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dc.contributor.authorMartínez Panero, Miguel 
dc.contributor.authorArredondo Luna, Verónica
dc.contributor.authorPeña García, María Teresa 
dc.contributor.authorRamírez, Victoriano
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-25T10:41:04Z
dc.date.available2020-02-25T10:41:04Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationEconomies 7(1), 17es
dc.identifier.urihttp://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/40526
dc.description.abstractIn this paper electoral disproportionality is split into two types: (1) Forced or unavoidable, due to the very nature of the apportionment problem; and (2) non-forced. While disproportionality indexes proposed in the literature do not distinguish between such components, we design an index, called “quota index”, just measuring avoidable disproportionality. Unlike the previous indexes, the new one can be zero in real situations. Furthermore, this index presents an interesting interpretation concerning transfers of seats. Properties of the quota index and relationships with some usual disproportionality indexes are analyzed. Finally, an empirical approach is undertaken for different countries and elections.es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes
dc.language.isospaes
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/*
dc.titleA New Quota Approach to Electoral Disproportionalityes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees
dc.identifier.doi10.3390/economies7010017es
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage17es
dc.identifier.publicationissue1es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleEconomieses
dc.identifier.publicationvolume7es
dc.peerreviewedSIes
dc.identifier.essn2227-7099es
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rightsCC0 1.0 Universal*
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/draftes


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