2026-04-30T00:44:19Zhttps://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/request

oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/379392021-06-23T10:07:17Zcom_10324_1146com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1262

García Lapresta, José Luis Llamazares Rodríguez, Bonifacio 2019-09-14T09:20:48Z 2019-09-14T09:20:48Z 2000 Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, n. 4, p. 673-690. 0176-1714 http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37939 10.1007/s003550000048 673 4 690 Social Choice and Welfare 17 1432-217X This paper studies by means of reciprocal fuzzy binary relations the aggregation of preferences when individuals show their preferences gradually. We have characterized neutral aggregation rules through functions from powers of the unit interval in the unit interval. Furthermore, we have determined the neutral aggregation rules that are decomposable and anonymous. In this class of rules, the collective intensity of preference is the arithmetic mean of the values assigned by a function to the individual intensities of preference. We have also considered the neutral aggregation rules based on quasiarithmetic means. We have established that this class of rules generalizes the simple majority, when individuals have ordinary preferences and collective preferences are reciprocal. eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Aggregation of fuzzy preferences: Some rules of the mean info:eu-repo/semantics/article