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00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Arguedas, Carmen author Cabo García, Francisco José author Martín Herrán, Guiomar author 2020 We analyze optimal pollution standards and enforcement strategies in settings where environmental damages depend on accumulated pollution, and enforcement is socially costly. We assume that a regulator and a representative polluting firm interact in a Stackelberg differential game, and we specifically allow the firm to pollute above the limit, and pay the corresponding fine. A crucial element is how progressive the fine is with respect to the degree of non-compliance. Some of our results contradict the related literature on the control of stock pollutants under full-compliance. In particular, we find that setting standards dependent on the pollution stock (setting quantities) is preferred if fines are sufficiently non-linear; while setting fines dependent on the pollution stock (setting prices) is preferred if fines are linear or almost linear, and specially when the environmental problem is particularly harmful Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, March 2020, vol 100, 102297 http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/41006 10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102297 Enforcing Regulatory Standards in Stock PollutionProblems 100 Enforcing regulatory standards in stock pollution problems