Rule of Law and Political Representation

Abstract

How do the rule of law and political representation relate to each other? I answer this question, hitherto neglected by rule-of-law scholars, taking my cue from Joseph Raz’s revision of his conception of the rule of law and by relying on a distinction between preferences and interests, which pervades discussions of political represen tation. I argue that political representatives’ attention to their constituents’ prefer ences, and not just their interests, is a necessary feature of a conception of represen tation that expresses a robust allegiance to the rule of law. More specifcally, that such allegiance is better honoured when representatives are responsive to prefer ences warranted by public interests. I ofer two groups of rule-of-law reasons for that claim. First, because respect for preferences by representatives facilitates the conditions for the law to be obeyed. Second, respect for those preferences through the justifcation of the representatives’ collective decisions allows for accountability and for non-arbitrary creation and application of the law. I fnish addressing a three fold objection to my reliance on preferences as objects that representatives should consider when making their decisions