RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Price Coordination in Distribution Channels: A Dynamic Perspective
A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar
A1 Taboubi, Sihem
AB In this study, we investigate two important questions related to dynamic pricing indistribution channels: (i) Are coordinated pricing decisions efficient in a context whereprices have carry-over effects on demand? (ii) Should fi rms practice a skimming or apenetration strategy if they choose to coordinate or to decentralize their activities? Toanswer these questions, we consider a differential game that takes place in a bilateralmonopoly where the past retail prices paid by consumers contribute to the building ofa reference price. The latter is used by consumers as a benchmark to evaluate the valueof the product, and by fi rms to decide whether to adopt a skimming or a penetrationstrategy.We then compute and compare strategies, total channel profi ts and individual profitsunder vertical integration and decentralization at steady state and along the optimaltime-paths. One of our main fi ndings states that, for some values of the initial referenceprice, there is a time interval where channel decentralization performs better thancoordination. During this transition period, at least one of the channel members couldbe tempted to end his cooperation, especially if he is not farsighted and if there are nobinding agreements with the other channel partners.
YR 2015
FD 2015
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27720
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27720
LA eng
NO European Journal of Operational Research 240, 401-414, 2015.
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 23-abr-2024