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Planning for growth: contradictions in a framework of economic and urban development. Some lessons from the “Spanish miracle” (1959-1973)

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Abstract

In the post war period, the strong economic growth in Western countries coincided with the configuration of their modern urban planning systems. This paper aims at exploring to what extent the targets of the economic planning that was broadly adopted in this growth period conditioned the performance of urban planning tools by analysing the case of Spain. During the so-called “Spanish miracle” that started in the early 1960s and lasted until mid-1970s, there were notable contradictions between economic and spatial planning policies and between the performance of the national and the municipal governments. It is concluded that the lack of an integrated approach to regional and urban planning policies at national level combined to the gap with the actual local planning framework, illustrated through the example of three cities, can help to understand the patterns of urban growth in a context of an expanding economy.

Keywords

urban growth; economic development; regional planning; urban planning; Spain

Introduction

This article aims at analysing the performance of urban planning in a context of quick and strong economic growth through the case of Spain between the early 1960s and mid-1970s. During the years of the so-called “Spanish miracle”, the kind of economic planning that was adopted to foster the industrialisation of Spain affected regional and urban planning, while local actors also conditioned the transition to the modern planning tools in a context of intense urban expansion.

The first part of the article provides the background of the research. It situates in its international context both the economic development that Spain experienced in this period and the indicative planning policy that the government decided to adopt from the late 1950s. Specific attention will be paid to the regional policy that was part of economic planning in this period, following the growth poles theories, and to its territorial and urban effects in Spain.

The second and third parts refer to the performance of urban planning within this framework of intense economic growth and aim at explaining the two main contradictions that emerged in this period. First, the gap between the targets of economic planning and the spatial planning system in force since mid-1950s, which conditioned the national urban planning framework. Second, the gap between this national framework and its planning tools and the situation at local level, which will be illustrated through three case studies.

1. Economic planning in the Golden Age of Capitalism. The case of Spain

Just after the Second World War, the Western Bloc under the influence of the United States began a period of very strong economic growth that has received different denominations in every country: *Wirtschaftswunder* in Western Germany, *Les Trente Glorieuses* in France, *Miracolo economico* in Italy, Japanese economic miracle, etc. Most highlight the "miraculous" condition of this post-war economic dynamism, initially driven by American aid, such as the well-known Marshall Plan. This period of growth lasted until the oil crisis of 1973, which is usually established as the end of this also called "Golden Age of Capitalism".

Arrighi stresses the interdependence between the formation of this worldwide capitalist system and the creation of a system of national States.[1] In this context, some States intervened in their national economies through indicative planning. Unlike socialist planning, indicative planning made it possible to maintain certain levels of state control and intervention, but within a market economy framework. This economic model was “an important element of the policy environment in many countries since the Second World War", with clear examples such as Japan and France.[2] After the end of the American occupation in 1952, Japan created an Economic Council that was composed of representatives of the private sector and later associated with the Economic Planning Agency, created with the status of a ministry in 1955, when the first five-year plan was also passed. France created the *Commissariat général du Plan* in 1946, with Jean Monnet as its first head, and the first plan was passed for the period 1947-1952. Subsequently, both Japan and France continued to approve indicative economic plans.

Indicative planning was also applied by other States within the capitalist world, both in East Asia and Europe, where there were authoritarian political regimes during this period, which involved distinctive features. For various reasons, these countries began their economic take-off later, in the 1960s, when their indicative planning policies could find references in their respective regional environments. In East Asia, the most representative case is South Korea. After the Korean War (1950-53), General Park Chung-hee seized power in 1961 and promoted the industrialization of the South Korean economy through a five-year planning model that relied on the consolidation of large family-owned corporate groups, the so-called *chaebols*.[3] Close to the Japanese model of *zaibatsu-keiretsu*, *chaebols* benefited from government support and foreign funding, mainly from Japan and the United States. Within a few years, they emerged as export-oriented international groups, while the South Korean consolidated a strong economic growth, which is known as the “Miracle on the Han River”. In Europe, it is worth discussing the case of Spain, where the dictatorship of General Franco also adopted an indicative planning model in the 1960s that resulted in the so-called “Spanish miracle”.

1.1. The “Spanish miracle”: from autarky to indicative planning

When the dictatorship of Francisco Franco began, Spain was in a situation of deep economic crisis as a result of the Civil War (1936-39). Soon after, the victory of the Allies in the Second World War resulted in the international isolation of Spain because of its connection with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, which had supported the Francoist rebellion. In this context of deep scarcity and isolation, the Spanish government adopted an autarkic economic policy. On the one hand, autarky had an important ideological component linked to nationalism, that is, to the confidence in Spain's capacity to be self-sufficient and to the rejection of a hostile international community. On the other hand, this economic policy was perfectly adapted to the will of the Francoist government to tightly control all aspects of life in the country, in a context of lack of liberty and political repression. Protectionism and interventionism were the main characteristics of this autarkic economic policy.[4]

In the context of the Cold War, the strong anti-communist position of Franco helped ending the international isolation of Spain. Just after the Korean War, the so-called Pacts of Madrid with the United States were signed, which allowed the installation in Spain of four US military bases in exchange for military and economic aid, and Spain was admitted as a member of the United Nations in 1955. Two years later there was an important change in Franco's government. The most nationalist sectors lost political influence, while the ministries of an economic nature, such as Commerce or Finance, were taken over by the so-called technocrats, who intended to open Spanish economy to international markets. As first step, they achieved that Spain became member of the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation between 1958 and 1959.

After overcoming numerous internal resistances, the end of autarky finally arrived in 1959, when the so-called Stabilization Plan was approved. This plan laid the foundations for a structural transformation of Spanish economy.[5] On the one hand, it promoted the incorporation of Spain to international markets after years of strong protectionism. On the other hand, he tried to reduce State interventionism and promote a more liberalized economy. The

Stabilization Plan initiated a new economic cycle in Spain that was characterized by consistent and high annual rates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, with an average of 8% during the 1960s (Figure 1). Thanks to this, in the mid-1970s Spain had become one of the largest economies in the world, which was soon named and is widely known as the "Spanish miracle".[6]



Figure 1: Spanish GDP evolution under Francoist Dictatorship (1939-1975). Data source: Angus Maddison, "Historical Statistics of the World Economy," http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm (accessed March 15. 2020).

However, this change in Spanish economy occurred within the same political regime, which entailed that a considerable degree of interventionism remained. As in the abovementioned case of South Korea, this new economic policy especially benefited those companies with closer relationships to the government, and it also included the adoption of indicative planning. On the one hand, this option was recommended in an influential report on the Spanish economy that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development elaborated in 1962 in order to give continuity to the measures adopted in the Stabilization Plan.[7] On the other hand, it was inspired by the successful French experience,[8] which was copied without readjustments "hoping for similar outstanding outcomes".[9] Thus, the Spanish Commissariat for the Economic Development Plan was created in 1962 and the Act 194/1963 passed the First Economic and Social Development Plan. Later, the Second Development Plan was approved in 1969, while the Third Development Plan, corresponding to the period 1972-1975, was the

last one, due to the outbreak of the international crisis in 1973 and to the important changes in the political framework after Franco's death in 1975. These plans aimed at bringing together the private and public sectors to achieve a certain rate of growth and level the Spanish economy with its European environment. They had to encourage higher productivity and efficiency by focusing in a few key sectors, such as heavy industry and capital goods, while also serve a more equitable distribution of income.[10] A duality that was also reflected in one of their main tools: the growth poles.

1.2. Growth poles: a theory for regional development. Its territorial and urban effects

Regional development was an important concern within post-war economic theories, both in United States and Europe.[11] Economic indicative planning in countries such as France and Spain combined with a spatial approach that was founded on the growth poles theory. This was first introduced by François Perroux and Albert Hirschman in the late 1950s and complemented by other authors in the early 1960s.[12] Perroux "emphasised the role of leading industries in generating development", while Boudeville "translated these ideas into a spatial context by defining a regional growth pole".[13] In France, the so-called Interministerial Delegation of Land Planning and Regional Attractiveness (DATAR according to its French name) was created in 1963 to guide the regional development policy. Following a report on the French urban system, the DATAR defined in 1964 the so-called "métropoles d'équilibre", eight main cities that would have to compensate the excessive weight of the Paris region.[14] It is worth mentioning that decentralization policies linked to economic development were also applied in other geographical contexts. In South Korea, indicative planning was combined to an industrial location policy and it similarly happened in Spain.

Clearly influenced by the French theories, the development poles strategy was one of the main props in Spanish indicative planning in the 1960s, emphasising efficiency and national integration rather than regional equity criteria.[15] The objective was to expand the industrialisation beyond the main Spanish cities, such as Madrid and Barcelona, but selecting as development poles those cities that already had some potential in this regard, in order to

reduce initial investments as much as possible.[16] As part of the First Economic and Social Development Plan, five cities were declared in 1964 as “poles of industrial development”: La Coruña and Vigo in Galicia, Seville in Andalusia, Zaragoza in the Ebro Valley and Valladolid in the Duero Valley, while two ones were declared “poles of industrial promotion”: Burgos, in Castile, and Huelva, in Andalusia. The aim of the poles of development was to consolidate an industrialization that had already begun, while the poles of promotion aimed to initiate it. In the framework of the Second Plan, four more cities were declared in 1969 as poles of development: Granada, Córdoba, Oviedo and Logroño, while an additional pole in Villagarcía de Arosa was declared some months later (Figure 2).



Figure 2: Industrial poles that were declared within the First and Second Development Plans in Spain.

The economic policy that was implemented through the Development Plans resulted in important transformations in the country. Beyond its long-term impact in industry,[17] it produced an acceleration of migrations, both towards other countries and inside Spain, and caused a polarization in the distribution of both the population and the economic activity, as they started to concentrate in certain areas to the detriment of others. In the 1960s, almost all Spanish

inland provinces lost more than 10 or even 20% of its population, while a few provinces, including Madrid, the Mediterranean Coast and the Basque Country grew with those same rates (Figure 3). The agricultural regions of inland Spain were then relegated by a few areas whose cities concentrated industrialization and tourism, including those that benefited from the development poles policy. For instance, the population of the inland provinces of Zaragoza and Valladolid, whose capitals were declared as poles of industrial development in 1964, grew notably in the 1960s. It is worth mentioning that between the beginning of the 1960s and the mid-1970s, the seven most dynamic provinces, that is Madrid, Barcelona, the three Basque provinces, Alicante and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, which represent only 6.5% of Spanish territory, gathered 30% of the population and more than 40% of GDP. At the same period, the 28 most regressive provinces, nearly all inland Spain, descended from 30% to 23% of total population and from 19% to 15% of GDP.[18]

Obviously, these large migrations to a few areas caused an intense growth of the population in some cities. For instance, the population of Madrid grew more than 40% in the 1960s and reached 3,1 million inhabitants, according to the respective Census of Population. This rate was even higher in some industrial poles declared in 1964 such as Zaragoza, Valladolid and Burgos, whose population increased about 50% in these ten years. It grew from 304,000, 151,000 and 81,000 inhabitants in 1960 to 469,000, 234,000 and 120,000 in 1970, respectively. In other cities, such as Barcelona or Vigo, growth was lower, but because it was mainly concentrated in their neighbouring municipalities (Figure 3).



Figure 3: Variation of Spanish population in the 1960s, per provinces and in main cities and poles of development (I Plan). Data source: Spanish National Institute for Statistics (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*, INE). Census of Population.

2. A development-oriented urban planning: gaps between economic and spatial planning during the "Spanish miracle"

The Golden Age of Capitalism matches the "golden age of planning", as it consolidated as profession while the postwar legislation set the basic framework for several decades.[19] Among others, this was the case of Spain, where the execution of the abovementioned indicative planning policies between the beginning of the 1960s and the mid-1970s, and more specifically the parallel regional development policy linked to growth poles, came into conflict with the regional and urban planning system that had been defined a few years earlier.

Throughout the period of autarky, the scarcity of economic and material resources and the lack of urbanized land caused urban and housing policy to be overwhelmed by real needs. For instance, a first Housing Plan for the decade 1944-1954 estimated that 1,400,000 homes for that period were needed, but actual results did not reach even half of these figures.[20] In the early 1950s, Madrid was in a chaotic situation, because there was not enough affordable

housing for the migrants that were continually arriving in the city, which generated uncontrolled and very poor suburbs in the periphery. In this context, the Francoist government passed in the mid-1950s a new legal framework for urban and housing policy with the aim of providing solutions to these urgent needs.

First, the Act of July 15, 1954 on the protection of low-income housing was passed with two main objectives: to define a more cohesive legal framework and, especially, to promote the participation of private promoters in the construction of social housing. This task had been mainly assumed by public bodies such as the National Housing Institute (*Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda*, INV), but public resources were not enough to satisfy all needs, so the government decided to make private action easier, through administrative and fiscal incentives. These measures were included in a new National Housing Plan for the period 1956-1960. It was passed in 1955 and foresaw the construction of more than half a million homes. A few months later, this new legal framework was completed through the Act of May 12, 1956 on land regime and urban planning (Land Act).

The Land Act defined the modern framework of Spanish urban planning establishing a unitary, coherent and hierarchical system.[21] It aimed to control urban growth, avoiding both irregular occupation of land and land speculation. In this sense, it defined that land ownership must play a social function and that urban planning must be a regulated and binding framework for land uses. Among its main contents, the Land Act included a land regime that is based in a classification of land according to its condition and development possibilities: urban, urban reserve and rural, the second one corresponding to land for urban expansion. It also established a hierarchical system of plans composed of general plans (*planes generales*), including national plan, provincial plans and county and municipal plans, which define the main guidelines for urban development; and of special and partial plans (*planes especiales y parciales*), which respectively aim to regulate singular aspects and to plan new urban fragments to materialize urban expansion. Along with this planning tools, the Land Act also defined a set of management systems that facilitated not only public initiative, such as expropriation, but also the private one.

It is important to point out that the Land Act was clearly influenced by the Falangist ideology, in aspects such as the concept of the social function of land ownership or the establishment of a hierarchical system of plans directed by the State.[22] In this regard, the Italian Act of August 17, 1942, which was passed during the Fascist regime, was a model for the Spanish Land Act, along with other contemporary European regulatory models.[23] However, the important change in the Francoist government that was previously mentioned and that took place in 1957 entailed a clear loss of influence of Falangists within the government, although they initially managed to retain some control of urban and housing policy. José Luis Arrese, a prominent Falangist, was the first head of the new Ministry of Housing, which assumed the control of the INV and included a new General Directorate for Urbanism. Two years later, the so-called Urbanization Agency (*Gerencia de Urbanización*, GU) was also created within the Ministry of Housing with the specific role of preparing urbanized land for both industrial and residential uses. These public bodies were thus in charge of the regional and urban planning system when clear gaps between it and the objectives of the new economic planning policy emerged in the early 1960s and eventually put the spatial planning system in question.

2.1. A pragmatic way for urban planning: alternative mechanisms and sectoral approaches to manage urban growth

From the beginning of the 1960s, the fulfilment of the objectives of economic growth conditioned all public policies in Spain, including those related to spatial planning. Although its legal framework had just been renovated, there was a gap between the new priorities concerning economic and urban development and the inspiring principles and planning procedures of the Land Act, so the latter were quickly ignored.[24] In fact, an alternative system for managing urban growth eventually emerged throughout the 1960s. It was composed of new acts and planning mechanisms that adopted a pragmatic approach to urban planning, even though it was contradictory to basic principles and procedures of the Land Act in force. Moreover, the Ministry of Housing and its dependent bodies, such as the GU, decisively contributed to this process.

From its creation, the usual performance of the GU consisted of obtaining some land, normally through expropriation, to urbanise new urban fragments called *polígonos*. Once prepared, the GU transferred the resulting plots to INV, or organized their alienation to private developers for the construction of industrial facilities or housing estates. According to the Land Act, these *polígonos* required the elaboration of a partial plan that had also to comply with the conditions defined by the corresponding general plan of the municipality. However, the Act 52/1962 was passed to make the activity of the GU easier. It allowed the delimitation of these *polígonos* even in the absence of a partial plan or a general plan, as well as the direct modification of the existing ones, if necessary, which represented a clear aggression to the urban planning system in force from the government itself.[25] It should be noted that the Land Act had declared that, once approved, plans are "public, executive and mandatory, not only for the administered, but also for the Administration [who] may not dispense with its observance".[26]

Likewise, the abovementioned Development Plans and the declaration of the poles of development eventually altered several principles of the Land Act, as they adopted the "American model of the 'industrial state', that is, with autonomy and independence regarding their location and development".[27] In this regard, the Ministry of Housing issued an order in September 1964 to approve provisional planning rules in the territory of the poles whose main mechanism was zoning.[28] The municipal territories corresponding to the declared poles were thus divided into areas different to those categorized by the Land Act. In the case of the "areas for exclusive industrial use", the establishment of industrial facilities was allowed with the sole requirement of presenting a draft of partial plan to define the basic requirements of accessibility and infrastructures. Likewise, in the "areas of tolerance for the location of special industrial facilities", which usually corresponded to rural land according to Land Act, any industrial establishment was allowed as long as it executed the basic infrastructures that it required.

Moreover, this order also established that the general plans of these municipalities had to assume these rules, even though they were named as "provisional". The system that was defined in the Land Act was thus being perverted, as these provisional rules allowed to ignore its procedures and even admitted the modification of general plans, so they reversed the

established hierarchy of plans. This subordination of the urban planning system to the objectives of the economic planning policy was confirmed through the Act 86/1965. This act represented a serious breach of the urban planning system that the Act 52/1962 had already anticipated, as it altered the basic principle of the precedence of planning to urbanization,[29] allowing to elaborate "simultaneously or successively" the projects of expropriation and urbanization and the partial plans, and to reduce the terms set out in the Land Act by half.[30]

Thanks to the pragmatic and simplified procedures that these acts provided, the development of *polígonos* by the GU soon accelerated, as a fundamental tool for the Development Plans.[31] Some figures that correspond to the projects that were undertaken by the GU just in its first five years of existence are clear evidence: 226 *polígonos* had been executed or were in operation, involving almost 15,000 hectares, of which 10,000 corresponded to residential estates and 5,000 to industrial uses. More than 5 billion pesetas (Spanish currency) were paid in expropriations for the obtainment of this land and almost 1.5 billion had been invested in works, while another 3.3 billion were already committed for this purpose. It was estimated that all that urbanized land would allow the construction of more than 900,000 dwellings and the installation of industrial facilities equivalent to 400,000 jobs,[32] which supported the economic development targets.

Reflecting the economic conditions of 1956 rather than those of the 1960s, the Land Act "failed to provide a viable framework for physical planning and its integration with economic planning", also in absence of a "unified strategy of spatial localisation of national economic planning forecasts".[33] While the gaps between the procedures of the Land Act and the urgent requirements derived from economic planning were filled through alternative acts and planning mechanisms, sectoral approaches to spatial planning also consolidated in Spain. In 1962, the General Directorate for Urbanism prepared a preliminary report for the national plan that was regulated in the Land Act as a comprehensive tool whose aim was to define the main guidelines of the spatial planning of the whole Spanish territory, according to social and economic needs. However, this plan was never passed, while the policy of selection of the

poles of development initially focused on potential for industrial development and eventually "failed to develop as an instrument for achieving regional policy objectives".[34]

It is also worth mentioning the Act 197/1963 on Centres and Zones of National Tourist Interest, as it denatured again the Land Act regarding its basic principle of a global organization of the territory, giving priority to a sectoral approach that aimed to meet the needs of an activity that played a key role in the development of Spanish economy in the 1960s. More specifically, this act established that territorial and urban plans in zones of touristic interest had to respect the "needs and assumptions" included in the Touristic Promotion Plans approved by the Ministry of Information and Tourism, while it also specified that the Land Act would be "supplemental" to the regulations of this act.[35]

This development-oriented approach to spatial planning, combined to "the active participation of developers and the autonomy of infrastructure and housing policies", had negative consequences that started to emerge at the end of the 1960s, with "densified centres and generally low-quality and fast-growing residential and industrial peripheries".[36] In fact, the Third Development Plan renounced to the poles policy and tried to promote an integrated regional development related to a comprehensive approach to spatial planning at national level.[37] However, the patterns of urban growth in this period were not only conditioned by this deficient integration between spatial planning and economic and other sectoral policies, but also by the lack of coordination and coherence between the initiatives by the national government and the actual planning framework existing at the local level. This situation will be illustrated through the cases of Burgos, Valladolid and Zaragoza, three inland cities that were declared as industrial poles in 1964 by the First Economic and Social Development Plan.

3. A new planning framework: contradictions between national and local perspectives. The cases of Burgos, Valladolid and Zaragoza

From 1964, the declaration of Valladolid and Zaragoza as poles of development strengthened their previous industrial base, which had been growing since mid-1950s, while the declaration of Burgos as pole of promotion attracted new industries to the city. This industrial dynamism

fostered the continuous arrival of numerous immigrants to these cities, mainly from their rural surroundings, which accelerated their demographic growth. As mentioned above, Zaragoza, Valladolid and Burgos were among the Spanish cities with the highest population growth in the 1960s, doubling the ratio of the previous decade (Figure 4).



Figure 4: Population of the cities of Zaragoza, Valladolid and Burgos (1940-1981). Data source: Spanish National Institute for Statistics (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*, INE). Census of Population.

Obviously, these migratory flows generated an enormous demand for housing in the three cities, while their declaration as poles also generated new needs of land for industrial uses. The respective city councils faced this situation of demographic and urban expansion through urban planning tools which were outdated and used beyond their possibilities or were directly ignored. In this context, where the political autonomy and technical capacity of the municipalities was very limited, the national government intervened directly in these three cities through new planning methods which clashed with the existing local planning framework. The lack of coordination between the city councils and the national government when managing urban growth was evident, and even showed in some cases a divergence of interests. Zaragoza, Valladolid, and Burgos are three very representative examples in this respect, as will be shown below.

3.1. Burgos: the "provisional" rules as a general plan for the industrial expansion

Burgos was the seat of Francisco Franco's government during the Civil War, which led to a remarkable population growth in the 1930s (Figure 4) that aggravated the problems of lack of housing. Trying to solve this situation, and after several previous attempts, the City Council passed in 1944 a "Plan of *Ensanche* (Extension) and Inner Reform", elaborated by the engineer José Paz Maroto. This general plan was based on nineteenth-century urban planning mechanisms, such as alignment projects, and had "a more theoretical than practical application", although it already anticipated that the future expansion of the city would take place towards the northeast.[38] In fact, during the period of autarky, Burgos consolidated an emerging industrial base in the food and textile sectors, with new factories which mostly established in a zone whose boundaries were the main communication routes towards the northeast (Madrid-Irun railway and roads to Logroño and Vitoria). However, this zone was a part of another neighbouring municipality, Gamonal. Given its inability to manage this emerging urban development, Gamonal requested its annexation to the municipality of Burgos, which became effective in 1955, while in 1959 a partial plan was passed to "add" this nucleus to the general plan as part of its *ensanche*.

Therefore, at the beginning of the 1960s, Burgos had an obsolete and patched up general plan, and the declaration of the city as pole of promotion made this situation unsustainable. It should be noted that this declaration was to some extent unexpected, as the national government had initially chosen Aranda de Duero. This municipality, which is located in the same province of Burgos and is directly connected by road with Madrid, had been chosen in 1958 as one of the "decongestion areas" of the capital of Spain, and it had already passed a partial plan project for an industrial area. Conversely, the City Council of Burgos had hardly planned the preparation of the land that the new factories would need to establish, so the national government imposed its new urban planning tools.

More specifically, the aforementioned provisional planning rules that the Ministry of Housing passed in September 1964 for the territory of the poles delimited in Burgos two "areas for exclusive industrial use": one in Gamonal, in a zone that the City Council had already studied

for this purpose in 1963, and another in Villalonquéjar, to the west of the city (Figure 5). In other words, the general plan of 1944 was *de facto* replaced by these "provisional" planning rules which, however, guided the growth of the city throughout the 1960s. The City Council accepted this situation and began to draw up a partial plan for the *polígono* of Gamonal in 1964. Obviously, this *polígono* was not contemplated in the general plan, as required by the Land Act, but only in the provisional planning rules. Despite, the partial plans were passed, and the City Council even authorised the construction of buildings on the site before its approval in February 1966, which the Land Act prohibited. In the same year, the GU began to draw up the partial plan for the *polígono* of Villalonquéjar, which was passed in February 1967, but could not be occupied until the 1970s. The local private developers also took advantage of this lack of clear urban planning regulations and they developed very dense residential estates without the necessary urban services, most of them in Gamonal.[39]



Figure 5: Provisional Planning Rules for the territory of the pole of industrial promotion of Burgos. Source: City Council of Burgos, 1964.

Therefore, the needs for industrial and residential land in Burgos due to the declaration of the pole were managed completely outside the procedures established by the Land Act, and often without any effective control. It is worth mentioning that the City Council of Burgos had initiated the revision of the old general plan of 1944 shortly after the Land Act was passed, but the official commission was not passed until 1966, almost ten years later. The new general plan was drafted by Julio García Lanza and it was not passed until December 1970, so it was conditioned by the *faits accomplis* of the previous decade. On the one hand, "it could only assume the existing urban structure and that derived from the pole", which conditioned the future development of the city; on the other hand, it definitively regularised urban planning in the city by including the new mechanisms that the national government had previously introduced, such as partial plans.[40]

3.2. Valladolid: opposed planning tools by different planning agents

During the 1950s, Valladolid accelerated its demographic growth, doubling that of the previous decade (Figure 4). The expansion of its traditional metallurgical industry in the automobile branch contributed to this, especially thanks to FASA, a company which began its production in 1953 with a licence from the French group Renault and grew continuously in the following years. The resulting increase in demand for housing was initially faced through various projects promoted by the INV, but from mid-1950s this became insufficient.

At that moment, the City Council decided to put into practice the proposals of the so-called "Extension Project of the city, with a general plan of alignments for its inner part". This general plan had been drawn up by the influential Spanish planner César Cort and passed in 1939, but it had hardly been implemented due to lacking resources. On the one hand, Cort proposed a intense transformation of the historic centre through the opening of new streets. On the other hand, he proposed a double expansion of the city: to the west, beyond river Pisuerga, and to the east, beyond the railway. Firstly, the City Council had focused on the historic centre and substituted the ambitious reform designed by Cort by little adjustments in the streets through a plan reform that was passed in 1950. Secondly, it started in 1953 the works of the expansion

project beyond river Pisuerga, in the so-called Huerta del Rey. However, the City Council had technical and financial difficulties to carry on this project, and the national government eventually decided to take charge of it.

In 1958, the City Council and the General Directorate for Urbanism signed an agreement to leave the extension plan of Cort aside and organize together a national competition to plan a *polígono* in the about 50 hectares that the City Council had already bought in Huerta del Rey. This project thus became a sort of test for the planning tools that the Ministry of Housing would intensively use in the following years. Some of the most relevant Spanish architects participated in the competition, and they proposed different solutions following the principles of functionalist urbanism that, at that time, and in Valladolid, were completely innovative. A few months later, the Ministry of Housing eventually decided to expropriate the land to the City Council and take over exclusively the project, which was then transferred to the newly created GU.[41] The GU adapted the plan that resulted from the competition to include its own plot models, while it additionally promoted the industrial *polígono* of Argales in the southeast of the city.

While the GU was drawing up the partial plans and urbanization projects for these two new *polígonos*, the City Council planned the growth of the city to the north and east using a completely different urban planning mechanism: between 1959 and 1960 it approved several "partial alignments reforms", similar to that of the historic centre. Whereas the partial plans included all the necessary infrastructures, public facilities and large open spaces between the buildings (mainly blocks and towers), the alignments reforms only defined the network of streets and did not include any reserves for green spaces or public facilities, which resulted in very dense neighbourhoods (Figure 6 and 7). Therefore, just before the declaration of the pole, Valladolid had an outdated general plan which was ignored by both the GU and the City Council, who were respectively planning the expansion of the city through totally opposed planning tools.

Figure 6: Plan and visual scheme of Huerta del Rey according to the project of 1963 by the GU (left), and photograph of the neighbourhood in early 1970s (right). Sources: Gerencia de Urbanización, *Gerencia de Urbanización 1959-1964* (Madrid: Gerencia de Urbanización, 1965); Municipal Archive of Valladolid, FC 95.



Figure 7: Partial alignments reform of Delicias neighbourhood (left), and photograph of the neighbourhood in mid-1960s (right). Sources: Municipal Archive of Valladolid, C 1357-5 and FC 128.

In view of this situation, the General Directorate for Urbanism approached the City Council on several occasions to prepare a new general plan adapted to both the Land Act and the actual situation of the city. The City Council even started the previous works for this in 1962, although they were soon interrupted, while the national government was not actually demanding either. In fact, the GU took advantage of the Act 52/1962 to approve in 1963 the partial plans and urbanization projects for the Huerta del Rey and Argales *polígonos*, contradicting the general plan in force, and the Ministry of Housing planned the industrial development of the city through

the provisional planning rules of the pole that were passed in 1964, ignoring again the expansion guidelines that had been defined by Cort.

In this way, the large urban growth of Valladolid in the 1960s was managed in a fragmented way and through opposed mechanisms by different planning agents, in a context of total lack of coordination and even divergence of interests between the City Council and the national government. On the one hand, the City Council clearly benefited the local private developers, who made huge profits in the working-class neighbourhoods that emerged thanks to the partial alignments reforms, where they were not required to transfer any land or invest in public infrastructures. On the other hand, the national government did not prevent the City Council from using this kind of urban planning tool that were contrary to the Land Act, and it developed its own projects in the city with total autonomy: it even went so far as to study the promotion of another *polígono* in the south of the city without even informing the City Council, which motivated a official complaint by the mayor.

This totally anomalous situation began to be overcome when local interests converged again with those of the national government at the end of the 1960s. Once they had exploited all the profits possibilities in the new working-class neighbourhoods, the local developers wanted to give way to the new mechanisms for urban expansion, and the City Council definitively promoted the elaboration of a new general plan. The work was commissioned in 1968 to a team led by the architect Javier de Mesones, one of the most important Spanish planners of the period,[42] and the new general plan was passed in June 1970. From the point of view of the national government, this general plan served as an example of the new type of plans that the General Directorate for Urbanism was promoting, based on the ideas of the well-known Greek architect Doxiadis.[43] From the local point of view, the plan by Mesones provided enormous possibilities for urban expansion to the west and south of the city, as expected by local developers. Indeed, one of the most prominent ones, Antonio Alfonso, who had built hundreds of dwellings in the working-class neighbourhoods, presented in 1974 one of the largest partial plans in Spain, drawn up by Javier de Mesones himself. It included more than 200 hectares to build almost 12,000 dwellings that this time were intended for the emergent middle-class

population of the city, at a moment when a new phase in local planning and development was beginning.

3.3. Zaragoza: the ultimate contradiction of the Land Act

From mid-1950's, a period of large demographic and urban growth began in Zaragoza (Figure 4), thanks to a great extent by its industrialization. The city benefited from its location at the crossroads of the two major axes that connect the main industrial and urban nodes of Spain: Madrid-Barcelona and Bilbao-Valencia, which provided a solid industrial base that reinforced after the declaration of the pole in 1964. At that time, Zaragoza already represented a third of the total population of its region, Aragon, while at the end of the 1970s it gathered almost half of the Aragonese population, which produced a change of urban scale, including the formation of an emerging low-density metropolitan area.[44]

Unlike Burgos and Valladolid, Zaragoza faced the urban growth of the 1960s with a general plan adapted to the Land Act. It was elaborated by a team led by José de Yarza García and passed in 1959, but this general plan was widely conditioned by the local planning inertia. On a structural level, it replicated the radio-centric model of the preliminary plan that Yarza himself had drawn up in 1943, combining it with a new regulation of urban expansion based on *polígonos* and zoning guidelines. However, the regulation of building in the urban centre continued to depend on the plan for inner reform and the building regulations that had been passed by the City Council in 1939. In fact, in the 1960s, these building regulations were “the main tool for housing production [...] at the expense of compacting the neighbourhoods”, while “the urban legacy of these years of development corresponds to the actions by the State totally, unrelated to the municipal plan”.[45]

Regarding these actions by the national government, once again outside the local urban planning framework, the provisional planning rules of the pole that were passed in 1964 played a key role. Instead of the radio-centric model of the plan by Yarza, they proposed a linear expansion for industrial uses following the course of the river Ebro, as well as a great mixed residential and industrial growth towards the northeast, following the course of the river

Gállego. Similarly, the planning study for Zaragoza's arterial road network approved that same year by the Ministry of Public Works did not respect the structural model in the general plan either. Aiming at solving this evident contradiction between the planning approved by the City Council and the planning approved by the national government, a new general plan was passed in 1968. Drafted up by Emilio Larrodera, who had worked in the GU at the beginning of the sixties and shortly after was nominated General Director for Urbanism, this general plan assumed the structural model that had been outlined by the provisional planning rules of the pole, adding new territories, while it also encouraged local developers to use the new urban planning tools of the Land Act, such as partial plans. However, this new general plan did not eventually solve the lack of coordination.

In 1970, the national government approved the Decree-Act 7/1970, of June 27, on Urgent Urban Development Actions (the so-called ACTUR, *Actuaciones Urbanísticas Urgentes*). With the aim of facilitating the acquisition and urbanization of land to build social housing, this decree authorized the Ministry of Housing to propose the delimitation of areas for this purpose, as well as to approve the corresponding partial plans and urbanization projects even if these contradicted the existing municipal plans,[46] which represented the second clear aggression to the urban planning system in force from the government itself after the Act 52/1962.[47] Although these urgent actions were mainly planned for Madrid and Barcelona, they were also enabled in other cities, including Zaragoza.

More specifically, the Ministry of Housing initiated in April 1971 the process to approve an ACTUR on an area of more than 650 hectares in the north-western part of the city (Figure 8). This area included seven *polígonos* which had been defined in the general plan of 1968, whose corresponding partial plans were being processed or even were already approved in some of them. However, all were cancelled, because the ACTUR divided the area into 22 zones and provided new planning guidelines for the partial plans that would enable their urbanization, whose approval started from 1973.[48] Therefore, the most relevant urban development action of the 1970s in Zaragoza was once again an initiative by the national government that was

defined outside the local urban planning framework: “the problem was not so much the lack of planning but of coordination”.[49]



Figure 8: General plan of Zaragoza (1968), with an added window indicating the location of the ACTUR (left), and plan of zones in the ACTUR (right). Sources: Manuel Guardia (dir.), *Atlas histórico de ciudades europeas. 1. Península ibérica* (Barcelona: Salvat, 1994), 261; Pablo de la Cal, Carmen Díez Medina and Javier Monclús (ed.), *Nuevas miradas y exploraciones urbanas: Zaragoza 1968-2018* (Zaragoza: Universidad de Zaragoza, 2018), 26.

4. Conclusions

In the so-called Golden Age of Capitalism, indicative planning was adopted as a basis for their economic development by several countries, both democratic regimes, such as France and Japan, and authoritarian dictatorships, such as South Korea and Spain. This economic model was usually combined to regional development policies, while it also induced territorial transformations and intense urban growth. Regarding these spatial aspects in a context of strong economic growth, the case of Spain shows the results of the lack of an integrated approach to regional and urban policies that has been analysed both in their contents (economic planning and spatial planning) and in their agents (national and local).

The regional policy within economic planning was itself sectoral and its spatial effects were also managed through a sectoral approach. The regional and urban planning system in force was ignored and substituted in practice by a parallel system, as the Spanish government prioritized a pragmatic approach to solve the gap with spatial planning and fulfil the industrialisation targets. In this context, the cases of Burgos, Valladolid and Zaragoza show

how further contradictions emerged between the national and the local level. Whilst the national government implemented autonomously its own projects through new planning tools, namely partial plans, the City Councils maintained its own planning inertia, which mainly benefited local developers, who played a key role in local economies throughout this period.

This contradictory framework resulted in imbalances both at regional and local levels with further effects. On the one hand, the economic and population imbalances among provinces that emerged in that period and later consolidated are key part of current social and political debate in Spain.[50] On the other hand, the pragmatic approach to urban planning eventually reinforced partial plans and consolidated a framework for urban expansion consisting of massive housing production through autonomous fragments. In the late 1990s, when national policies again fostered urban growth, this inertia that emerged in the 1960s contributed to an unsustainable urban development model with very negative consequences in many Spanish cities, showing once again “a lack of basic mechanisms for coordination and cooperation between political actors and between them and other economic and social stakeholders”.[51]

It is finally worth highlighting the relevance of these conclusions beyond the case that has been analysed. What happened in Spain in that period of intense economic growth can help to understand the patterns of urban growth in some expanding economies both in the past and nowadays.

On the one hand, when national strategies that induce urban growth are exclusively focused on economic targets and their spatial effects are not considered within an integrated approach, real estate production eventually consolidates as a source itself of economic growth, which may involve unsustainable building patterns. For instance, this kind of reflection is currently in place in China following the recent and very intense urbanisation processes. In a context of strong economic growth, territorial imbalances between inland and coastal regions have increased, while urban growth patterns have dramatically affected historic heritage and have also involved overbuilding in several cities.[52]

On the other hand, when dealing with this gap between economic development and spatial planning, local actors are likely to play a key role that can result in very different approaches. As previously said, they can also prioritize economic targets and foster the local real estate market in a framework of unsustainable urban growth patterns, as for instance most Spanish municipal governments did in the 1960s and once again in the 2000s, but they can alternatively implement local-based planning strategies able to define a resilient framework against unsustainable urban growth trends, as some local planning actors also did in Spain in the most recent period, for instance in Zaragoza and Valladolid.[53]

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