2026-04-14T19:45:34Zhttps://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/request

oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/228412021-07-06T08:33:26Zcom_10324_1146com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1262

García Lapresta, José Luis Martínez Panero, Miguel 2017-03-29T08:30:06Z 2017-03-29T08:30:06Z 2017 International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 2017 0884-8173 http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/22841 10.1002/int.21877 International Journal of Intelligent Systems Producción Científica In this paper, we consider a typical voting situation where a group of agents show their preferences over a set of alternatives. Under our approach, such preferences are codied into individual positional values which can be aggregated in several ways through particular functions, yielding positional voting rules and providing a social result in each case. We show that scoring rules belong to such class of positional voting rules. But if we focus our interest on OWA operators as aggregation functions, other well-known voting systems naturally appear. In particular, we determine those ones verifying duplication (i.e., clone irrelevance) and present a proposal of an overall social result provided by them. Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (ECO2012-32178) Junta de Castilla y León (programa de apoyo a proyectos de investigación – Ref. VA066U13) application/pdf eng Wiley info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess © Wiley Periodicals Sistemas de votación Positional voting rules generated by aggregation functions and the role of duplication info:eu-repo/semantics/article http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/int.21877/abstract SI