RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article T1 Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support A1 Llamazares Rodríguez, Bonifacio A1 Pérez Asurmendi, Patrizia K1 Voto - Matemáticas AB In this paper we study to what extent majorities based on difference in support leads to triple-acyclic collective decisions. These majorities, which take into account voters’ intensities of preference between pairs of alternatives through reciprocal preference relations, require to the winner alternative to exceed the support for the other alternative in a difference fixed before the election. Depending on that difference, i.e., on the threshold of support, and on some requirements on the individual rationality of the voters, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for avoiding cycles of three alternatives on the collective decision. PB Elsevier YR 2015 FD 2015 LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/21493 UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/21493 LA eng NO Information Sciences, 2015, Vol. 299, p. 209–220 NO Producción Científica DS UVaDOC RD 22-nov-2024