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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem:http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27721

    Título
    Does Flexibility Facilitate Sustainability of Cooperation Over Time? A Case Study from Environmental Economics
    Autor
    Frutos Baraja, Francisco Javier deAutoridad UVA Orcid
    Martín Herrán, GuiomarAutoridad UVA Orcid
    Año del Documento
    2015
    Documento Fuente
    Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 165(2), 657-677, 2015.
    Résumé
    In this paper we present nonlinear incentive strategies that can be applied to a class of differential games that are frequently used in the literature, in particular, in environmental economics literature. We consider a class of nonlinear incentive functions that depend on the control variables of both players and on the current value of the state variable. The strategies are constructed to allow some flexibility in the sense that, unlike the common literature on the subject, the optimal state path evolves close to the cooperative trajectory. As a consequence of this flexibility, the incentive equilibrium is credible in a larger region than the one associated with the usual linear incentive strategies.
    Revisión por pares
    SI
    Patrocinador
    This research has been supported by Spanish MINECO, projects ECO2008-01551/ECON, ECO2011-24352 and MTM2010-14919 (cofinanced by FEDER funds).
    Idioma
    eng
    URI
    http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27721
    Derechos
    openAccess
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    • DEP20 - Artículos de revista [181]
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