https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/1294 Dpto. Filosofía (Filosofía,Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Teoría e Historia de la Educación, Filosofía Moral, Estética ...) - Artículos de revista 2026-04-06T06:50:01Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83110 El artículo da cuenta que la historia constitucional chilena se encuentra vinculada a las nociones de orden y estabilidad. Esta situación se manifiesta de manera particular en la Constitución de 1980, fruto del régimen de un gobierno de facto que implantó un sistema constitucional fundado en una comprensión liberal de la democracia, la cual se fundamenta y se legitima por su uso. Se apuesta por una reforma a la Carta, la que actualmente opera fuera de los fines de toda Constitución, restringiendo la participación ciudadana. Particular atención merecen las manifestaciones que tienen lugar hoy y que reflejan cómo el régimen constitucional impide poner sobre la mesa de discusión con el Gobierno un ideal de educación que abandone una democracia instrumental y que recoja principios republicanos. 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83109 De los conceptos fundamentales de la teoría comunicacional del derecho: derecho, ordenamiento y ámbito jurídico -- Del sistema: algunas notas sobre la relación entre la norma y la ciencia del derecho en la teoría comunicacional del derecho -- Notas en relación al lugar de la dogmática en la teoría comunicacional: la norma jurídica como construcción del sistema -- El argumento democrático -- ¿Es posible la legitimidad por vía de la legalidad? Sobre el "vacío" dejado por el derecho natural racional y el papel de la legitimidad en la validez de las normas jurídicas -- Sobre las cadenas de legitimación: Böckenförde y los fundamentos del Estado democrático de derecho. 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83108 El trabajo discute algunos aspectos de la legitimidad de la supremacía judicial desde un punto de vista histórico y normativo. Adicionalmente, reflexiona sobre las teorías político-constitucionales conocidas como departamentalismo y constitucionalismo popular. A continuación, enuncia y descarta como válidos diversos argumentos prácticos y normativos que defienden la supremacía judicial, es decir, el carácter final con que los tribunales controlan normas emanadas de otros poderes del Estado. Finalmente, nos valdremos de la distinción entre republicanismo y liberalismo para argumentar que la única justificación de la supremacía judicial puede proveerla una comprensión liberal e instrumental de la democracia, la cual consideramos insuficiente desde una perspectiva republicana y deliberativa. 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83107 El artículo rechaza perspectivas holísticas en la evaluación de sistemas de deliberación, esto es, que determinan como válido o exitoso un sistema con relativa independencia de la existencia de fallos o de baja calidad deliberativa al nivel de los individuos que lo integran. Para rechazar esta perspectiva, adopto una visión republicana de la deliberación y concluyo que, bajo esta óptica, la preferencia en la evaluación debe estar en los individuos antes que en el sistema. 2016-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83106 We lack analyses of the judiciary from a systemic perspective. This article thus examines arguments offered by deliberativists who have reflected about this institution and argues that the current state of deliberative democracy requires us to rethink the ways they conceive of the judiciary within a deliberative framework. After an examination of these accounts, I define the deliberative system and describe the different phases deliberative democracy has gone through. I then single out elements common to all systemic approaches against which I test whether the regard that the authors show for the judiciary in deliberative terms can be maintained and argue in the negative. I conclude by pointing at the necessity to think about the definition of deliberative systems, and to the value of these discussions for debates on the legitimacy of judicial review when it is exercised under the form of judicial supremacy. 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83105 Por medio del rechazo a la supremacía judicial en la interpretación constitucional, este artículo argumenta que entender la interpretación de una constitución como un práctica estrictamente legal y judicial, excluye a la ciudadanía de dicha actividad. El artículo ofrece una clasificación de análisis de interpretación constitucional. Primero, las tesis implícitas discuten sobre la interpretación sin reflexionar sobre si dicha actividad puede ser también llevada a cabo por instituciones no judiciales. Segundo, las tesis explícitas cuestionan si la interpretación constitucional es un asunto que ha de ser tratado por los tribunales, y responden afirmativamente. Crítico ambos grupos de argumentos. Las tesis implícitas no explican por qué la interpretación constitucional es de naturaleza puramente judicial. Las tesis explícitas no justifican suficientemente por qué la judicatura es la institución ideal para dotar de significado final a la constitución de manera autoritativa, tanto en términos instrumentales como normativos. Finalizo sugiriendo caminos para investigaciones futuras. 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83104 Rejecting judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, this paper argues that understanding the interpretation of constitutions to be a solely legal and judicial undertaking excludes citizens from such activity. The paper proffers a two-pronged classification of analyses of constitutional interpretation. Implicit accounts discuss interpretation without reflecting on whether such activity can or should be performed by non-judicial institutions as well. Explicit accounts ask whether interpretation of constitutions is a matter to be dealt with by courts and answer affirmatively. I criticise both camps. Implicit accounts fail to explain why constitutional interpretation is purely judicial in character. Explicit accounts do not provide enough reasons why the judiciary is allegedly the ideal institution to give constitutions meaning with final authority, both in instrumental and normative terms. The paper closes by suggesting avenues for future research. 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83103 Legal scholars generally consider the theorisation and constitutionalisation of constitutional interpretation as a matter for the courts. This article first challenges this tendency on conceptual grounds, showing that no institutional commitment follows from the nature of interpretation in law, constitutional law included. It then provides guidance for thinking about institutional perspectives according to two criteria: the nature and normative strength of the sources interpreted and the capacity of the interpreter to include and consider every possibility affected when her interpretation carries collective effects and is authoritatively final. The application of these criteria places the discussion on the grounds of democratic theory. The article thus reviews competing democratic theories and champions deliberative democracy as the alternative whose constitutive features best allow for the development of institutions capable of exercising constitutional interpretation when the imposition of meaning on the constitution is final and carries erga omnes effects. 2018-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83102 The article elaborates an original intertwined reading of republican theory, deliberative democracy and political equality. It argues that republicans, deliberative democrats and egalitarian scholars have not paid sufficient attention to a number of features present in these bodies of scholarships that relate them in mutually beneficial ways. It shows that republicanism and deliberative democracy are related in mutually beneficial ways, it makes those relations explicit, and it deals with potential objections against them. Additionally, it elaborates an egalitarian principle underpinning the resulting model that I label Equality of Access and Deliberation. The upshot of these considerations is a novel and mutually reinforcing interrelated three-tiered theoretical and institutional proposal. 2018-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83101 This article discusses Dimitrios Kyritsis’ critique of the ‘democratic objection’ to constitutional review. Kyritsis performs a misguided comparison between legislatures and the judiciary regarding their institutional roles qua participants in a representative system. The mistake rests on his reliance on a conception of the “trustee/proxy” divide that overlooks that both categories are regulative ideals, not reflections of how political practice operates. Such understanding of political representation, as well as of the corresponding institutional roles of courts and legislatures within a representative system, leads to a refutation of Kyritsis’ argument that the democratic objection falls short of justifying the rejection of constitutional review. After reconstructing Kyritsis’ discussion of the democratic objection, his arguments are rejected based on a revision of the notion of political representation. The revision is then shown to directly affect the argument in favour of constitutional review. 2019-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83029 Constitutionalists and deliberative democrats show increasing interest in deliberative constitutionalism. They seek to reconcile two prima facie conflicting camps in legal and political philosophy: constitutionalism and democracy. These concepts’ internal tensions, have led deliberativists to theorise on constitutional matters unsystematically, and constitutionalists to largely ignore the influential deliberative turn in political philosophy of the past four decades. Scholars want to put this in the past. Nowadays, deliberative constitutionalism is explicitly presented as a clear and distinct idea that keeps those tensions at bay. With this in the background, this article does three things: It first describes the state-of-the art in deliberative constitutionalism. Second, it shows the limitations of the current literature. Finally, it proposes an alternative conception of deliberative constitutionalism as a suggestion that may cope with those limitations based on a republican understanding of representative deliberative democracy. 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83028 Este artículo examina y propone alternativas institucionales para el constitucionalismo popular. La propuesta es una combinación progresiva de instituciones que buscan dotar a la ciudadanía con el poder final para determinar qué significa una constitución, contribuyendo a asegurar su libertad republicana, implementando mecanismos de deliberación, al tiempo que es respetuoso de una forma particular de comprender la igualdad política. El artículo comienza con una descripción del constitucionalismo popular y de los principios que considero que deberían fundamentar la teoría. Luego, procede a examinar críticamente diversas propuestas institucionales presentes en la literatura. Después de mostrar las áreas en las que dichas propuestas se quedan cortas en el esfuerzo de encarnar los principios aquí defendidos, el artículo aboga por la implementación de cuatro mecanismos que, según sostendré, sí se acercan más a dichos objetivos. 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83027 This article analogises political representation to legal interpretation. It then applies the analogy to the hitherto neglected question of what political representation means for deliberative constitutionalism. The upshot is a conception of deliberative constitutionalism that, while uncompromisingly grounded in the reasoned expression of the preferences of a polity's constituents through deliberative democratic institutional innovations, mandates representatives to translate those preferences into general and abstract constitutional law. It thus enhances the deliberative contribution of citizens in the determination of constitutional meaning, while preserving the value of representative institutions. 2021-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83026 Champions of systemic approaches to deliberative democratic theory consider that deliberative systems serve sundry functions. Whether guaranteeing political freedom should be one of those functions has not been explored in the scholarly literature. This article thus examines which conceptions of freedom underpin systemic approaches to deliberative democracy. I explore and circumscribe the analysis to two prominent options: freedom as absence of interference and freedom as non-domination. The answer to which of these alternatives best serves as a function of the deliberative system hinges on the previous question of whether holistic evaluations of systemic deliberative performance are to be endorsed. The article then argues that holistic evaluations are only compatible with freedom as non-interference. By contrast, freedom as non-domination is incompatible with holism. I then provide reasons for endorsing freedom as non-domination and, by implication, to reject holistic systemic evaluations. 2021-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83025 This article discusses from the perspective of democratic theory an innovative proposal for the selection of constitutional, supreme court, or federal judges that aims at combining the values of expertise and political independence. It consists in combining a certification process – selecting a pool of properly qualified candidates – with a random selection among this pool. We argue that such selection procedure would better respect the separation of powers and the specific legitimacy of courts, and we champion this two-stage mechanism vis-à-vis other, more traditionally employed, selection procedures. We then deal with a diversity of objections to our proposal and conclude by taking stock of both its virtues and limitations. 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83024 Courts do many good things. Judges carefully consider individual claims and arguments,1 and contrast them against the law in light of evidence. Their decisions are argued for, are public, and can be contested in form and content in different hierarchical stages. Additionally, and among other things, these practices are said to contribute to the will-formation of the public sphere and improve the quality of the legislative process.2 2021-06-25T00:00:00Z