RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Selection of a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a Class of Differential games
A1 Frutos Baraja, Francisco Javier de
A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar
AB This paper revisits the problem of how to select an equilibrium in a differential game in the case of multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Most of the previous applied dynamic games literature has considered pre-play negotiations between players, implicitly or explicitly, with the aim of reaching an agreement on the selection of the pair of strategies. The main objective of this paper is to determine what would be the  equilibrium to be played without pre-play communications. We study the linear and nonlinear Markov perfect Nash equilibria for a class of well-known models in the literature if pre-play communications are eliminated. We analyze both symmetric and nonsymmetric strategies. We show that the nonlinear strategies are not always the optimal strategies implemented when pre-play communications are  removed. We conclude that in the presence of multiple equilibria and without pre-play communications   the  equilibria actually implemented are symmetric piecewise linear Markov perfect Nash equilibria at least for a range of initial values of the state variable.
YR 2018
FD 2018
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/31974
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/31974
LA eng
NO Dynamic Games and Applications 8(3), 620-636, 2018
DS UVaDOC
RD 01-may-2024