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Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo Hauert, Christoph 2025-06-24T09:11:36Z 2025-06-24T09:11:36Z 2025 Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2025, vol. 608, p. 112129 0022-5193 https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/76097 10.1016/j.jtbi.2025.112129 112129 Journal of Theoretical Biology 608 In populations subject to evolutionary processes, the assortment of players with different genes or strategies can have a large impact on players’ payoffs and on the expected evolution of each strategy in the population. Here we consider assortment generated by a process of partner choice known as selective assortment. Under selective assortment, players looking for a mate can observe the strategies of a sample of potential mates or co-players, and select one of them to interact with. This selection mechanism can generate positive assortment (preference for players using the same strategy), or negative assortment (preference for players using a different strategy). We study the impact of selective assortment in the evolution and in the equilibria of a population, providing results for different games under different evolutionary dynamics (including the replicator dynamics). eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ © 2025 The Author(s) Atribución 4.0 Internacional Positive and negative selective assortment info:eu-repo/semantics/article