2024-03-28T09:18:30Zhttps://uvadoc.uva.es/oai/requestoai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/323332021-06-23T10:06:45Zcom_10324_1146com_10324_931com_10324_894col_10324_1262
The endogenous determination of retirement age and Social Security benefits
Cabo García, Francisco José
García González, Ana
Differential games
Pension systems
Public pension system
effective retirement age
differential games
credibility of incentive equilibrium
Producción Científica
An ageing population in modern societies has put stress on public
pension systems. To prevent Social Security deficits from increasing to
unbounded stocks of public debt we focus on two policies: reducing the
generosity of pension benefits, determined by the government, and post-
poning the effective retirement age, chosen by employees. An atomistic
employee would disregard the effect of his retirement decision on the public
debt and would retire as soon as possible. Conversely, an ideal farsighted
agency considering all current and future employees would postpone re-
tirement, thereby alleviating the pressure on public debt and allowing
for a more generous long-run pension. The government may design a
proper incentive strategy to induce myopic atomistic decision-makers, to
act non-myopically. This strategy is a two-part incentive with non-linear
dependence on the stock of public debt. It is credible if deceiving em-
ployees slightly adjust their retirement age decisions to increments in the
public debt.
MICINN under project ECO2008- 01551/ECON.
2018-10-25T17:38:43Z
2018-10-25T17:38:43Z
2014
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100512000296
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 18, pp. 93-113.
1365-1005 (Print), 1469-8056 (Online)
http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/32333
93
113
Macroeconomic Dynamics
18
spa
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/macroeconomic-dynamics/article/endogenous-determination-of-retirement-age-and-social-security-benefits/9EE091C1A9DC1379CEF4202FB4E21EA7
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
application/pdf
Cambridge University Press