La victoria de la caja vacía en las elecciones locales de la ciudad de Makassar, en el sur de Sulawesi Indonesia en 2018

Democracy without Contestation: The Victory of the Empty Box in the Local Election of Makassar City, South Sulawesi Indonesia in 2018

Resumen: Este estudio tiene como objetivo explorar cómo la dinámica política en las elecciones locales de la ciudad de Makassar en 2018. En particular, este estudio reconoció las causas de la victoria de la caja vacía y analizar el papel de los partidos políticos y los titulares en el proceso de candidatura y elección. En esta investigación se utilizaron métodos de investigación cualitativa. Se realizó documentación para obtener datos relacionados con las redes de actores en la elección local, adquisición de votos, normativa electoral y así como el apoyo de partidos políticos en la elección local, que se obtiene de libros, revistas y noticias en los medios de comunicación. Además, se llevó a cabo el FGD a partir de las partes interesadas que invitaron a académicos, estudiantes y activistas de ONG a obtener datos e interpretaciones de los datos recopilados. El análisis descriptivo cualitativo se realizó interpretando los datos recolectados, verificando y generalizando los datos para concluir esta investigación. Esta investigación reveló que la casilla vacía en las elecciones locales de la ciudad

Abstract: This study aims to explore how the political dynamics in the local election of Makassar City in 2018. In particular, this study reconnoitered the causes of the victory of empty box and analyze the role of political parties and incumbents in the candidacy process and election. Qualitative research methods were used in this research. Documentation was carried out to obtain data related to actor networks in the local election, vote acquisition, election regulations and as well as political party support in the local election, which is obtained from books, journals and news in the mass media. In addition, FGD was carried out from stakeholders inviting academics, students and NGO activists to obtain data and interpretations of the collected data. Qualitative descriptive analysis was carried out by interpreting the collected data, verifying and generalizing the data to conclude this research. This research revealed that the empty box in the local election of Makassar City is actually not an empty box, nonetheless it is the representation of the incumbent who was disqualified from the local elections. Most of the political parties supported the sole candidate formally. It was found that
de Makassar en realidad no es una casilla vacía, sin embargo, es la representación del titular que fue descalificado de las elecciones locales. La mayoría de los partidos políticos apoyaron formalmente al candidato único. Se encontró que existía una diferencia entre la política de los partidos a nivel local y las políticas de los partidos a nivel nacional. Además, se encontró que la toma de decisiones del partido estaba centralizada.

Palabras Clave: Democracia, Elección local, Titular, caja vacía, Partido político.

1. INTRODUCTION

A sole candidate always wins against the empty box in the local Election in Indonesia. It happened in 11 regions in the local elections of 2018. However, the case of the local Election of Makassar City is unique because it was the only sole candidate that lost against an empty box. The phenomenon of the local Election in Makassar City showed the failure of democracy in two ways, first; the absence of contestation in elections which is an essential principle in democracy. Second; the failure of the Election as a tool of democracy to choose the best candidate since there was no candidate to be elected as a Major. Therefore, the case of the local Election of Makassar City is interesting to be analysed, both from the perspective of democracy, political parties' roles, and the candidates.

The local Election is a manifestation of democracy so that government leaders are following the wishes of the people. The Local Elections are held directly and democratically. According to Ranney (Ranney, 1996) there are eight characteristics of democratic elections, namely: regular elections, meaningful choices, freedom to put forth candidates, freedom to know and discuss the choices, universal adult suffrage, equal weighting of votes, free registration to choice and accurate counting of choices and reporting of result. The availability of a significant choice indicates a choice to the public so that voters can determine the best choice. Substantively, there are values and principles in elections which are free, open, honest, fair, competitive, directly, generally, free and confidential principles.

Meanwhile, according to Dahl (Dahl, 1971), three things in a democracy must be owned so that the government is responsive to its people, namely competition, participation and freedom. These three
arguments showed that competition is an essential aspect in elections and democracy because, with the competition, the voters could choose the best candidates. According to him, the higher the degree of competition, the better democracy. He added that in order to bring up better contestation and participation, Dahl mentioned eight elements that must be ensured by the government. These are freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Dahl, 1971).

It is in line with Huntington (Huntington, 1991), who stated that democracy could serve as a system of leader selection conducted by the people through competitive elections. As a selection system, there are not only one candidate should be selected in the competitive election, so voters have many alternatives to choose. The selection was carried out by political parties, either by using open or closed selection.

In every election, political parties usually as contestants or as a political party supporting the candidate pair. They usually do coalition with other political parties in gaining public support and winning votes. In the local elections, political parties or the coalition of them have at least 20 per cent of the seats of the local representatives to support the candidate pair. Thus, there are usually at least two candidates’ pairs or a maximum of 4 candidate pairs supported by a coalition of political parties. Besides, there are opportunities for pairs candidate pairs to register as an independent or non-party candidate. The existence of two pairs or more candidate make the election more competitive to find the best candidate.

However, in many cases, there is only a sole candidate pair as well as happened in Makassar City. In Makassar City, 11 political parties get seats in the local representatives (DPRD), and ten of them supported the pair of the candidate Munafri Arifuddin and Andi Rahmatika Dewi (Appi-Cicu) the rivalry of the incumbent. It is an unusual phenomenon when the incumbent does not get the support of political parties. Only the Democratic Party supported the incumbent, but this party got less than 20% in the previous election in DPRD. So, the Democratic Party supported the incumbent, namely Mohammad Ramdhan Pomanto and Indira Mulyasari (DIAmi) to register as an independent or non-party candidate. However, the pair candidate of Mohammad Ramdhan
Pomanto-Indira Mulyasari (DIAmi) disqualified by the KPU, so there was only one pair of candidates.

In this wake, this study aims to explore the political dynamics in the local election of Makassar City in 2018. Further, it has analysed, how did the empty box win in the election of Makassar City? This study has provided analysis from the perspectives of both candidates, political parties and their supporters in the local election. The structure of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the Literature Review solely on political party and democracy. The description of the methods is given in Section 3. The results and discussions are done in Section 4 & 5. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 5.

1.1. Political Party and Democracy

Democracy is a system selection of leaders by the citizens through a competitive election (Huntington, 1991). Commonly, democracy is known as the government from the people, for the people, and by the people (Lijphart, 2012). However, many interests exist in society, so the question is who has the right to govern. In other words, who has the right to represent those interests? In order to answer the question above, Lijphart (Lijphart, 2012) explained two models of democracy. First, democracy by the voice of the majority. In this model, Lijphart believes that the majority vote is better than minority which is represent a small group of people. While the second is consensus democracy. In this model of democracy, the public allowed the majority to take power, but they cannot handle the power exclusively. The second model of democracy characterized by inclusiveness, which the loser can bargain and compromise with the winner. Lijphart added, when the majority excludes the minority from public policymaking, it is undemocratic because the system excluded a part of people.

On the other hand, Dahl (Dahl, 1971) argued a different way to describe democracy. He said that the democratic system is a government which is responsive to all citizen preferences. In order to achieve the goal, Dahl explained the two requirements, contestation and participation. He said the higher degree of the two conditions implies to the higher level of democracy. He stated the highest level of democracy as Polyarchy. Furthermore, in order to bring up competitiveness and participation, Dahl mentioned eight elements. These are freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, have the right to vote,
have the eligibility for public office, have the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

In a democratic system, a political party has seven functions: 1) candidate nominations, 2) electoral mobilization, 3) issue structuring, 4) societal representation, 5) interest aggregation, 6) forming and sustaining government, 7) social integration. From those functions, Hazan saw that nomination/selection of the candidate is the primary function of a political party. He said that candidate nomination illustrating the character, demography, geography, and ideology of the political party. For Hazan, functions of a political party in nominating candidate can show a more profound character of a political party than his structure or a political manifesto.

A candidate's nomination is the primary key in a competitive democracy. Candidate selection is an essential element in the free elections to realize its ideals with people's approval. There are five models of candidate selection between two continuums, inclusive and exclusive. The five models of candidate selections are the selection by voters, selection by a member of the party, selection by delegations of the party, selection by elite party, and selection by the party leader (Reuven Y Hazan, 2010).

The candidate selection process, as mentioned above, depends on the party capability to recruit. At least, there are many types of political recruitment based on its mechanism. Almond and Powell (Gabriel Almond, 1966) divided recruitment into two types: first, closed mechanism, it is a kind of recruitment for a specific person such friend, people with religious similarities, area, ethnic and family. In comparison, open recruitment type was run openly for the citizen who meets the criteria.

Further, Geddes (Geddes, 1966) differs by presenting four models of recruitment. First, partisanship, it is political recruitment which considering the loyalty of cadre. This type is less considering of cadre competency. Second, meritocratic, its recruitment model based on competency such entrepreneur, technocrat, scholar and expert. Third, compartmentalization, it is a model of recruitment based on pragmatic consideration, may be based on meritocracy or another appointment in order to obtain short term support or improving loyal member. Fourth, survival, it is political recruitment to recompense postulant; this model
tends to use patronage. The four models of political recruitment, according to Barbara Geddes are based more on the character of the candidate who recruited by the party.

The function of a political party to selecting a candidate is intended for them to be able to compete with the other party candidate. In the selection candidate process, political party determine their candidate with the highest electability and popularity to gain public support. This phase is a necessary process that will determine the party performance in the election, and it will affect further in party performance in the government and representative institutions. Political parties are the main actors who should determine in the candidate selection process. Party should select the candidate following party policy lines. So, the candidates chosen by parties have strong ties with political parties and act according to party policy lines.

Nevertheless, in the process of political recruitment, a political party is not the only factor because there are legal and party variables as well (Peter M. Siavelis, 2008). The legal variable consists of the electoral system, geographical organization, and the strength of the legislative body. At the same time, the political party variable consists of the characters of centralization, inclusiveness, party organization and party finance. The criteria for political party variables contain confusion by distinguishing party organization and party finance because party finance is part of the strength of party organization. The party variables concept proposed by Siavelis and Morgenstern is more focused on the process of selecting candidates, whether centralized /decentralized, whether inclusive or exclusive, how candidate’s selection mechanism, and who controls party finances, especially in campaign funding.

Internal variables are party variables consisting of inclusiveness, centralization/decentralization (Peter M. Siavelis, 2008), party organization and party finance. However, there are no standard criteria for analysing party organizations. Party finance is part of party organization, so party variables include inclusiveness, decentralization/centralization and party organization. Meanwhile, according to Susan Scarrow (Scarrow, 2005), the primary dimension of party organization in political recruitment is internal party democracy which includes inclusiveness, decentralization/centralization and party institutionalization. Internal party democracy is as the structure and process of decision making in political parties that make it possible for
individual citizens to influence the various choices that parties offer to their voters.

Inclusiveness is related to the capability of a political party in order to open the decision-making process. Is the decision making decided by one leader, a group of people, or by involving party members and the community? Centralization or decentralization related to party organizational structure in decision making, whether centralized or decentralized. In this study, inclusiveness and decentralization or centralization are related to political recruitment mechanisms which were executed by political parties. So, the internal democratic variables of political parties in this study are organizational variables parties which include mechanism for political recruitment and institutionalization of political parties.

Elitism in decision making in political parties is a common phenomenon in bureaucratic organizations, as a party oligarchy. An oligarchy is a form of government in which political power is in the hands of a small group of minorities (Winters, 2011). According to Mitchels, the law of iron oligarchy is inherent in every organization. The organization raises the domination from the elected to people, domination from the mandated to the mandate, because talking about organizational means talking Oligarchy. Michael stated that the emerge of the iron law of Oligarchy because of the low political capacity of the masses, inexperienced, uneducated, apathetic and inferior.

Decentralization was an opportunity for local elites and oligarchs to obtain and maintain their political and economic power through procedural democratic mechanisms. Nevertheless, local political dynamics are also influenced by political dynamics at the national level (Richard Robison, 2004). Local politics reflects national politics. Local politics (Richard Robison, 2004) is also a manifestation of efforts to maintain power from old actors and bring about local oligarchies. The winners in the regional elections were old actors associated with the New Order authorities (Richard Robison, 2004).

In the perspective of an oligarchic democracy, a shift in large political power in the region ultimately allows old political actors, who collaborate with local capitalists to control local economic and political resources. Despite the institutional format and procedures for democracy was changed, these actors succeed occupying their cronies and families in strategic positions to ensure that the allocation of resources was under the direction, interests and grasp of local strongmen (Zuhro, 2009).
The concept of Oligarchy is different with elite theory as proposed by Pareto and Mosca and the Oligarchy proposed by Michels in his iron law of Oligarchy. The Oligarchy referred to Robison and Hadiz is in line with the concept of Oligarchy proposed by Winters (Winters, 2011). The central aspect in the concept of Oligarchy is the effort to maintain material power, both with and without a political office. Oligarchy refers to politics to maintain wealth by actors who have material wealth. ‘Oligarchy refers to the politics of wealth defence by materially endowed actors. While oligarchs are actors who try to maintain their material power, oligarchs are actors who dominate and control the concentration of material resources to maintain or enhance their wealth and privileged social position (Winters, 2011).

From the argument above, oligarchs differ from elites. Elites are not necessarily oligarchs, but oligarchs are usually elite, namely the economic elite. In the concept of elite theory, oligarchs are among the deciding elites that influence the ruling elite. In this context, dynastic politics can be seen from two aspects, namely as a political elite who occupies political positions in the region. While the second one is an oligarch who is obtaining such political office is an effort to maintain or obtain material wealth. There are two efforts to defend wealth from oligarchs, namely property and income defence (Winters, 2011).

The existence of this oligarch is related to the tendency for political cartels. The political cartel arose because of the party's financial dependence on the state due to the decline in the party's ability to mobilize membership fees. The party's financial problems have made the party more pragmatic. In nominating candidates, they tend to support candidates with high electability or candidates with the highest dowry.

The concept of Political Cartel initially introduced by Katz and Mair (Richard S. Katz, 1994). The political parties turned into cartels because they lost their characteristics. The loss of character also causes a loss of boundary between the winning party and the opposition. Political cartels often generalize that all parties have the same essence and have the same access to government (Richard S. Katz, 1994). Therefore, the cartel party has an interest for themselves only. At least, they want to make politics as a profession for cadres, not in the context of fighting for the public interest (Richard S. Katz, 1994).

The loss of party character and to be more pragmatic aim makes less competition among them. They arranged and agreed upon the competitions. So even though there is competition, but in the end, they
will share the results (Richard S. Katz, 1994). There are a few political cartel characters, suppose based on party work and campaign forms. Political cartels require considerable capital to carry out exclusive campaigns. Therefore, party performance is highly dependent on resources, privileges or other incentives given by the state.

Meanwhile, concerning the relationship between members and leaders, the political cartel loses clear boundaries between party members and non-party members. In the absence of clear boundaries, political parties often invite all parties to participate in party decision-making activities and processes. Unclear party membership also had an impact on the candidate selection process. Often candidates are no longer selected through congressional deliberations but through direct appointment to person who has connections with the central board. Consequently, all political party matters are in the hands of the national level. Political party official in the local level has to approve candidates who must be elected or following the national political party policies (Richard S. Katz, 1994). In the end, an increasingly centralized party system and low competition made the party only a tool for party leaders to occupy the government office. Party votes are valued as a result, not as a source of policy formulation.

2. MATERIAL AND METHODS

This study has used qualitative research, with documentation data collection techniques. Apart from that, focus group discussion with the relevant stakeholders were also conducted. Documentation is carried out to obtain data related to actor networks in the local election, vote acquisition, election regulations as well as political party support in the local election, which is obtained from books, journals and news in the mass media. The focus group discussion was carried out by inviting academics who were concerned with related issues, students and NGO activists to obtain data and interpretations of the collected data. Qualitative descriptive analysis is carried out by interpreting the collected data, verifying and generalizing the data to conclude this research.

3. RESULTS

Local Election of Makassar City in 2018 was different from the previous election. In 2013, the election was very pluralistic because there were ten pairs of the candidate. Danny Pomanto-Syamsu Rizal is one pair of them supported by two Political parties, the Democratic Party and the
Crescent Star Party. He got the most support of 182,484 voters or 31.18 per cent (Ramdhan, 2013) and become a major after beating nine other pairs of candidates.

The local election of Makassar City in 2018 only attend by one incumbent candidate, Ramadhan Pomanto (Danny). It is a common phenomenon in the local elections in Indonesia, where strong incumbents tend to be sole candidates and get majority support of political parties. There are 11 sole candidates in the local elections throughout Indonesia in 2018. However, in the development of political dynamics in Makassar, appear a challenger candidate, Munafri Arifuddin (Appi), so that the incumbent gained political rivalry in this election. After the emergence of Appi, the political constellation in the local election of Makassar City underwent significant changes. If in other areas, incumbents usually get the support of the majority of political parties because they have high electability but in the local election of Makassar City the incumbent registers as an independent candidate or non-party candidate. The political parties that are supporting Danny in the previous elections, namely the Democratic Party and the Crescent Star Party did not meet 20% to nominate Danny. While other parties, although there has been communication between the leaders of the local party to him, there is no clarity and certainty to support him to be a candidate.

Therefore, Danny decided to register from the path of an independent candidate. The pair Danny Pomanto-Indira Mulyasari Paramastuti (DiAmi) was only supported by the Democratic Party which only won 7 seats in the DPRD (15%). The terms of support for carrying a pair of a candidate in the elections are at least 20%. While the challenger, the Munafri Arifuddin-Rahmatika Dewi (Appi-Cicu) gained the support of almost all political parties in the Makassar City. Appi-Cicu supported by ten political parties, namely the Golkar Party, National Democratic Party, PDIP, Gerindra Party, PPP, Hanura Party, PKS, PAN, PKPI, PBB (Alfian, 2018). Appi-Cicu received 43 seats (84%) support of the Local representative's Body of Makassar City. So Appi-Cicu has a big chance to be the winner of the local election of the Makassar City.

With the presence of two pairs of Major candidates of Makassar in 2018, political dynamics were getting hotter because Danny Pomanto has disqualified. The disqualification was inseparable from the report made by the Appi-Cicu Team regarding Danny's policy as Mayor before the election, with the case of distributing 5,971 mobile phones to RT / RW, the appointment of contract workers and the use of 2x +Better Tagline
Danny's policy violates Law No. 10 of 2016 concerning the second amendment to Law Number 1 of 2015 concerning the stipulation of government regulations in place of Law Number 1 of 2014 concerning the election of governors, regents and mayors to become Laws. At first, after he registered from an independent channel, Danny was briefly examined at the South Sulawesi Regional Police Headquarters for two corruption cases, namely the SME corruption case and the procurement of ketapang trees.

Based on these two cases, Appi-Cicu then sued the Makassar City KPU to the Makassar City Panwaslu. Appi-Cicu accused the Makassar City KPU of making the wrong decision of passing Danny Pomanto. Appi-Cicu accused Danny of misusing his position as Mayor of Makassar in the previous period. In this case, Panwaslu Makassar City rejected the Appi-Cicu suit.

However, Appi-Cicu also filed a similar lawsuit to PTUN Makassar. The Makassar PTUN Judge Council then decided to cancel the nomination of the Danny-Indira pair. Upon the decision, the Makassar City KPU sent an appeal to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court also rejected it. Hence, the Makassar City KPU had to disqualify Danny-Indira (DiAmi). Danny-Indira had time to fight by bringing a lawsuit against the Local Election Commissionaire Body (KPU) of Makassar City to Panwaslu. Danny-Indira sued the KPU's decision regarding the sole candidate. Danny-Indira won the suit. However, the KPU of Makassar City insisted on holding the local election with one pair of the candidate (Sholih, 2018)

Because Danny-Indira has disqualified, there was only one pair of the candidate. The Singular Candidates in the local election of Makassar City come from the most influential business and political clans in South Sulawesi. Munafri Arifuddin (Appi) had the family relationship with Aksa Mahmud and Jusuf Ka. Appi is the son-in-law of Aksa Mahmud. Meanwhile, Aksa Mahmud was known as Deputy Chair of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) of 2004-2009 Period is a brother-in-law of Jusuf Kalla, the Vice President for the period 2004-2009 and 2014-2019. Aksa Mahmud also holds the owner of Bosowa Corporation. In Makassar City, Bosowa has several business units, ranging from mining, transportation, cooperatives, and universities. Jusuf Kalla is also known as the owner of Kalla Group, the largest business group in Eastern Indonesia which has its headquarters in the city of Makassar. Kalla
Group's businesses cover the fields of automotive, mining, energy, roads and malls (Eko Rusdianto, 2018).

On the other hand, Appi's partner Andi Rachmatika Dewi (Cicu) is the daughter of Nurhayati Sirajuddin. Nurhayati Sirajuddin is the older sister of Ilham Arif Sirajuddin who incidentally was the Mayor of Makassar for two periods from 2004-2014. Cicu is a political student of Ilham Sirajuddin who will continue the political clan. Cicu's previous role was as a member of the South Sulawesi Provincial Parliament from the Democratic National Party. In the previous period, Cicu was also a member of the Makassar City DPRD from the Golkar Party. Cicu is also the Bone Nobleman's family, Andi Ikbal (Eko Rusdianto, 2018). As such, the Appi-Cicu is a robust political clan partner in Makassar.

As the sole candidate, Appi-Cicu who fighting against the empty box had a big chance to win, considering that 84% of political parties in the DPRD supported him. However, unlike the sole candidates in other regions who always win in the elections, the sole candidate in the Local election of Makassar City lost against the empty box. The Empty Box received 300,795 votes (53%), while the sole candidate, Appi-Cicu only got 264,245 votes (47%) (Eko Rusdianto, 2018). At the same time, the level of community participation in the Makassar City Election was only 57.02 per cent. In other words, only 584,406 people used their voting rights, out of the total Permanent Voter List (DPT) of 1.01 million. This figure is down when compared to the Makassar City Election in 2013, where the participation rate reached 59.9 per cent (Herlina, 2018).

Munafri Arifuddin (Appi) even lost at the polling station where he voted. At TPS 03 SD Mangkura 1, Sarewigading Village, Ujungpandang District, Makassar, Appi-Cicu only got 43 votes. At the same time, the empty box received 91 votes and five invalid ballots. The total votes at TPS Appi were 139 votes (Eka Hakim, 2018). The table mentioned below presents the results of the 2018 Local election of Makassar City in each district:
Table 1. Distribution of votes in the local election of Makassar city 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Subdistrict</th>
<th>Votes for Appi-Cicu</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Votes for Empty Box</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Biringkanayya</td>
<td>36,092</td>
<td>47.86</td>
<td>39,320</td>
<td>52.14</td>
<td>75,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sangkarrang</td>
<td>3,261</td>
<td>47.22</td>
<td>3,645</td>
<td>52.78</td>
<td>6,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Manggala</td>
<td>30,384</td>
<td>52.37</td>
<td>27,631</td>
<td>47.63</td>
<td>58,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mamajang</td>
<td>10,886</td>
<td>44.81</td>
<td>13,407</td>
<td>55.19</td>
<td>24,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Makassar</td>
<td>13,654</td>
<td>39.31</td>
<td>21,081</td>
<td>60.69</td>
<td>34,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mariso</td>
<td>11,566</td>
<td>47.38</td>
<td>12,845</td>
<td>52.62</td>
<td>24,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tallo</td>
<td>26,297</td>
<td>47.45</td>
<td>29,122</td>
<td>52.55</td>
<td>55,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Panakkukang</td>
<td>25,069</td>
<td>44.63</td>
<td>31,108</td>
<td>55.37</td>
<td>56,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rappocini</td>
<td>29,844</td>
<td>47.90</td>
<td>32,460</td>
<td>52.10</td>
<td>62,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Tamalanrea</td>
<td>16,738</td>
<td>43.99</td>
<td>21,312</td>
<td>56.01</td>
<td>38,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ujung Pandang</td>
<td>3,822</td>
<td>34.31</td>
<td>7,319</td>
<td>65.69</td>
<td>11,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Tamalate</td>
<td>33,817</td>
<td>50.20</td>
<td>33,541</td>
<td>49.80</td>
<td>67,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ujung Tanah</td>
<td>7,362</td>
<td>46.95</td>
<td>8,317</td>
<td>53.05</td>
<td>15,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Wajo</td>
<td>4,695</td>
<td>37.12</td>
<td>7,954</td>
<td>62.88</td>
<td>12,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Bontoala</td>
<td>10,584</td>
<td>47.06</td>
<td>11,907</td>
<td>52.94</td>
<td>22,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>264,071</td>
<td>46.73</td>
<td>300,969</td>
<td>53.27</td>
<td>565,040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data analysis

Based on the table above, Appi-Cicu only won in 2 of 15 subdistricts, namely Manggala and Tamalate. In contrast, 13 subdistricts won by the Empty Box. Even in Ujung Pandang, the Subdistrict of Appi, he gets the lowest vote than other Subdistricts, which is only 34.31%. It is ironic because a sole candidate has the support of the majority of political parties. The phenomenon of winning this empty box raises several questions. How exactly does political party support, and how does the party machine work in the elections?

4. DISCUSSION

4.1 Political Party Oligarchy and Pragmatism

The direct local election is a manifestation of the implementation of local autonomy. The argument is that the leadership at the local level is in line with the aspirations of the local community. However, the purpose of this direct local election is not in line with the mechanism of political parties. Decision making in the local elections is not in the hands of the
leadership of political parties at the local level. However, there is at the leadership of political parties at the national level. It caused the gap between party decisions at the national level and the will of the people at the local level. Whereas in its function, political parties must articulate, and aggregate people interests. This phenomenon is what happened in the local election of Makassar City 2018.

From the perspective of party support, politically, the Appi-Cicu could win the election. In reality, it lost with the empty boxes. the strength of support from each political party to Appi-Cicu is tracked in the following table.

Table 2. Political parties support to Appi-Cicu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Support to Appi-Cicu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Golkar Party</td>
<td>Strong support from the Golkar Party because Appi comes from the Golkar family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>National Democratic Party (Nasdem)</td>
<td>Strong support from the Nasdem Party because Cicu came from the Nasdem Party. However, Danny's partner, Indira, also came from the Nasdem Party, so there was an opportunity to erode the votes of Nasdem's constituents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Gerindra Party</td>
<td>National's recommendation supported Appi-Cicu, but Initially The local party supported DiAmi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>United Development Party</td>
<td>National's recommendation supported Appi-Cicu, but Initially The local party supported DiAmi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Hanura Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)</td>
<td>National's recommendation supported Appi-Cicu, but Initially The local party supported DiAmi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>National Mandate Party (PAN)</td>
<td>National's recommendation supported Appi-Cicu, but Initially The local party supported DiAmi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP)</td>
<td>National's recommendation supported Appi-Cicu, but Initially The local party supported DiAmi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>PKPI</td>
<td>National's recommendation supported Appi-Cicu, but Initially The local party supported DiAmi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Crescent Star Party (PBB)</td>
<td>National's recommendation supported Appi-Cicu, but Initially The local party supported DiAmi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data analysis
The table above showed the map of political party support for the Appi-Cicu pair. Even though there were ten supporting parties, there were only two parties that initially supported this candidature, namely the Golkar Party and National Democratic Party/Nasdem (26% of the seats in the local representative's body). While other parties, party leaders at the local level supported DiAmi, but party decisions at the national level supported Appi-Cicu. As stated by Danny (Linksulses, 2018)

"The seven supporting parties are Democrats, PDI-P, Gerindra, PKS, PPP, PAN, and PKPi. All party leaders in South Sulawesi and Makassar supported me, but there was no recommendation from the national level. There is a party rob at the national level. What are their power party leaders here."

The official party support given to Appi was not trustworthy and thus considered porous, because the party at the local level supported Diami. There were some notes regarding the lack of reliable party support for Appi-Cicu. First; PKS, which was one of the parties supporting the Appi-Cicu, at the cadre level is a supporter of DiAmi. It is evident from the existence of PKS cadres' rejection of DPP support to Appi-Cicu and signed a motion of no confidence in the Chairperson of the South Sulawesi Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) official. There were two reasons for PKS cadres' rejection of their party's support for Appi-Cicu, namely that the PKS official at the National level not concerned with local interests. Also, from the opinion of the PKS local official in Makassar City, 11 of the 15 DPCs (67%) supported DiAmi, not Appi-Cicu. From the three pairs of candidates who appeared before registration to the Local General Election Commission (KPUD), local party Official of PKS support to DiAmi, after that to the pair Iqbal Djalil, and finally Appi-Cicu. So, from the perspective of PKS, support for Appi-Cicu is the last support. Thus, PKS support for Appi-Cicu is only formal legal support and support from party elites, not a reflection of PKS constituent support.

Second; The National Mandate Party (PAN) also officially supported the Appi-Cicu pair. However, PAN also did not wholeheartedly invite its constituents to support Appi-Cicu. PAN's official at National Level, Zulfikfli Hasan, did not require PAN cadres to choose the Appi-Cicu, but provides an opportunity for PAN cadres to choose anyone they consider component (Metro timur, 2018). Even
Ahmad Pasima, Deputy Chairperson of the PAN in South Sulawesi, instructed the volunteer network to support DiAmi. He also stated that there was no problem for the PAN constituents who supported DiAmi. They will not get threats or sanctions from the party (Metro timur, 2018).

Third; Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) legally supports the Appi-Cicu pair. Nevertheless, at the mass level also supported DiAmi. Based on the results of the selection in 153 villages in Makassar City, they showed that they support incumbent candidate Danny Pomanto. Branch and twigs leaders of PDIP of Makassar City had also signed support for Danny. However, afterwards, there was a recommendation from the National office of PDIP to support the Appi-Cicu (Liputan, 2018). The difference support between the lower levels and the National board disappointed PDIP cadres, even though there was no apparent resistance.

Fourth; the Democratic National Party fully supports the Appi-Cicu. However, his political partner, Indira came from the Democratic National Party. Thus, at the mass level, the possibility of Democratic National Party support was also not reliable.

Fifth; PKB is a party supporting Appi-Cicu after the DiAmi was disqualified. However, it is the rational choice for PKB to support Appi-Cicu after KPUD disqualified DIAmi. However, they also stated that PKB was Danny's loyalist so that it did not rule out the possibility at the mass level still support to Danny(Sulsel satu, 2018).

The above-mentioned findings showed that although 84% of parties in the DPRD supported Appi-Cicu, the support was not reliable. The lack of support was due to differences in policy between party office, the local level and party office at the national level. One year before the registration of the candidacy process, there were nine political parties support Danny Pomanto (incumbent). The nine parties are PDIP, PPP, PKS, Gerindra, PAN, PKPI, Perindo Party, Dream Party (Partai Idaman) and Beringin Karya Party (Febrianto, 2018). Party support for DIAmi is strong, as is the phenomenon of the incumbent in the local elections commonly.

Nevertheless, Danny said that there would be an attempt to tackle him at the time of the nomination because the other parties would support
the opposing party (Syam, 2017). If he does not register through the private channel, then there is no chance for him to participate in the regional election contestation. Therefore, Danny then registered via the independent pathway or non-party candidate on the last day of registration.

From the process of recruiting candidates for Regional Heads from each party, the party generally seeks to gather aspirations bottom up. Although the process of nominating candidates is not carried out by voters, they involve party officials at the level of the bottom, or through party delegations. The selection process is carried out through branch office and branch managers from political parties. Process of the candidate nomination at the local level, from the perspective of inclusivism-exclusivism in Reuven Hazan's political recruitment, is a medium process involving party delegations. However, unfortunately, the existing party structure is centralistic, so that the final decision-making is in the hands of party leaders at the national level. This exclusive decision-making makes party support for candidate formally. At the local level, party policy lines at the national level are not fully implemented by the regions. It happens because, on the one hand, the thick political pragmatism of the existing parties. This political pragmatism intertwined with oligarchy and elitism of political parties. Political parties are dominated by a handful of oligarchic elites, thus denying the aspirations of the people. It is undeniable that in every election, there is a political dowry from the candidate to the party. Although there has never been any information about dowry to this party, the reality is complicated for candidates who do not have a dowry to get their boat in the local election contestation. Party support for a candidate is usually short-term because support is based more on political pragmatism and transactional politics. The candidate who has high electability or candidates who give higher dowry will get party support.

Danny stated that political parties would tackle him in the local election contestation. It is a threat to democracy if democracy without contestation in Makassar City is a scenario of the political cartel of the existing parties. They agreed that there would be no competition in the elections.

4.2. Empty Box Victory as Incumbent Victory and Political Party Failure
Although the phenomenon of empty boxes occurred in 11 elections in 2018 in Indonesia, the phenomenon of empty boxes in Makassar city is different from other regions. An empty box in other areas is a form of incumbent domination in the elections. Political parties support candidates who are sure to win in the elections so that the political parties tend to support the same candidate, namely the incumbent. In the case of Makassar City, the empty box that occurred was an attempt to get rid of the incumbent from his political opponents, by raising legal cases that had the potential to get rid of them. Thus, the empty box is not empty without a candidate. However, an empty box in the local election of Makassar City is a representation of the incumbent that is disqualified from the local election. Thus, the victory of the empty box in the Makassar City is the victory of the incumbent.

Responding to reporters' questions after being disqualified, Danny said that he would fight for an empty box. Especially after being disqualified, Danny returned to serving as Major of Makassar City so that the campaign to select an empty box (Sholih, 2018) had a significant influence. For some voters, choosing an empty box means choosing DIAmi. It is reinforced by the existence of a warning from the Acting Governor of South Sulawesi, Soni Sumarsono because Danny Pomanto committed unethical actions. After all, as a state official participated in the victory of the empty box in the election (Haryanto, 2018)

From a survey conducted by PT General Survey Indonesia (GSI) (Yahya, 2019), four factors determine the victory of an empty box. 1) because it follows the orders of officials (Camat, Lurah, RW, RT) of 28.16%; 2) Fanaticism towards DIAmi by 21.4%, 3) successful teamwork of other candidates who want re-election of 19.35%, and because the Appi-Cicu program is considered unclear, at 10.24%. The rest factor of dislike of democracy, trial and error, or because of confusion in making choices. The survey results show that the victory of the empty box was due to Danny's factor. Although the fanatic or loyalist Danny is only 21.4%, as Major, he has the authority to move the bureaucracy down to the lower levels. So, it is not surprising that 28.16% of the empty box is affected by orders from local officials. Moreover, the community that supports DIAmi continues to strive to campaign for an empty box. Thus, the community also have the awareness that the victory of the empty box will provide an opportunity for Danny in the re-election. That is why he also fights for the re-election to be carried out.
The victory of the empty box in the local election of Makassar City also showed the failure of political parties in carrying out their functions. Political parties should articulate and aggregate community interests. In reality, they nominated the candidates that are not desired by the community. The party structure is that the party leader only determines centralistic and exclusive decision-making. Thus, there is a gap between the interests of the people and the interests of the party. The result is that society loses trust in political parties. Party and constituent movements at the lower levels that are not in line with the recommendations of party leaders at the national level show defiance of party policy. It also shows that the party is not rooted in society. Especially in the culture of the society in South Sulawesi, support for the party depends on the party leadership at the local level, so the phenomenon of moving parties is followed by the removal of the constituent carriages. In the context of this election, the community at the local level followed the party's elite policy at the local level, which from the beginning gave their support to the DIAMI. So, 84% of political party support Appi-Cicu is formal and centralistic.

There are differences in the interests of parties at the national level with parties at the local level. The defeat of candidates supported by 84% of the political parties also showed the weak legitimacy of political parties in dealing with their people. The results of Buchler's research are still relevant to be used to analyze the local election of Makassar City, which states that the party's objective in selecting candidates is to obtain funds (Michael Buechler, 2005)

It is undeniable that the political dowry aspect is often the party's primary consideration in supporting candidates. Moreover, Appi is a businessman and comes from a very influential business family in South Sulawesi. The party which prioritizes the acquisition of funds from candidates is an obstacle for democracy. Parties tend to look at the popularity of candidates, and if candidates are more important than political parties, political parties as organizations fail to get legitimacy from voters.

5. CONCLUSION

The sole candidate in the local election of Makassar City is different from the sole candidate in other regions in Indonesia. A sole candidate in another area occurs because there are indeed no incumbent
challengers in the elections. While in Makassar City, there are two candidates, namely incumbent candidates who register through an independent (non-party) candidate and the challengers who are supported by the majority of the political party in the DPRD of Makassar City. It is a different phenomenon because it is usually the incumbent candidates who get the support of the majority of political parties. In the case of the local election of Makassar City, incumbent candidates advanced through non-party channels because there was no certainty of support from political parties. It is precisely their rival candidates who have the support of 84% of the political parties in the DPRD. Due to legal case reports by rivals, the incumbent was eventually disqualified from the regional election contestation. Thus, the empty box in the local election of Makassar City is not empty in the real sense but is a representation of disqualified incumbent power. Thus, the victory of the empty box in the local election of Makassar City means the victory of the incumbent.

There are some notes of the victory of the empty box in the local election of Makassar. 1) there is a gap aspiration between the people and local office political party and the party at the national level. At the local level, party policy based on the representation of the local office political party at the level below it. However, the final decision rests with the party leadership at the national level. Party policies are oligarchic and elitist, and centralized party decisions make the party loses its legitimacy before constituents. 2) Political party support Appi-Cicu formally, but not entirely a policy at the party at the local level. Party support for candidates is not in line with constituent support for candidates that they carry in the elections. 3) After disqualified, Danny serves again as Mayor of Makassar City, directly or indirectly, able to use his authority to influence the community to choose the empty box. 3) The victory of the empty box shows an increasingly better political awareness of the community. It is a form of resistance to political parties and a form of support for the incumbent.

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