RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives
A1 Llamazares Rodríguez, Bonifacio
K1 Voting systems
AB Voting systems between two alternatives have been widely studied in the literature of Social Choice. One of the results given by Fishburn (The Theory of Social Choice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1973) allows us to characterize anonymous, neutral and monotonic voting systems by means of functions satisfying adequate conditions. From among all kinds of functions, the class of affine functions is highly interesting because from them it is possible to obtain the voting systems most used in practice. In this paper we analyze the structure of the set of these functions and we show that this set is convex and its extreme points are the functions that generate the following voting systems: simple majority, absolute majority, unanimous majority and Pareto majority. Moreover, we suggest a simple method for choosing a voting system when two alternatives are under consideration.
PB Springer
SN 1434-4742
YR 2013
FD 2013
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/36226
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/36226
LA eng
NO Review of Economic Design, 2013, vol. 17, n. 3, p. 239-248.
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 26-abr-2024