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dc.contributor.authorGarcía Lapresta, José Luis 
dc.contributor.authorLlamazares Rodríguez, Bonifacio 
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-14T09:20:48Z
dc.date.available2019-09-14T09:20:48Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.identifier.citationSocial Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, n. 4, p. 673-690.es
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714es
dc.identifier.urihttp://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37939
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies by means of reciprocal fuzzy binary relations the aggregation of preferences when individuals show their preferences gradually. We have characterized neutral aggregation rules through functions from powers of the unit interval in the unit interval. Furthermore, we have determined the neutral aggregation rules that are decomposable and anonymous. In this class of rules, the collective intensity of preference is the arithmetic mean of the values assigned by a function to the individual intensities of preference. We have also considered the neutral aggregation rules based on quasiarithmetic means. We have established that this class of rules generalizes the simple majority, when individuals have ordinary preferences and collective preferences are reciprocal.es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherSpringeres
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.titleAggregation of fuzzy preferences: Some rules of the meanes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s003550000048es
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs003550000048es
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage673es
dc.identifier.publicationissue4es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage690es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleSocial Choice and Welfarees
dc.identifier.publicationvolume17es
dc.peerreviewedSIes
dc.description.projectEste trabajo forma parte del proyecto de investigación: Junta de Castilla y León Regional Grant VA09/98.es
dc.identifier.essn1432-217Xes
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersiones


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