RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 The effects of decision timing for pricing and marketing efforts in a supply chain with competing manufacturers
A1 Karray, Salma
A1 Martin-Herran, Guiomar
AB This paper investigates the impact of decision timing for pricing and marketing efforts in a supply chain led by competing manufacturers. We develop and solve six games to consider the scenarios (games) where prices and marketing efforts (ME) are decided simultaneously, and when they are not (i.e., ME is set either before or after prices). We examine these three scenarios for the benchmark case of a bilateral monopolistic channel, then extend the analysis to a supply chain with competing manufacturers. We identify the optimal decision timing by comparing equilibrium profits and strategies across games in each supply chain set-up. We find that a monopolistic manufacturer always prefers that prices and ME be decided simultaneously. However, this result does not hold when product competition is taken into account. The optimal decision timing for competing manufacturers depends on the retailer’s and manufacturers’ ME effectiveness levels as well as on competition intensity. Specifically, when ME are not very effective, a simultaneous decision scenario is preferred because it provides the advantage of higher profit margins or sales. However, for highly effective ME, manufacturers prefer to decouple ME and pricingdecisions. The retailer’s optimal scenario is either to make all decisions simultaneously or to choose prices prior to ME. This means that supply chain firms can face conflict due to the decision timing for prices and ME.
SN 0969-6016
YR 2024
FD 2024
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/61893
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/61893
LA spa
NO International Transactions in Operational Research 2024, 31, 568-615,
DS UVaDOC
RD 21-may-2024