

Towards a Poetics of Fascination: Mimesis, Becoming, and Giordano Bruno's Furious Subject

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ABSTRACT: “Those poems by Giordano Bruno are a gift for which I am grateful with all my heart.” In this way, Nietzsche expressed his enthusiasm for the writings of Giordano Bruno (1548–1600). It is not difficult to discern the reasons why those poems turned out to be so stimulating for Nietzsche since, long before the ideas of individualistic self-sufficiency managed to impose themselves, Bruno characterized the human and more-than-human condition as a play of affective contagions. In this essay, I will explore some of those mimetic links. To do this, we will focus on his general theory of bonds (*De vinculis in genere*), and we will put it in relation to his Italian poems (especially *De gli eroici furori*). Thinking about these links, which are nothing but vital forces that operate below, through, and beyond human, will lead us to reflect on the relevance that these non-modern conceptions could have today.

KEY WORDS: affect, becoming, bonds, imagination, intuition, metamorphosis, mimesis

Venice, May 22, 1884. Friedrich Nietzsche, physically and mentally weak, with severe neuralgias that force him to stay in bed, writes a letter in response to his young friend, Heinrich von Klein (1857–1887). Soon after, the two would meet in person at Sils-Maria, but it seems that Nietzsche cannot contain his enthusiasm for reading a sixteenth-century Italian philosopher, Giordano Bruno (1548–1600). The letter begins as follows:

These poems of Giordano Bruno are a gift that I thank you for from the bottom of my heart. I have allowed myself to appropriate them as if I wrote them and “taken” them as strengthening drops. Alas, if you knew how rare it is for me to receive something invigorating from the outside world! (Nietzsche 1884: 514)¹

A few months earlier, Klein—an expert in the philosophy of the Nola-born thinker—had sent Nietzsche his own translation of those passages that excited him. He did so as a token of gratitude for having received the third part of his philosophical masterpiece, *Also sprach Zarathustra*. Among those fragments were the preface poem of *De la causa, principio et Uno*, the third sonnet of the introduction to *De l'infinito, universo e mondi*, as well as some passages belonging to the fourth dialogue of *De gli eroici furori* (Posani Löwerstein 2014).

What was it that caused Nietzsche's sudden admiration?² Surely, he found in Bruno not only an imposing speculative capacity, but also a brave personality that was able to convey that philosophical depth with expressive and creative poetic language.³ Refusing the preponderance of abstract logic, Bruno tried to disentangle the deep meanings of nature, wherein human beings were nothing but a specific configuration more. Beyond any humanistic anthropocentric vision, or today's "existence in stoical self-sufficiency or individual arrest" (Sloterdijk 2011: 207), Bruno felt the world as a kind of "spiraling loop" (Lawtoo 2022: 10), a complex network of affective contagions, of energies that act in a symbiotic way, of resonances and fascinating mimetic forces that, after all, end up denying the narcissistic individual autonomy. The following quote, taken from his 1591 treatise *De vinculis in genere* (translated as *A General Account on Bonding*), provides us with an eloquent example of the ontology of attractions and mutual correspondences the Nolan philosopher assembled, which also makes him worthy of a place in the genealogy of *homo mimeticus* (Lawtoo 2022: 27):

The toad attracts the weasel with a hidden power in its breathing; the cock overwhelms the lion with its voice; the mullet, by its touch, stops a ship; in his fantasy, the fanatic devours the demon; and a melancholic and unstable humour acts like a magnet on evil spirits. . . . There are species which are bound to a different species through love, hate, admiration, piety, compassion, and other such passions. For example, there are some famous cases of such bonding, like Lesbia with her sparrow, Corinna with her small dog, Cyparissus with his doe, and Arion with his dolphin. In general, the seeds of all species are attracted to other species [*in summa, in omni specie semina sunt illecebris ad reliquas*]. I will remain silent about the sympathy between a man and a lion, and I will pass over what I know about the astonishing intimacy between a boy and a snake. (Bruno 2004: 155, 162)

It is a rich and densely allusive fragment, in which Bruno takes the reader through illustrations chosen from nature, mythology, or even doubtful anecdotes from the lives of saints—the sympathy between man and lion recalls Saint Jerome healing a wounded lion—to point out the importance of these mimetic bonds that are at work everywhere. Perhaps, it seems to tell us, we have forgotten the ordinary presence of this network of affinities and its effects precisely because they are common and subtle, like someone so used to the beauty that he no longer

pays attention to it.⁴ We can focus on the fact that each body, each animal, has its own special predispositions—the weasel feels attracted by the toad’s breathing, the cock’s voice overwhelms the lion, and so on—but it is just one more procedure within the thick and convoluted machinery of impersonal human and non-human forces.

Very much like the Nietzschean privileged image of the bridge (Lawtoo 2022: 124), the phrase “the seeds of all species are attracted to other species” expresses not only the omnipresence of this common mimetic circuit of vibrant materialities (Bennett 2010), but also the uncertainty of the links, the unexpectedness of the attractions, the fragility, in short, not only of the bond but of what is bonded. But why can everything be attracted to everything? Bruno makes an ontological movement in which divinity is immanent to nature, and not a transcendent entity (Knox 2013). All beings share, therefore, the same thread of life, a matter that is not passive, but that actively seeks form (Bruno 2004: 70–87). That is to say: it is not a static and homogeneous substance, we could not even consider it a substance in the strict sense, but rather it is a process that gives shelter and sustains the multiplicity, the becoming, the emerging novelty.

In this way, Bruno defines this circuit of mimetic movements as an underlying structure in nature: a mode of causality that goes beyond individual human psychology, an impersonal system of multiple and incessantly changing resonances and attunements. He seems to join forces not only with Nietzsche, but also with Spinoza, Deleuze, and more recent developments in object-oriented philosophy, new materialisms or the so-called non-human turn.⁵ In the pages that follow, I intend to explore this kind of material agency that acts between, below, through, and within bodies. To do this, I will use some of the examples of the Brunian philosophy that dazzled Nietzsche.

“AND HE SAW HIMSELF CONVERTED INTO THE THING HE WAS PURSUED”

The youthful Actaeon unleashes the mastiffs and the greyhounds
to the forests, when destiny directs him
to the dubious and perilous path,
near the traces of the wild beasts.

Here among the waters he sees the most beautiful countenance and breast,
that ever one mortal or divine may see,
clothed in purple and alabaster and fine gold;
and the great hunter becomes the prey that is hunted.

The stag which to the densest places
is wont to direct his lighter steps,
is swiftly devoured by his great and numerous dogs.

I stretch my thoughts to the sublime prey,
 and these springing back upon me,
 bring me death by their hard and cruel gnawing. (Bruno 1964: 123)

In 1585, during his stay in London,⁶ Bruno wrote *De gli eroici furori*, a series of philosophical dialogues that reveals an impressive poetic style and conceptual brilliance. Like Plato and later Nietzsche, Bataille, and many others, Bruno is one of those philosophers who makes use of “myth’s primary medium of mass communication: namely, mimesis” (Lawtoo 2022: 70). In the passage quoted above, Giordano Bruno presents, through the story of Actaeon and Diana, a beautiful image of the relationship between human beings and knowledge. The fragment, a poem recited in the midst of a dialogue between Tansillo and Cicada, is structured around three components: Actaeon, who is the subject of the experience, and his relationship with himself—represented by the mastiffs and greyhounds, which are nothing more than his thoughts, his intellect and his desire; the mediating visual act between Actaeon and the image; and, finally, the ghostly semblance reflected on the water. Fascinated by the vision and excited by the desire to catch the divinity responsible for such a beautiful representation, the heroic hunter embarks on an enterprise destined, from the beginning, to fail: the dogs—that is, his thoughts—turn against Actaeon, who dies devoured.⁷

Bruno seems to trace an insurmountable metaphysical abyss between the supernatural and the earthly, an obvious hierarchy of Platonic influence between two levels of reality—the ideal and the apparent. If so, Bruno’s story would not deal so much with experience, but with its impossibility, with the finitude of human knowledge. However, the Brunian movement toward knowledge through experience is situated in the relationship of the self—in this case, Actaeon—with the world that surrounds him, since the image that seizes him is a reflection of Diana, precisely the goddess who embodies nature. In this sense, the Nolan thinker rushes to show the true meaning of the death of his main character: in a mimetic movement, the hunter becomes prey and becomes hunted, because “having already tracked down the divinity within himself it was no longer necessary to hunt for it elsewhere” (Bruno 1964: 127). Immersed in the event, he had become, for a moment, the finest and most sensitive nerve endings on the planet: he is captured by and resonating with the image. Subject and object are not only confused but ultimately come to exchange their roles, so Actaeon manages to reach “the region of incomprehensible things” by becoming the object of experience. At the heart of Bruno’s description is not so much the ultimate goal—that is, the experience of light—as the process, the luminosity of the experience, in which divinity, nature, and image form a perfect virtuous circle (Ciliberto 2013: 37).

There are two nuclear elements in this experience: on the one hand, the eros of Actaeon, the fundamental drive of the furious hero, “the truly character of participation” according to Jean-Luc Nancy’s statement in his conversation with

Nidesh Lawtoo (2022: 5). On the other hand, the image— “it is convenient for those who want to know, to speculate with images; likewise, understanding is either imagination or imagining something” (Bruno 1997: 336, my translation)—which radiates its valences (“purple, alabaster and fine gold”) and enlivens the hunter’s eros. Resonating together, both build the bond (the fascination) that leads to the definitive mimesis: within this lively tension, the heart of Bruno’s mimetic hero palpitates between mediation and immediacy. But how are these two central elements related? And what lessons can we draw from that mimetic connection?

Let’s look first at Diana’s reflection on the water, a more abstract figure, directly related to nature, which contains divinity within itself (*complicatio*). Principally, we should note that the unfolding (*explicatio*, following the terminology Bruno borrows from Nicolas of Cusa) of those fascinating strands of purple, alabaster, and fine gold has no *a priori* fixed goal. Nature radiates fully in its absolute indifference, regardless of any intentionality. The paths drawn by its emanations are uncertain, plural, and omnidirectional, but they contain the active potentiality—allow me the apparent paradox, which is also at work in Bruno’s thought—of creating connection nodes, transport routes that carry modes of knowledge, if they meet an attentive and susceptible entity. The *explicatio* is an act of manifestation that is vital and active, but indifferent to any pre-established *telos*.

Let us now examine the eros of Actaeon, which contains in itself, as Lawtoo (2022: 268) puts it, “a privileged human medium of (dis)possession.” The hunter actively seeks to obtain his object—knowledge—following the uncertain paths (*dubio ed incauto camino*) nature proposes, as we have seen. And it is here where Bruno’s sonnet magnificently displays a kind of speed change, suggesting that knowledge springs unexpectedly, precisely from the rush of attraction towards the stag. That kind of magnetism forces Actaeon to pay attention and, in the end, entails a mimetic movement. So, there is an objective established by intelligence and reason, there is a directionality and an intention, but it is the will—eros, after all—that leads the hunter to attend to the signals that Diana—nature—radiates: dubious paths that sometimes intersect, get in the way, even annul each other. The boundaries between desire and mimesis are, therefore, eroded.

The attraction to the vitality of other entities, the inclination that leads to the mimetic union is, then, necessary. But why? Bruno himself, through the character of Tansillo, explains it: “he becomes the prey by the operation of the will whose act converts him into the object” (*E questa caccia per l’operazione della voluntade, per atto della quale lui si converte nell’oggetto*), he affirms confidently. At this stage, intelligence and reason are not useful, because they “understand things intelligently, that is, according to its own mode” (*sai bene che l’intelletto apprende le cose intelligibilmente, idest secondo il suo modo*). But “the will pursues things naturally, that is, according to the manner in which things exist in themselves” (*e la volontà perseguita le cose naturalmente, cioè secondo la ragione con la quale sono sé*).

In other words, reason operates by applying previous molds to a given thing: it works in its own way, on its own terms, that is, from outside things or events. It is even capable of anticipating consequences, so it is essential that the results fit the predetermined frame. But eros needs mimesis to know. From it derives a type of knowledge that is very different from that provided by intelligence, because in it, the process is everything—and not so much the result. As Bruno himself tells us, the will can know things in themselves, without imposing molds, that is, from the inside. The key to eros is not to reach an outcome that will be diverse almost out of necessity, but to internalize the movements and passions of what is resonating with it. For this reason, Bruno tells us that “having already contracted the divinity within himself it was no longer necessary to hunt for it elsewhere” (*perché già avendola contratta in sé, non era necessario di cercare fuor di sé la divinità*). It is no coincidence that Bruno uses the verb “to contract.” *Contractio* is another term that the Nolan philosopher assumes from Nicholas of Cusa: it supposes absorption, in other words, the incorporation and internalization of the external entity.⁸ The moment when the external is contracted to the maximum inside the furious coincides with the supreme expansion of Actaeon, in a kind of influx and efflux oscillation, following Jane Bennett’s conceptual framework. It is a moment of extreme harmonization, where opposites coincide (Bruno 1964: 96).

From all that has been said, the type of knowledge achieved through eros and mimesis logically derives. It is not a rational, schematic intelligence, much less a discursive knowledge. It is performative. As Bruno tells us, when Actaeon finishes the dazzling process of union,

turns his feet and *directs his new steps*; is renewed for a divine course—that is, with greater facility and with a more efficacious inspiration—*toward the densest places*, toward the deserts, toward the region of incomprehensible things: from the vulgar and common man he was, he becomes rare and heroic, rare in all he does, rare in his concepts, and he leads the extraordinary life. (Bruno 1964: 126)

The quotation displays a kind of performative knowledge that does things “not only with words, as poststructuralism taught us, but also does things through bodies” (Lawtoo 2022: 272). It is about an active, vital, and experiential intelligence, one that confers Actaeon a location so real, so touchable, and so integrated into nature that it gives him back a very objective image of his own position. Like a tiny particle inserted into a much higher order of things, now the hunter shines like nature: the metamorphosis is completed.⁹ And as the living knowledge that it is, it is creative knowledge. Perhaps for this reason there is a magnification of the imagination in Bruno’s thought as perhaps never before in the history of Western philosophy. Intimately connected to the outside world and internal affects, but also regulated by intuition and memory, the world of imagination

is not simply a shadow of the natural universe. Instead, it is a very particular mirror, radically animated by a vital principle that never ceases to create new images (Bruni 1886: 119). It is, therefore, a vibrant space that can even enter into conflict with the creative power of nature. What the imagination reflects is not a particular world, nor a specific image, but nature's creative power itself. Not in vain, the creative action of nature and the functioning of the imaginative faculty are defined through similar terms: the "space" of the imagination and the "space" of natural life coincide and, consequently, it is in the imaginative world where the bonds with natural life are tightened (Bruno 1886: 28–29).¹⁰

According to Bruno, these mimetic currents are not something casual, but causal: they underlie the fabric of nature itself. In this way, as we have seen previously, we can ensure that the toad knows the fact that with the invisible power of its breath, it attracts the weasel, and that the cock is able of frightening the lion with its voice. They all know, they all have a certain agency, even if they act without the help of molds, diagrams, symbols, or concepts. All of them move, without intelligence or, better still, with non-human intelligence, within this Brunian ontology of reciprocal effects, of resonances between multiple poles of energy. Logically, if this underlying mimetic machinery works at the level of all entities—with a difference of degree in relation to their potentialities to link and be linked—it should also work within the subject. Let's explore this idea before concluding.

"AT ONCE BURIED IN THE BODY AND EXPOSED TO THE SUN"

In the third dialogue of the second part of the *De gli eroici furori*, Bruno creates a memorable scene. As the furious man relaxes under the shade of a cypress tree, his eyes and his heart begin to argue: "each one complained that the other was the cause of the laborious torment that consumed his soul" (Bruno 1964: 228). The heart begins the debate:

How is it, eyes of mine, that I am tormented so powerfully
by that ardent flame which derives from you?

How can my mortal substance
continue to be fed by so great a fire,

that I believe all of the ocean's moisture
and the most frozen part of the slowest star of the Arctic
to be inadequate to curb my fire even for a moment
and give me a shadow of refuge?

You made me captive
of a hand that holds me, yet wants me not;
because of you I am at once buried in the body and exposed to the sun.

I am a principle of life, and yet, there is no life in me.
 I do not know what I am,
 for I belong to this soul, yet it does not belong to me. (Bruno 1964: 228–29)

According to the heart, the sensible knowledge that is given through the eyes is the culprit that ignites desire. However, the eyes disagree, accusing the heart of being the source and cause of all the tears they shed. But how is it possible, the heart wonders, that from one cause and one principle an opposing force can arise? How could the heart, being fire, fill the eyes with tears? How could the eyes inflame the heart? Perhaps, the logical thing would be to think that, being two forces of the same magnitude, they should collapse or neutralize each other (Bruno 1964: 236). However, the traditional sequence between sensitive stimulus and affect is eroded in Bruno's position, and what is suggested is a close interaction between sensation, knowledge, and affect, that is to say, *pathos* and *logos*. This is a fact that also brings the figures of Bruno and Nietzsche closer together. One cannot be separated from the embodied *pathos* (Lawtoo 2022: 79). Eyes and heart must mingle and conspire with each other, absorb each other and work harmoniously. Otherwise, if the eyes were not influenced by the heart, they would be just opaque glasses. If the heart inflames the eyes so much that they turn to ashes, it may lead the subject awfully astray, enclosing the individual within itself:

And now for that which pertains to a consideration of the eyes, note that the present discourse attributes two functions to them, one of impressing the heart, the other of receiving an impression from the heart. Similarly the heart has two functions, one of receiving an impression from the eyes, and the other of making its impression upon them. The eyes apprehend the species and propose them to the heart; and the heart desires them and transmits its desire to the eyes; these conceive the light, diffuse it and enkindle the fire in the heart; the heart, burned and inflamed, sends its humour on the way to the eyes so that they may digest it. Thus in the first place the cognition moves the affection which in turn moves the cognition. (Bruno 1964: 238)

Once again, the opposites are only apparent, since they must work in sympathy to achieve knowledge. Therefore, the eyes are first described as mere mirrors, but when they are moved by the affection of the heart, they become “zealous performers.” Nonetheless, on both occasions, they are means of knowledge: from the “speculative intellect” (from Latin *speculum* and Italian *specchio*, mirror) that captures beauty in the external entity, to the “diligent intellect” that, affected by the fire of the heart, infinitely seeks what is infinite. Precisely, the weeping eyes symbolize the radical affinity and the arduous separation of the thing desired from the subject who desires it. Just as Actaeon's steps are lighter—his body and his mind change after the mimetic event¹¹—the eyes are not the same after feeling, sympathetically, the tribulations of the heart. And, once more, the operation,

namely the process of becoming-other, entails knowledge in its own right: “the felicity of the gods is described by their drinking of nectar and not by their having drunk it. . . . Therefore, the gods hold satiety to be a state of movement and apprehension and not a state of repose and comprehension” (Bruno 1964: 240).

Through examining the underlying mimetic machinery in nature, the figure of a particular subject has been outlined before us. Let us conclude, then, by asking ourselves what the subject described by Bruno is like. Perhaps we can discern some of the consequences that could flow from this.

Bruno’s subject is a conscious entity that lives immersed in a dense network saturated with forces that, operating mimetically, emphatically deny an autonomous and sovereign conception of the individual. We could say that human beings are always attracted to, even fascinated by something, be it another human being or non-human entities, whether natural or artificial. This virtual capacity to yearn for the other entails several fundamental issues: in the first place, the bonds and mimetic processes are not only material mediations, but they are the machinery that operates below, within, and between different entities. It is a material, vivid and experimental causality that shapes knowledge and performs it (Lawtoo 2019). Secondly, but directly related to what was said above, the Brunian hero must be someone open to the world, curious and attentive, and prepared to cooperate symbiotically with the actions and effects of other entities that populate the world. Thus, the human being is described as one more mediating entity in a world moved by multiple correspondences, sympathies, and attractions. From both statements derives the need of the other to achieve knowledge, not as a mediating instrument, or as a mere object, but as a being that is also endowed with agency. Considering the concept of a subject that emerges from Bruno’s thought, in the mimetic processes the differences are not eroded in favor of an “almighty” human individual who imposes and projects himself on the object to achieve a goal, but the relationship is more intensive than rational: the affective joining operation is the key, a way of knowing in itself.

However, Bruno is also aware of the dangers that mimetic actions entail, because subjects can easily blind themselves, or be blinded if they do not pay attention: the eyes can act as simple external receptors without depth, affectivity can blind and lock the subject within itself, just as manipulators can lure us in with their tricks, as evidenced in *De vinculis in genere*, which can be directly interpreted as a manual for effective mass manipulation (Couliano 1987). For this reason, the mimetic activity as described by Bruno must be, first of all, an active process by both parts from the beginning, an operation where the most visceral sensitivity is already a means of knowledge, a kind of first filter. And second, but not least, it must be creative, hence Bruno’s sublimation of the imaginative faculty. Are not all forms of systemic violence, among other things, assaults on the role of the imagination as a political principle?

As we have verified in the case of Actaeon, the mimetic machinery, through affectivity and imagination, dislocates the subject from any stable essence or iden-

tity, from its central position. After all, according to Bruno's thought, there is no subjective process that is not directly intersubjective, or collective in a certain way. Imagination creates spaces where dormant potentialities, sometimes unexpected and unknown, can be triggered. Ultimately, the function of the imagination and memory—so closely related¹²—within the mimetic act is the selection of sensations and affects, of these potentialities awakened by the sympathetic bond with other entities, in order to compose images that act as affirmative forces.

At last, Bruno's mimetic conception is a profoundly ethical project, in which sympathetic movements, affinities and resonances are essential elements. After all, mimesis unfolds, at its very core, the deep longing for change, to become other, to undergo a transformation through the encounter with the other, be it a human or non-human entity. Therefore, the underlying mimetic machinery creates the space for these correlations, for sympathies and antipathies, for the meeting with energies that attract each other. Precisely because he conceives mimetic bonds as fragile, unstable but transforming forces, for his sublimation of the imagination and attentiveness, I believe Giordano Bruno's thought—seen next to Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze, Badiou, or Bennett—but could serve as an inspiration for present and future ethical developments.

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NOTES

1. My own translation of the following: "Diese Gedichte Giordano Bruno's sind ein Geschenk, für welches ich Ihnen von ganzem Herzen dankbar bin. Ich habe mir erlaubt, sie mir zuzueignen, wie als ob ich sie gemacht hätte und für mich — und sie als stärkende Tropfen 'eingenommen.' Ja wenn Sie wüßten, wie selten noch etwas Stärkendes von Außen her zu mir kommt!"
2. I am by no means the first to notice the deep affinities between the thoughts of Nietzsche and Bruno. In this sense, see Miguel Ángel Granada (2002).
3. It is not surprising, therefore, that it was Nietzsche himself who, in another letter to Klein shortly after their meeting at Sils-Maria, placed Bruno alongside Plato and Goethe as a great creative figure. See posthumous fragment 1884, 26 [42]: "Die höheren Formen, wo der Künstler nur ein Theil des Menschen ist — z.B. Plato, Goethe, G Bruno. Diese Formen gerathen selten."
4. As Nidesh Lawtoo (2022: 30) recently puts it: "These powers tend to go largely unnoticed . . . for they have become habitual and second nature over time."
5. Bruno's influence on Spinoza has long been recognized, see the publication of Miguel Ángel Granada (2002) as an example. Similarly, Joshua Ramey (2012) has investigated the legacy of Bruno present in Deleuze's philosophy. On the other hand, it is eloquent how Bruno's thought was at the center of the debate between Graham Harman and Iain Hamilton Grant. See Graham Harman (2010: 21-40), and the response by Iain Hamilton Grant (2010: 41-46).

6. Bruno's life was a nomadic one, usually forced by adverse circumstances. This is a fact that obviously has an echo in his own philosophy. Due to limited space, I cannot focus on the vicissitudes he lived during his stay in London. In this sense, I strongly recommend the publications of Giovanni Aquilechia (1995, 2001) and John Charles Nelson (1958).
7. The reflections on the history of Actaeon in Bruno are varied and divergent from each other. One of the most interesting, since it compares Actaeon with the figure of Narcissus (and is, therefore, radically different from the analysis presented in this article) is found in the book by Nuccio Ordine (2008).
8. It is worth remembering here the beautiful definition of *contractio* established by Alfonso Ingegno: "a specifying of the absolute of the divinity in the singular creature" (Ingegno 1987: 119, my translation).
9. It is interesting to observe the process by which the furious hero gains access to knowledge through the image of the three graces: Aglaea, who shines; Euphrosyne, who absorbs the gift; Thalia, who, by returning the gift, becomes as resplendent as Aglaea, so the cycle begins again. In this regard, see Lars Spuybroek (2020).
10. It is not a casual decision to apply the concept of *space* to the imaginative faculty. In Bruno there is a diagrammatic spatialization of the faculties in many of his treatises on memory and on the composition of images.
11. Bruno himself clearly states this in his treatise *De magia* (*On Magic*), written practically at the same time as *De vinculis in genere*: "This opens the door to those other impressions which the art of binding seeks in order to establish further bonds, namely, hope, compassion, fear, love, hate, indignation, anger, joy, patience, disdain for life, for death, for fate, and all of the powers which cross over from the soul to change the body" (Bruno 2004: 142).
12. Many of the studies on the philosophy of Giordano Bruno have focused on the faculty of memory, although more precise research on the ways in which imagination and memory are combined in his thought is still needed.

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