2024-03-28T21:06:03Zhttps://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/requestoai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/410062021-06-23T10:07:37Zcom_10324_1146com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1262
2020-06-08T16:35:51Z
urn:hdl:10324/41006
Enforcing regulatory standards in stock pollution problems
Arguedas, Carmen
Cabo García, Francisco José
Martín Herrán, Guiomar
Producción Científica
We analyze optimal pollution standards and enforcement strategies in settings where environmental damages depend on accumulated pollution, and enforcement is socially costly. We assume that a regulator and a representative polluting firm interact in a Stackelberg differential game, and we specifically allow the firm to pollute above the limit, and pay the corresponding fine. A crucial element is how progressive the fine is with respect to the degree of non-compliance. Some of our results contradict the related literature on the control of stock pollutants under full-compliance. In particular, we find that setting standards dependent on the pollution stock (setting quantities) is preferred if fines are sufficiently non-linear; while setting fines dependent on the pollution stock (setting prices) is preferred if fines are linear or almost linear, and specially when the environmental problem is particularly harmful
2020-06-08T16:35:51Z
2020-06-08T16:35:51Z
2020
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, March 2020, vol 100, 102297
http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/41006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102297
Enforcing Regulatory Standards in Stock PollutionProblems
100
eng
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069618305473
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Elsevier