Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem:http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27721
Does Flexibility Facilitate Sustainability of Cooperation Over Time? A Case Study from Environmental Economics
Año del Documento
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 165(2), 657-677, 2015.
In this paper we present nonlinear incentive strategies that can be applied to a class of differential games that are frequently used in the literature, in particular, in environmental economics literature. We consider a class of nonlinear incentive functions that depend on the control variables of both players and on the current value of the state variable. The strategies are constructed to allow some flexibility in the sense that, unlike the common literature on the subject, the optimal state path evolves close to the cooperative trajectory. As a consequence of this flexibility, the incentive equilibrium is credible in a larger region than the one associated with the usual linear incentive strategies.
Revisión por pares
This research has been supported by Spanish MINECO, projects ECO2008-01551/ECON, ECO2011-24352 and MTM2010-14919 (cofinanced by FEDER funds).
Aparece en las colecciones