Swinging Modernity

Jazz and Politics in Franco's Spain (1939–1968)

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Jazz appeared in Spain almost at the same time as it did in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, usually considered its main centers in Europe. The first musical "jazz" performances in Spain, as described by contemporary papers, took place in Madrid and Barcelona between late 1919 and early 1920. The term was soon linked to dances such as the one-step, the ragtime, and the foxtrot, which had appeared in Spain before jazz reached the country. The spread of jazz in Spain was initially modest, especially in terms of its social base: its first listeners were mainly aristocrats and intellectuals. However, from the mid-1920s, jazz was leaking extensively into musical theatre and cinema, helped by the enthusiastic reception of the charleston and the success of Sam Wooding's, Josephine Baker's, and Jack Hylton's performances. Jazz's spread continued during the Second Republic (1931-1936), mainly in Barcelona, where the large and exclusive Hot Club was founded in May 1935. This association edited a prestigious Jazz Magazine and managed to bring Benny Carter's big band and the Quintette du Hot Club de France to Barcelona in January 1936. It was also a model for the creation of further small clubs in other Catalan towns, in Madrid and Valencia. But the military revolt in July 1936 and the Civil War violently dislocated Spanish social and cultural life. General Francisco Franco's victory in 1939 established a dictatorship that would survive almost forty years.

This chapter analyzes the relationship between jazz and Franco's Spain up to 1968, when this music underwent a crisis and adjustment to new institutions, practices, and audiences directly connected with the subsequent transition to democracy. One of its premises is that, throughout this period, jazz in Spain was particularly linked to transformations originated or consolidated by modernity and the dictatorship's complex practices of resistance and adaptation to it. By modernity, I mean broadly the condensation of a capitalist economy of mass production and consumption, the decline of fixed social hierarchies, the dominance of secular forms of authority and political power, and the gradual dissemination of a materialist, rationalist, and globalized culture (Hall 1996; Mouzelis 1999). Instead of focusing only on Francoist legislation and rhetoric about jazz, my purpose is to link discourse and experience considering their connections and interactions and their material conditions. The chapter is structured into three parts, which correspond approximately to three decades marked by political, social, economic, and cultural changes that notably affected jazz.

From Condemnation to Indulgence: Jazz in the 1940s

The Civil War of 1936–1939 did not bring about a very significant decline of jazz in Spain. Contrary to what García Martínez (1996) and Pujol Baulenas (2005) have said, its practice was not suppressed by both sides, and its forms and styles were not remarkably altered by the conflict. But the war certainly transformed the spaces and audiences of jazz. In a context of populist exaltation, strong economic crisis, and shifting needs for entertainment, jazz was part of mass rhetorics and events used extensively and strategically by Loyalist and Nationalist cultural institutions and the media. Therefore, the Spanish Civil War meant a quantitative growth of jazz fans in the big cities. With its diffusion through radio, dance halls, theater and cinema, jazz even overshadowed other genres then in vogue, such as the tango, the *pasodoble* or the Mexican *ranchera*.

The dictatorship that Franco established after the war, in 1939, used culture and music intensively and systematically as propaganda to define its image and shape public opinion. For its connotations and considerable presence, American popular music became one of the main negative references used by the new regime to define Spanish race and music under the precepts of nationalism, Catholicism, and totalitarianism. The support of Germany and Italy for the nationalist forces during the Spanish Civil War and the rise of both countries in World War II stimulated the dictatorship's identification with fascism. And the imitation of Hitler's and Mussolini's regimes not only fed foreign policy and propaganda, but also institutional and artistic guidelines. Through the different organizations of the Vice-Secretariat of Popular Education, ruled by the only legal party, the fascist Falange Española, the dictatorship exercised a very tight control of the press, radio and any kind of public shows. It demanded personal reports, carried out censorship, and sent regular cautions and instructions (Pérez Zalduondo 2011).

Jazz was officially identified with black American music and defined as the antithesis of Spanish music. The main musicographers and critics warned in the press of the dangers of those "exotic black dances, product of the American jungles," "savage" and "pagan," "collected and exported by Masons and anti-Catholics," which involved "a satanic malice" and "should be eliminated without mercy" (Iglesias 2010). A series of circular letters sent to the radio stations pointed out that one of the main musical goals of the new regime was to "banish the arbitrary, anti-musical, and anti-human jazz wave with which America has invaded Europe for years." The reason was that there was "nothing further from our virile racial characteristics than that dead, sickly-sweet, decadent and monotonous melodies, which, like a cry of impotence, soften and feminize the soul." By mid-1942, at the height of fascist enthusiasm, the Vice-Secretariat of Popular Education banned the broadcasting of "the so-called black music, swing, or any other kind of compositions whose lyrics are in a foreign language." Jazz was vilified not only as a genre in itself, but also as a source of hybridization: in August 1942, the National Spectacle Union forbade the live performance of works of the classic repertoire by jazz and dance bands, and one month later extended the prohibition to recordings and cinemas (Martínez del Fresno 2001).

However, in practice, the attitude of the dictatorship towards jazz was far from unitary and unequivocal, ranging from its condemnation as degenerate music, its tolerance as economic sustenance, and its naturalization as mass entertainment. The presence and connotations of jazz in Spain also enabled the dictatorship to use it if necessary, modifying significantly its discourse. Since 1943, when the course of World War II threatened the integrity of the Franco

regime and its international position, the positive references to American music in the media served, on the other hand, as an example of the tolerance, renovation, and a pro-Allies orientation of the dictatorship. The media began a propaganda campaign aimed at showing Franco as the great ally of the West (and especially of the United States) in its struggle against Communism. The regime and the press then opened their doors to the culture of democratic countries, and particularly to American art, literature, and music. After 1946, the dictatorship also allowed the reappearance of the Hot Clubs of Barcelona and Madrid, and jazz-specific publications (such as *Ritmo y melodía*, Rhythm and Melody). American popular music even became the major topic of the main music magazine of the time, *Ritmo*. This was not due to a relaxation of censorship of periodicals, because, as Elisa Chuliá has remarked, the implementation phase of the Francoist press did not end until 1948. The rigid information system of the regime was not in a stage of dissolution or opening, but in its most complete and operative form (Chuliá 2001, 32).

The pro-American musical discourse advanced at the same time that radio once again regularly scheduled jazz programs and Hollywood recovered its hegemony in the Spanish film market: imported films from the United States rose from 10 percent to 66 percent of the total between 1942 and 1945 (Díez Puertas 2003, 141). This had its impact on the various jazz styles in Spain: The one-step and the charleston entered their definitive declines in favor of the two great novelties of the postwar period, swing and boogie-woogie, which instituted a new dance culture that was massive and increasingly specialized. The Spanish Civil War and the tense diplomatic relations of the Franco regime with the United States had prevented their large-scale reception in Spain until 1942. If swing had served as an analgesic for the American youth during the difficult 1930s, it played a similar role in a Spain battered by the effects of the Civil War. The economic policy of the dictatorship, which based the reconstruction of the country on self-sufficiency or "autarky," also contributed to the precarious situation. Both swing and boogie-woogie were directly linked to physical pleasure and the corporal liberation, the opposite of the stoicism and restraint promoted by Francoist biopolitics, the official precepts on morals and the body. Consequently, the regime tried to impose continuous impediments to jazz through recreational and fiscal policies, which remained even after the official discourse about American music changed in the mid-1940s (Iglesias, forthcoming).

Improvising Allies: Jazz and the Cold War in the 1950s

From 1947, the severe ideological confrontation known as the "Cold War" intensified the adulatory attitude of Franco's regime toward the United States. Jazz benefited from this official adjustment by gaining favor in a dictatorship that had initially condemned it as degenerate and pernicious music. From the early 1950s, and especially from the change of government in July 1951, jazz was part of the activities organized by Francoist institutions, media, and organizations such as the Ateneos of Madrid and Barcelona, the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, Radio Nacional de España, and the Sindicato Español Universitario (SEU), the state-controlled university union. This was the first period of advance for be-bop, which had awakened the interest of Spanish musicians and fans after World War II, due above all to the visits of the tenor sax player Don Byas to Barcelona and Madrid in 1947 and 1948. Thanks mainly to a young blind pianist, Tete Montoliu, who was to become the most international and influential Spanish jazzman, so-called "modern jazz" gradually abandoned its marginal position in Spain in the late 1950s and early 1960s.




Figure 8.1 Modest Cuixart's drawing for Brossa's poem "Oda a Louis Armstrong"

Source: Dau al Set, March 1950. Biblioteca de Catalunya, Barcelona.

The regime's opinion about jazz was then linked to the official discourse on avant-garde art. In 1948, an artistic group called Dau al Set (Dice on Seven) was created in Barcelona by four painters (Antoni Tàpies, Modest Cuixart, Joan Ponç, and Joan Josep Tharrats) and three writers (Joan Brossa, Arnald Puig, and Juan Eduardo Cirlot). This group was firmly committed to a trend halfway between the oneiric Surrealism of Paul Klee and Joan Miró and the abstract Expressionism, and was particularly interested in African-American culture. In this "informalism," as the artists themselves named it, jazz was a constant source of inspiration until the dissolution of Dau al Set, in 1953: the group wrote some monographs on it and, along with the Hot Club of Barcelona, organized the "Jazz Show" in 1951, 1952, and 1953. The members of Dau al Set were captivated by the blues and hot jazz, for its "spontaneity," "primitivism," and "spirituality" (Figure 8.1).

From 1951, this artistic avant-garde was used by the dictatorship as modernizing propaganda abroad, first in the Bienal Hispanoamericana de Arte, held in Madrid in 1951, and later with the conference *Problemas del Arte Abstracto* (Problems of Abstract Art), which took place in Santander in 1953 (Cabañas Bravo 1996). The legitimation and sponsorship of informalism and of its fascination with black culture required a drastic shift in the xenophobic racial rhetoric of the dictatorship. The official music critics appreciated hot jazz with the same terms they used to qualify abstract art: contemporary, authentic, non-rational, and unrelated to any social

concern. This view stressed the modernity of jazz while keeping it far from any social or political connotation. Enrique Sacau-Ferreira (2010) pointed out that these same features (non-ideological, non-commercial, authentic and modern) later served to define Spanish avant-garde music when it was also made official as propaganda from 1958.

But the reception of jazz in Spain during the 1950s was achieved not only via the gaps permitted by the dictatorship and used by the fans. In 1950, the regime had little chance of unilaterally encouraging cultural exchanges with the United States. But the radicalization of the Cold War, after the outbreak of the Korean War in July 1950, prompted the US government to reformulate relations with the Franco dictatorship for geostrategic reasons. This bilateral rapprochement led to the signing of an agreement between Spain and the United States in September 1953, whereby the dictatorship allowed the installation of US military bases on Spanish soil in exchange for political recognition and military, economic, and technical aid. This change in policy towards the dictatorship was accompanied by a reactivation of American cultural diplomacy in Spain, to create a climate of opinion favorable to military bases (Delgado 2005; León Aguinaga 2009).

Although the US government emphasized the need to spread "distinctive American creations" abroad, it largely dismissed popular culture at first. The aim was to present a "sophisticated" view of American art, "demonstrating to international audiences that American tastes were more refined than Hollywood and Elvis Presley suggested" (Osgood 2006, 225). Certainly, the visits of many leading American jazzmen and bluesmen to Barcelona starting in 1950, although facilitated by new Spanish-American relations, are primarily attributable to the efforts and negotiations of the Hot Clubs of Barcelona and Granollers: Willie "The Lion" Smith, in 1950; Mezz Mezzrow, in 1951; Bill Coleman, in 1952; Dizzy Gillespie, "Big Bill" Broonzy, and Jimmy Davis, in 1953; Lionel Hampton, Louis Armstrong, and Sidney Bechet, in 1955; Sammy Price and Count Basie, in 1956.

Nevertheless, the Spanish case resists the idea, common among American historians and musicologists, that jazz was not officially sponsored until the spring of 1956, with Dizzy Gillespie's tour of the Middle East (Carr 2004; Davenport 2009; Osgood 2006, Von Eschen 2004). First, there was jazz in the recordings that the Embassy of the United States provided from World War II to Radio Madrid, a collaboration which persisted through the 1950s. This music was granted a privileged place on that station, with the program Hora Americana (The American Hour) from 1944, with Casino Fin de Semana (Weekend Casino) from 1946, and with Album de Norteamérica (North American Album) in the 1950s (Iglesias 2011, 42). Second, jazz was part of the officially sponsored concerts of American classical music given in Spain between 1952 and 1955, but perhaps only if we integrate the view of the recipients of that cultural diplomacy. Aaron Copland's Clarinet Concerto and George Gershwin's Rhapsody in Blue, An American in Paris or Porgy and Bess were described by the Spanish media as jazz works. Finally, several American institutions had financed jazz concerts in Spain before Gillespie's tour: the big bands of the Coral Sea and the Franklin Roosevelt aircraft carriers played in clubs "by courtesy of the U.S. Army;" the America House sponsored and organized a symphonic jazz concert in Madrid in 1955; and the US Government, with the help of the American National Theater Academy (ANTA), funded a "Gershwin Festival" also in Madrid in January and February 1956.

The success of these jazz concerts was unexpected and overwhelming, and urged US authorities to make an even greater economic effort, financing one of its most prominent and multifaceted international musicians: Lionel Hampton. His concerts in Madrid, sponsored by the US



Figure 8.2 Cover of Lionel Hampton's Jazz Flamenco (1957)

Embassy, were held on the 14th and 15th of March, 1956, two weeks before Gillespie inaugurated the intercontinental jazz tours under the auspices of the State Department. Hampton recorded in Madrid an extravagant album entitled *Jazz Flamenco*, successfully distributed in the United States and in Spain by the RCA-Victor label (Figure 8.2). A *Down Beat* reviewer wrote that the diplomatic importance of Hampton's tour and recording undoubtedly exceeded the value of the music itself.³

The interest aroused by Hampton convinced the United States Information Agency (USIA) of the diplomatic relevance of American popular music in Spain. A few months later, John Reid, Cultural Attaché of the Embassy of the United States, notified Antonio Villacieros, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, of a series of concerts in Spain being put on by the "U.S. Army Field Band," and financed by the State Department.⁴ The program consisted of marches, film soundtracks, operettas and jazz. The opening concert took place on June 5th at the bullring of Las Ventas, and was preceded by the words of the US Ambassador to Spain, John Davis Lodge, who described the act as "a vehicle of the best Spanish-American friendship" (Franco 1957).

Economic Liberalization and Cultural Capital: Jazz as a Modern Art in the 1960s

Jazz continued to be part of the propaganda of the dictatorship in the 1960s. With the changes in the successive governments of 1957 and 1962, the new technocratic leaders of the Ministry of Information and Tourism used it, sporadically but very visibly, to display Spain as a modern country. However, several events and processes marked the years 1959–1961 as a period of crucial changes in the reception of jazz in Spain. Those years saw the abandonment of autarkic policies and the first effects of the new economic program, the *Plan de Estabilización*, which laid the foundations for a free market economy and for the spread of a leisure culture. In 1959, the music industry in Spain made a profit of one million dollars annually; six years later, that amount had increased tenfold.⁵ The interaction between that economic liberalization and the consolidation of various logistic and business processes that started in 1953 was instrumental in the development of jazz in Spain.

First, the four US military bases proposed in the agreements of 1953 were completed and became operational in those years, near Madrid, Zaragoza, Seville and Cadiz. On the one hand,

they meant the arrival in Spain of many US soldiers—some of them musicians—jazz recordings, books, and instruments. On the other hand, their stations began to broadcast daily jazz programs in frequency modulation (FM), such as Jazz Is My Beat or The Big Bands, and Music USA, hosted by Willis Conover at The Voice of America. In addition, the military bases served as a stage for orchestras and musicians who, once in Madrid or Seville, could be hired by jazz clubs for lower fees. Two early examples were Bud Powell's and Donna Hightower's concerts at the Torrejón base (in Madrid) in November 1960. Coming from Paris, both also played at the Whisky Jazz Club in Madrid and, in the case of Hightower, on Spanish Television. The big band of the 16th Division of the U.S. Army, established at the Torrejón base, also played regularly at the jazz clubs of Madrid and Bilbao.

Second, some of the record companies that then distributed part of the so-called "modern jazz," be-bop and its derivatives, set up offices in Spain or reached agreements with Spanish labels. They thereby joined the record companies that had arrived in Spain before 1953 (EMI) and those that had landed in the mid-1950s (RCA and Decca). The Belter label had achieved the exclusive distribution of the Vanguard recordings in early 1957. In 1961, Hispavox and Discophon struck deals with Reprise and Seeco, respectively, Iberofón signed with the French company Bel Air, Odeón began to distribute Capitol, and Warner recordings appeared in Spain through Ediciones Modernas. The following year, Philips increased its jazz titles in Spain through Inderdisc (an organization that included the catalogs of Blue Note, Riverside and Contemporary), and Hispavox signed a contract with Columbia to be its sole distributor. Soon after, Hispavox acquired the distribution rights of Impulse! and Atlantic.

Third, if private US companies had not been particularly influential in spreading jazz in Spain during the 1950s, the situation changed in the next decade. In this regard, one of the most active companies was Coca-Cola. Its president, James A. Farley, a vehement anti-Communist, visited Spain for the first time in 1948 and had periodic meetings with General Franco. In 1955, he received the Commander of Isabella the Catholic, one of the most prestigious Spanish diplomatic awards, for "his exceptional work for the Spanish-American friendship in recent years." Coca-Cola sponsored many of the foremost jazz concerts of the 1960s in Spain: the performances of Bill Coleman in Barcelona in 1961 and in Madrid and Bilbao in 1962; Peanuts Holland's concert in Barcelona in January 1962; and Donna Hightower's show in Madrid in June 1963. The culmination came in 1964, with the financing of concerts in Madrid of The Modern Jazz Quartet in May, and The Mainstream Jazz Group, a quintet consisting of Coleman Hawkins, Sir Charles Thompson, Harry Edison, Jimmy Woode and Jo Jones, in October. The US company settled its debt to Barcelona, still the main jazz center of the country, by collaborating on the sponsorship of the "American Folk Blues Festival" which starred many figures of the blues revival of the 1960s such as John Lee Hooker, Fred McDowell, Roosevelt Sykes and Big Mama Thornton, in October 1965, and by financing the solo performance of Earl Hines in May of 1966.

Coca-Cola was not the only company linked to the spread of American culture through the sponsorship of jazz. Its great rival, Pepsi-Cola, which had established itself in Spain in the summer of 1955, co-financed two concerts by Buck Clayton in Barcelona in April 1961. In addition, a few months prior to Clayton's concerts, the US firm had sponsored Louis Armstrong's second visit to Spain. In 1960, the State Department and Pepsi hired a group of musicians, among them Armstrong, Trummy Young, and Barney Bigard, for a concert tour of Africa that combined commercial advertising and political propaganda (Von Eschen 2004, 67). But the first stop of the tour on October 12 was not Accra, the capital of Ghana, as appears in the US official



Figure 8.3 Poster announcing the visit of Louis Armstrong to Barcelona, sponsored by Pepsi

Source: La Vanguardia Española, October 12, 1960.

records.⁷ Pepsi thought it could take advantage of the stopover in Barcelona to showcase Armstrong in a brief press conference (Figure 8.3), and to that end it organized a reception with the slogan: "music promotes cordiality between nations."

The new possibilities offered by the combination of official permissiveness, private sponsorship, and new means of dissemination and consumption in the 1960s were used by musicians and fans to promote jazz in Spain and, at the same time, to legitimize it as art. This new configuration of jazz took place mainly in elitist jazz clubs and arcades in Madrid and Barcelona. The Whisky Jazz Club in Madrid (inaugurated in April 1959) and the Jamboree Jazz Cava in Barcelona (opened in January 1960) were distinguished places where fans from both cities met, the sanctuaries of jazz in the Spain of the 1960s. The main Spanish jazz musicians of that time, the pianists Tete Montoliu, Juan Carlos Calderón, and Manuel Gas, the saxophonists Pedro Iturralde, Vladimiro Bas, Salvador Font "Mantequilla," and Ricard Roda, the trumpeter Joe Moro, the trombonist José Chenoll, and the drummers Enrique Llácer "Regolí," Ramón Farrán, and José Farreras played there, sometimes accompanied by figures such as Gerry Mulligan in 1962, Chet Baker in 1963, Dexter Gordon in 1964 and 1965, Paul Bley, Lee Konitz, and Art Farmer in 1965, and Hampton Hawes in 1968, among others.

Many of the opinions and debates of those present were printed in the only jazz-specific publication of those years: *Aria Jazz*. In its pages, jazz creation was configured as a "sub-field of restricted production," an exclusive cultural capital, opposed to the expectations of a wide audience and to the interest in economic profit (Bourdieu 1993, 115–121). The critics served as arbiters and gatekeepers of taste, as well as the first historians of the genre in Spain. Jazz needed a genealogy of its own, organic and self-referential, and modern jazz was seen as a logical and necessary evolution. This discourse obliterated "commercial" dance music, predominant until the 1950s, to point out that jazz did not even exist in Spain before the 1960s. Stylistic innovations were increasingly valued in the context of this evolution. In October 1965, Ornette Coleman's performance at the Jamboree Jazz Club in Barcelona was still received with coldness. Three years later, the experiments of this American saxophonist were already considered the best proof of "the eternal and indelible march of the art, which is always ahead of the aficionado" (Montes 1968). That discourse was shared by the Hot Clubs of Barcelona, Madrid,

Granollers, Bilbao, and the new ones created in Granada (in 1962), Seville (in 1963), and Oviedo (in 1965). The jazz concerts held in Spain in the second half of the 1960s were primarily an initiative of these clubs, in collaboration with other private agents. A good example was the joint performance of Duke Ellington and Ella Fitzgerald in Barcelona and Madrid in January and February 1966, as part of a European tour organized by the American impresario George Wein. The relevance of "modern jazz" was ratified in the late 1960s by the first periodic jazz festivals held in Spain, which soon turned into European landmarks: the festivals of Barcelona and San Sebastián. Between 1966 and 1968, some of the leading figures usually included in hard-bop (Sonny Rollins, Max Roach, Roy Eldridge, Wayne Shorter, Horace Silver, Nathan Davis, Albert Mangelsdorff) and in cool jazz (Dave Brubeck, Paul Desmond, Stan Getz, Dusko Gojkovic) played at the Barcelona Jazz Festival.

The separation of jazz from commercial music isolated it from commercial music's economic mediations. In 1971, all directors of the major labels agreed that jazz was only 2–3 percent of music sales in Spain. It was established as an autonomous art in the discourse of its critics and fans, but the vast majority of its musicians were far from able to live exclusively on their jazz playing. To manage this situation, one of the strategies more commercially successful and with more sustainability was the creation of glocal hybrids which systematically and extensively integrated elements of flamenco and Spanish music in jazz. In 1967 and 1968, the saxophonist Pedro Iturralde published two albums, *Flamenco Jazz* and *Jazz Flamenco*, which combined hard-bop with the accompaniment of flamenco guitarists (Paco de Antequera and a young Paco de Lucía), and formal elements such as the Andalusian scale and *soleá* time. Iturralde also hinted at political subversion in two ways: taking as a source of his titles the *Spanish Popular Songs* of the poet Federico García Lorca, an always uncomfortable figure for the dictatorship (he was murdered by Francoist authorities during the Spanish Civil War), and using formulas associated with the "gitanismo" or "mairenismo," a style of flamenco singing developed by the *cantaor* Antonio Mairena and associated with the political opposition to the regime (Iglesias 2005).

Paradoxically, this musical syncretism was favorably received in the official press, because it fit well in the motto—"Spain is the same, but different"—of the technocratic government (Buchanan 2007). Iturralde was even invited to play at the auditorium of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, in the presence of the authorities, in December 1967 (Franco 1967; Iglesias forthcoming). He thus prompted a hybridization which would continue through Paco de Lucía and himself in the next decade. Since the 1980s, this trend would develop until establishing itself internationally with musicians such as the flutists and saxophonists Jorge Pardo and Perico Sambeat, the pianist Chano Domínguez, the guitarists Gerardo Núñez and Juan Manuel Cañizares, the bassists Carles Benavent and Javier Colina, and the percussionists Rubem Dantas, Tino di Geraldo and Guillermo McGill.

Conclusion

Jazz was not simply adopted or assimilated in Spain, but translated and re-elaborated through different categories, interests, practices and material conditions. Its spread took place within a process of reception of modernity, in a dictatorship with changing political and economic needs, and with musicians and audiences who constantly tried to expand their aesthetic options and consumption possibilities. The Spanish case reveals new information about the means and phases of jazz's reception in Europe, the relationship between music and totalitarian regimes, the channels and dynamics of cultural diplomacy during the Cold War, and the legitimization

of jazz as art and glocal expression. More broadly, it underlines jazz's ability to become a space and active resource of political negotiation and identity configuration.

In early 1969, jazz in Spain seemed to receive several fatal blows with the closure of the two main clubs in Madrid and Barcelona, the Whisky Jazz and the Jamboree, the disappearance of *Aria Jazz*, and the government reorganization. In a reactionary and agonizing attempt to survive, the dictatorship proclaimed the state of emergency and intensified censorship to avoid the advance of a cultural opening that, according to the new vice-president, the Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, had led Spain to moral and political deterioration. The intellectual and student opposition radicalized then, in parallel with the regime's new intransigent measures. Jazz established itself in the artistic, intellectual and academic milieus. It was associated with experimental avant-garde and shared spaces with dissident musical expressions such as the protest movement of the *cantautores* (singer-songwriters), in places like La Cova del Drac, in Barcelona, or the San Juan Evangelista College, in Madrid. It had changed from a challenge to the Francoist biopolitics in the 1940s to a rational political subversion in the 1960s, becoming part of the numerous artistic trends that developed a democratic consciousness and influenced the gradual weakening of the dictatorship until its end in 1975.

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Notes

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- 4. "U.S. Army Field Band. Conciertos en España." Documentación de la Casa Americana, Madrid, 20 March 1957. Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid, AMAE R. 4775, 7.
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