RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Cooperation for Sustainable Forest Management: An Empirical Differential Game Approach
A1 Andrés Domenech, Pablo
A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar
A1 Zaccour, Georges
AB We model the role of theworld's forests as a major carbon sink and consider the impact that forest depletion has on the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere. Two types of agents are considered: forest owners who exploit the forest and draw economic revenues in the form of timber and agricultural use of deforested land; and a non-forest-owner group who pollutes and suffers the negative externality of having a decreasing forest stock. We retrieve the cooperative solution for this game and show the cases in which cooperation enables a partial reduction in the negative externality. We analyze when it is jointly profitable to abate emissions, when it is profitable to reduce net deforestation, and when it is optimal to do both (abate andreduce net deforestation). Assuming that the players adopt the Nash bargaining solution to share the total dividend of cooperation, we determine the total amount that the non-forest owners have to transfer to forest owners. Next, we define a time-consistent payment schedule that allocates over time the total transfer.
YR 2015
FD 2015
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27722
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27722
LA eng
NO Ecological Economics, 117, 118-128, 2015.
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 23-nov-2024