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dc.contributor.authorCabo García, Francisco José 
dc.contributor.authorTidball, Mabel
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-31T14:51:44Z
dc.date.available2018-10-31T14:51:44Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationResource and Energy Economics, 47, pp. 56-71.es
dc.identifier.issn0928-7655es
dc.identifier.urihttp://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/32413
dc.descriptionProducción Científicaes
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a two-regime differential game, with a first period in which two countries cooperate in a joint investment project to construct a specific infrastructure. This period ends when the infrastructure is finished, which serves to increase each player’s welfare in a subsequent non-cooperative game played by the two countries thereafter. We define an imputation distribution procedure (IDP) to share the investment costs during cooperation according to each player’ future benefits. We prove that the IDP is time consistent if at any time within the cooperative period each country’s share on the surplus to go is equal to or converges towards the country’s relative gains from the existence of the infrastructure (real- ized in the subsequent non-cooperative period). Furthermore, we obtain the instantaneous side-payment scheme which makes the IDP feasible. The mechanism is studied for a joint investment project to build a water canal to transfer water between a surplus and a deficit river basin.es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherElsevieres
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.subjectEnvironmental Economicses
dc.subjectDifferential gameses
dc.subject.classificationCooperative differential gamees
dc.subject.classificationnon-cooperative differential gamees
dc.subject.classificationimputation distribution procedurees
dc.subject.classificationinstantaneous side-paymentes
dc.subject.classificationtime-consistent solutiones
dc.titlePromotion of cooperation when benefits come in the future: A water transfer casees
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.12.001es
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765516300574es
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage56es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage71es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleResource and Energy Economicses
dc.identifier.publicationvolume47es
dc.peerreviewedSIes
dc.description.projectMEC project ECO2014-52343-P, co- financed by FEDER funds. COST Action IS1104 “The EU in the new economic complex geography: models, tools and policy evaluation”.es


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