2026-05-05T20:55:25Zhttps://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/request

oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/670272025-03-26T19:10:04Zcom_10324_1147com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1266

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Andrés Alonso, Pablo De author Reig, Rodrigo author Vallelado González, Eleuterio author 2018 We review how the new European regulation of bank executive compensation could affect the future of banking in Europe. Although there is no conclusive empirical evidence on the relation between bank executive remuneration and the financial crisis, authorities have intensively regulated the compensation of bank managers to eliminate risk-taking incentives in the financial industry. However, the new regulation could have unintended consequences of creating an adverse selection problem at European banks, reducing the number of best-performing managers available for European banks, and motivating an excessive increase in fixed remuneration over total remuneration, altering the way incentive systems work. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2019, vol. 22, n. 3, p. 208-225. 0148-2963 https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/67027 10.1080/17487870.2018.1424630 208 3 225 Journal of Economic Policy Reform 22 Bancos - Personal - Países de la Unión Europea European banks’ executive remuneration under the new European Union regulation