2026-04-28T01:17:06Zhttps://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/request

oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/741912025-02-20T07:51:51Zcom_10324_1180com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1377

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Anton Heredero, Juan De author Ruiz Martín, Cristina author Villafáñez Cardeñoso, Félix Antonio author Poza Garcia, David Jesús author 2024 The surge in electronic procurement is fostering the proliferation of electronic marketplaces and advanced auctions as primary coordination mechanisms. Among these, combinatorial and double auctions are gaining traction in the procurement sector. However, prevalent implementations often assume participants to be perfectly rational, adhering to predefined behaviors within the auction model. These centralized models, while prevalent, fail to capture the intricate dynamics of real auction environments adequately. Consequently, there is a growing recognition of the necessity for decentralized models within an agentbased framework to simulate such auctions authentically. The contribution of this work is the application of the DEVS formalism to develop a decentralized model for a combinatorial iterative double auction to address the limitations of centralized implementations. The model is formally defined, and a case study is presented to verify it against its centralized version. This is the first step toward accommodating agents with varied behavioral patterns within auction simulations. 2024 Winter Simulation Conference. Orlando, FL, USA 979-8-3315-3420-2 https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/74191 10.1109/WSC63780.2024.10838958 DEVS as a Method to Model and Simulate Combinatorial Double Auctions for E-Procurement