RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Positional voting rules generated by aggregation functions and the role of duplication
A1 García Lapresta, José Luis
A1 Martínez Panero, Miguel
K1 Sistemas de votación
AB In this paper, we consider a typical voting situation where a group of agents show their preferences over a set of alternatives. Under our approach, such preferences are codied into individual positional values which can be aggregated in several ways through particular functions, yielding positional voting rules and providing a social result in each case. We show that scoring rules belong to such class of positional voting rules. But if we focus our interest on OWA operators as aggregation functions, other well-known voting systems naturally appear. In particular, we determine those ones verifying duplication (i.e., clone irrelevance) and present a proposal of an overall social result provided by them.
PB Wiley
SN 0884-8173
YR 2017
FD 2017
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/22841
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/22841
LA eng
NO International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 2017
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 22-dic-2024