RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes
A1 Diss, Mostapha
A1 Pérez Asurmendi, Patrizia
K1 Sistemas de votación
K1 Probabilidades
AB The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the possibility of reaching inconsistent collective decisions from the election process. In these cases, the collective preference includes cycles and even could prevent the election of any alternative as the collective choice. The likelihood of consistent outcomes under a class of majority rules constitutes the aim of this paper. Specifically, we focus on majority rules that require certain consensus in individual preferences to declare an alternative as the winner. Under majorities based on difference of votes, the requirement asks to the winner alternative to obtain a difference in votes with respect to the loser alternative taking into account that individuals are endowed with weak preference orderings. Same requirement is asked to the restriction of these rules to individual linear preferences.
PB Springer Verlag
SN 0040-5833
YR 2016
FD 2016
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/22903
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/22903
LA eng
NO Theory and Decision 80, pp. 473-494, 2016
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 13-ene-2025