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Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: Simple formulas and applications Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo 53 Ciencias Económicas Producción Científica We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points of these dynamics, but need not be stable. We provide some simple formulas and algorithms to determine the stability or instability of strict Nash equilibria. Agencia Estatal de Investigación (project PID2020-118906GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033) Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (projects PRX19/00113 and PRX21/00295) 2022-09-21T08:07:31Z 2022-09-21T08:07:31Z 2022 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 206, 105553 0022-0531 https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/55532 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105553 eng https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053122001430?via%3Dihub Atribución 4.0 Internacional info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ © 2022 The Authors application/pdf Elsevier https://uvadoc.uva.es/bitstream/10324/55532/2/Stability-strict-equilibria.pdf.jpg Hispana TEXT http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ UVaDOC. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/55532