RT info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart
T1 Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium
A1 Cabo García, Francisco José
A1 García González, Ana
A1 Molpeceres Abellá, María de las Mercedes
K1 Two-population evolutionary game Heterogeneous preferences Prisoner’s dilemma game Snowdrift game Social norms
AB This paper studies a two-population evolutionary game in a new settingin between a symmetric and an asymmetric evolutionary model. It distinguishes twotypes of agents: Sanchos, whose payoffs are defined by a prisoner’s dilemma game,and Quixotes, whose payoffs are defined by a snowdrift game. Considering an imita-tive revision protocol, a revising agent is paired with someone from his own popula-tion or the other population. When matched, they observe payoffs, but not identities.Thus, agents in one population interact and imitate agents from their own populationand from the other population. In this setting we prove that a unique mixed-strategyasymptotically stable fixed point of the evolutionary dynamics exists. Taking as anexample the compliance with social norms, and depending on the parameters, twotype of equilibrium are possible, one with full compliance among Quixotes and par-tial compliance among Sanchos, or another with partial compliance among Quixotesand defection among Sanchos. In the former type, Sanchos comply above their Nashequilibrium (as they imitate compliant Quixotes). In the latter type, Quixotes complybelow their Nash equilibrium (as they imitate defecting Sanchos).
PB Springer International Publishing
SN 978-3-030-19107-8
YR 2020
FD 2020
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37883
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37883
LA eng
NO Pierre-Olivier Pineau, Simon Sigué & Sihem Taboubi. Games in Management Science - 2020. Essays in Honor of Georges Zaccour. 2020, p. 283-313.
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 23-nov-2024