RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Non-linear incentive equilibrium strategies for a transboundary pollution differential game
A1 Frutos Baraja, Francisco Javier de
A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar
AB In this paper we apply non-linear incentive strategies to sustain over time an agreement. We illustrate the use of these strategies in a linear-quadratic transboundary pollution differential game. The incentive strategies are  constructed in such a way that in the long run the pollution stock (the state variable) is close to the steady state of the pollution stock under the cooperative mode of play. The non-linear incentive functions depend on the emission rates (control variables) of both players and on the current value of the pollution stock. The credibility of the incentive equilibrium strategies is analyzed and the performance of  open-loop and  feedback incentive strategies is compared in their role of helping to sustain an agreement over time. We present numerical experiments to illustrate the results.
PB Springer
SN 0884-8289
YR 2019
FD 2019
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37933
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37933
LA spa
NO Games in Management Science-Essays in honor of Georges Zaccour. P.O. Pineau, S.P. Sigué, S. Tabubi (eds.). Springer.  Doi. 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8. ISBN: 978-3-030-19106-1
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 27-dic-2024