2026-04-27T21:22:04Zhttps://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/request

oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/825892026-02-05T20:00:43Zcom_10324_1147com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1266

Audit Committee Networks and Audit Fees: A European Analysis García Cobo, Ruth Zarza Herranza, César López Iturriaga, Félix Javier Comité de auditoría Redes sociales corporativas Calidad de la auditoría Producción Científica This study investigates the association between audit committee member networks and audit fees in a sample of 225 publicly traded firms from eight European countries between 2005 and 2020. Using social network analysis, we find that director interconnections—established through overlapping board memberships—are associated with audit fees. Our findings reveal an extensive, yet fragmented director network, where higher centrality positions correlate with increased audit fees. This suggests that director connections strengthen the demand for audit effort, leading to higher audit fees. Furthermore, we show that director centrality moderates the positive relationship between firm complexity, financial risk, and board independence with audit fees. 2026-02-05T09:22:10Z 2026-02-05T09:22:10Z 2026 info:eu-repo/semantics/article Accounting & Finance, enero 2026, vol. 66, n. 1, (in press) 0810-5391 https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/82589 10.1111/acfi.70173 1 Accounting & Finance 66 1467-629X eng https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/acfi.70173 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ © 2026 The Author(s) Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Wiley SI