Therefore, characters in a drama or film who speak to an audience member or viewer in reality cannot interact with the public but only with the intratextual addressee of the work. What happens is that the audience or viewers identify themselves in each representation as the intratextual addressee.

Another imaginable case would be a theatrical presentation (and this would be impossible in a reading of a dramatic work or in a film) where the actor interacts with specific audience members and enters dialogue with them as if they were real people, improvising his speech conforming to what the spectators are saying to him. In this moment, something distinct would be produced with what occurs with typical theatrical “asides”, since they would be transgressing into another level of fiction: the actor would not be interacting anymore with the intratextual addressee but with the extratextual recipients.

The examples commented on constitute frequent cases of rupture in fictional logic. But the proposed textual model allows us, moreover, to imagine other forms of rupture in fictional logic that are not as frequent and which may not have even occurred. The theory of literature does not only analyze existing literary cases, but has a projective side related to the cases that might take place in the future, and the proposed model allows us to imagine other possibilities that might occur.

For example, we can imagine parallel cases in those most commonly occurring but in inserted text. Thus, in the same manner as Unamuno introduces himself in an impossible way into the world of characters of the original text, we could imagine an inserted author introducing himself in a parallel form in the inserted world of characters, as is represented in figure 16.
It is what would have occurred if Unamuno had created Augusto Pérez; if Augusto Pérez would have written a fictional novel, converting himself into an inserted author, and if Augusto Pérez were to put himself in contact in an impossible way with the fictional characters of his novel.

And in the same way that theatre characters can have their “asides” and interact with the addressee, just as well as characters of an inserted text being able have their “asides” and interact with the inserted addressee or even with the addressee of the original text (figure 17).
To summarize, in figure 18 all the discussed possibilities of rupture in fictional logic are outlined.

Figure 18: Impossible worlds.

A rupture can be produced in fictional logic when the author comes in contact in an impossible way with the world of the characters (as it occurs in Niebla, Rāmaiaņa and Don Quijote); or, in the cases which the inserted author comes in contact in an impossible way with the inserted world of characters; when the characters in the world of the characters interact in an impossible way with the addressee (theatre “asides,” Annie Hall); or when the characters of the inserted world of characters interact in an impossible way with the addressee or the inserted addressee. A rupture can also occur when the characters of the inserted world of characters come in contact in an impossible way with the world of the characters of the original text (Continuidad de los parques, Six Characters in Search of an Author), or when the original text and the inserted text are identified in an impossible way (Rāmaiaņa).

CONCLUSION

The textual model proposed, which integrates the basic categories of the world of the author and of the world of the characters, and which considers the possibility to include inserted texts in the world of the characters from the original text, allows us to explain the generic nature of whichever literary text, existing or imaginable. The said model also serves to explain the relations between literary genres and fiction, showing that there are fictional and non-fictional genres. On the other hand, the enlargement of the theory of possible worlds with a complementary theory of impossible worlds can explain in a precise manner the cases of rupture in fictional logic (fictional metalepsis). The theory of impossible worlds considers all possibilities of rupture in fictional logic, and the textual model proposed results in the usefulness in explaining and representing graphically the distinct possibilities of metalepsis that are produced in narrative, dramatic and cinematographic works.

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