2026-04-14T19:47:51Zhttps://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/request

oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/378802025-03-26T19:10:02Zcom_10324_1146com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1262

García González, Ana Cabo García, Francisco José 2019-09-11T15:04:35Z 2019-09-11T15:04:35Z 2019 Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Julio 2019, Vol 29, Issue 3, p. 1037–1057 1432-1386 http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37880 10.1007/s00191-019-00620-3 1037 3 1057 29 This paper studies a two-population evolutionary game in a new setting in between a symmetric and an asymmetric evolutionary model. It distinguishes two types of agents: Sanchos, whose payoffs are defined by a prisoner’s dilemma game, and Quixotes, whose payoffs are defined by a snowdrift game. Considering an imitative revision protocol, a revising agent is paired with someone from his own population or the other population. When matched, they observe payoffs, but not identities. Thus, agents in one population interact and imitate agents from their own population and from the other population. In this setting we prove that a unique mixed-strategy asymptotically stable fixed point of the evolutionary dynamics exists. Taking as an example the compliance with social norms, and depending on the parameters, two type of equilibrium are possible, one with full compliance among Quixotes and partial compliance among Sanchos, or another with partial compliance among Quixotes and defection among Sanchos. In the former type, Sanchos comply above their Nash equilibrium (as they imitate compliant Quixotes). In the latter type, Quixotes comply below their Nash equilibrium (as they imitate defecting Sanchos). eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Interaction and imitation in a world of Quixotes and Sanchos info:eu-repo/semantics/article