2026-04-22T20:59:52Zhttps://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/request

oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/452452026-03-20T07:40:16Zcom_10324_1180com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1375

Sandholm, William H. Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo 2021-02-11T07:57:58Z 2021-02-11T07:57:58Z 2019 Theoretical Economics 14 (2019), 1347–1385 1933-6837 http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/45245 10.3982/TE3565 1347 4 1385 Theoretical Economics 14 We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game. Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play. eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game info:eu-repo/semantics/article