2026-06-10T18:27:39Zhttps://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/request

oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/319762021-07-06T08:33:26Zcom_10324_1146com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1262

De Giovanni, Pietro Karray, Salma Martín Herrán, Guiomar Most of the cooperative advertising literature has focused on studying the effects of such programs considering marketing variables. This paper integrates production and inventory management with pricing and advertising considerations to assess the effects of cooperative advertising programs in bilateral monopolies. We consider a supply chain where a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) along with a consignment contract is implemented to coordinate the chain. We develop and solve a differential model for two games. The first one is a benchmark scenario where no cooperative advertising is offered, while the manufacturer offers the cooperative program in the second game. The main results show that cooperative advertising programs, usually considered as successful marketing initiatives, can be very difficult to implement in a supply chain undertaking a VMI policy with a consignment contract, in which operations and marketing interface in taken into account. A cooperative program mainly hurts the manufacturer's profits, and can be profit-Pareto-improving only in a few cases. Although the retailer is generally willing to receive a support from the manufacturer, she can opt for a non-cooperative program when the largest part of the supply chain profits goes to the manufacturer. 2018-10-03 2018-10-03 2019 info:eu-repo/semantics/article European Journal of Operational Research, 272, 465-480, 2019 http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/31976 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess