| dc.description.abstract | The now familiar idea that the detection of an empirical phenomenon is
inferred from a complex collection of data (Bogen & Woodward 1988,
Woodward 1989, 2000, 2010, McAllister 1997, 2011, Glymour 2000, Harris
2003, Massimi 2007, Leonelli 2015, 2019, Bokulich 2020) entails the
recognition that not only theories, but also the description of empirical
phenomena is underdetermined by evidence. Empirical
underdetermination, understood as the underdetermination of empirical
phenomena by data, emerges as a major challenge still to be fully
acknowledged and carefully approached in the philosophy of science.
To face this challenge, it is essential to be able to identify the multilevel
theoretical assumptions underlying the production of data models and
thus the inference to empirical phenomena. Despite the many difficulties,
this kind of analysis has already been attempted with some success in the
case of the natural sciences (Kaiser 1991, Leonelli 2009, Karaca 2018,
Bokulich & Parker 2021, Antoniou 2021), where background knowledge
about instruments and empirical procedures is often explicitly available.
However, the situation seems quite different in the case of the social
sciences, where the opacity of instruments (Borsboom et al. 2009) and the
highly conjectural nature of background assumptions, renders the
challenge of empirical underdetermination more dramatic. | es |