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oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/794512025-12-16T20:00:41Zcom_10324_1146com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1262

García Lapresta, José Luis Martínez Panero, Miguel 2025-11-07T13:20:08Z 2025-11-07T13:20:08Z 2025 Group Decision and Negotiation, 2025. 0926-2644 https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/79451 10.1007/s10726-025-09953-w Group Decision and Negotiation 1572-9907 Producción Científica In this paper, we extend preference-approval structures to a more general situation, where voters can sort the alternatives in three disjoint classes instead of two (for instance, acceptable, neutral and unacceptable). We propose a parameterized family of voting systems related to the Borda count, where positive (negative) individual scores are assigned to acceptable (unacceptable) alternatives in a decreasing way from best to worst, while neutral alternatives obtain null scores. We analyze the role of parameters and provide some properties that satisfy the proposed voting systems. Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (MICIU) / Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI): PID2021-122506NB-I00 (MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and ERDF, EU) Open access funding provided by FEDER European Funds and the Junta de Castilla y León under the Research and Innovation Strategy for Smart Specialization (RIS3) of Castilla y León 2021-2027. application/pdf eng Springer Nature info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ © 2025 The Author(s) Attribution 4.0 Internacional Sistemas de votación Recuento Borda Votación por aprobación Aprobación por preferencia 5903 Ideologías Políticas 5905.01 Elecciones 5306.01 Economía Investigación y desarrollo Experimental Combining the Borda Count with Approval and Disapproval Voting info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10726-025-09953-w SI