2024-03-29T07:08:15Zhttps://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/requestoai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/228412021-07-06T08:33:26Zcom_10324_1146com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1262
Positional voting rules generated by aggregation functions and the role of duplication
García Lapresta, José Luis
Martínez Panero, Miguel
Sistemas de votación
Producción Científica
In this paper, we consider a typical voting situation where a group of agents show their preferences over a set of alternatives. Under our approach, such preferences are codied into individual positional values which can be aggregated in several ways through particular functions, yielding positional voting rules and providing a social result in each case. We show that scoring rules belong to such class of positional voting rules. But if we focus our interest on OWA operators as aggregation functions, other well-known voting systems naturally appear. In particular, we determine those ones verifying duplication (i.e., clone irrelevance) and present a proposal of an overall social result provided by them.
Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (ECO2012-32178)
Junta de Castilla y León (programa de apoyo a proyectos de investigación – Ref. VA066U13)
2017-03-29T08:30:06Z
2017-03-29T08:30:06Z
2017
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
https://doi.org/10.1002/int.21877
International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 2017
0884-8173
http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/22841
International Journal of Intelligent Systems
eng
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/int.21877/abstract
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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