<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-28T19:35:34Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/32413" metadataPrefix="dim">https://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/32413</identifier><datestamp>2025-03-26T19:10:04Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10324_1146</setSpec><setSpec>com_10324_931</setSpec><setSpec>com_10324_894</setSpec><setSpec>col_10324_1262</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="abb084c92507035e" confidence="500" orcid_id="0000-0003-2958-9595">Cabo García, Francisco José</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="24f4fe5a-8cfc-44d4-9d8f-5c01af5b1fa7" confidence="500" orcid_id="">Tidball, Mabel</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2018-10-31T14:51:44Z</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2018-10-31T14:51:44Z</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2017</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="citation" lang="es">Resource and Energy Economics, 47, pp. 56-71.</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="issn" lang="es">0928-7655</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/32413</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="doi" lang="es">10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.12.001</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="publicationfirstpage" lang="es">56</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="publicationlastpage" lang="es">71</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="publicationtitle" lang="es">Resource and Energy Economics</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="publicationvolume" lang="es">47</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="es">Producción Científica</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="es">This paper presents a two-regime differential game, with a first period in which two&#xd;
countries cooperate in a joint investment project to construct a specific infrastructure. This&#xd;
period ends when the infrastructure is finished, which serves to increase each player’s welfare&#xd;
in a subsequent non-cooperative game played by the two countries thereafter. We define an&#xd;
imputation distribution procedure (IDP) to share the investment costs during cooperation&#xd;
according to each player’ future benefits. We prove that the IDP is time consistent if at any&#xd;
time within the cooperative period each country’s share on the surplus to go is equal to or&#xd;
converges towards the country’s relative gains from the existence of the infrastructure (real-&#xd;
ized in the subsequent non-cooperative period). Furthermore, we obtain the instantaneous&#xd;
side-payment scheme which makes the IDP feasible. The mechanism is studied for a joint&#xd;
investment project to build a water canal to transfer water between a surplus and a deficit&#xd;
river basin.</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="project" lang="es">MEC project ECO2014-52343-P, co- financed by FEDER funds. COST Action IS1104 “The EU in the new economic complex geography: models, tools and policy evaluation”.</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="format" qualifier="mimetype" lang="es">application/pdf</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="es">eng</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="es">Elsevier</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" qualifier="accessRights" lang="es">info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="es">Environmental Economics</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="es">Differential games</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="classification" lang="es">Cooperative differential game</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="classification" lang="es">non-cooperative differential game</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="classification" lang="es">imputation distribution procedure</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="classification" lang="es">instantaneous side-payment</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="classification" lang="es">time-consistent solution</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="es">Promotion of cooperation when benefits come in the future: A water transfer case</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="es">info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="relation" qualifier="publisherversion" lang="es">https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765516300574</dim:field>
<dim:field mdschema="dc" element="peerreviewed" lang="es">SI</dim:field>
</dim:dim></metadata></record></GetRecord></OAI-PMH>