RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
A1 Sandholm, William H.
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel
A1 Izquierdo, Luis R.
AB We study a family of population game dynamics under which each revising agentrandomly selects a set of strategies according to a given test-set rule; tests each strategyin this set a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against anewly drawn opponent; and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest,breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. These dynamics need not respectdominance and related properties except as the number of trials become large. StrictNash equilibria are rest points but need not be stable. We provide a variety of sufficientconditions for stability and for instability, and illustrate their use through a range ofapplications from the literature.
PB Elsevier
SN 0022-0531
YR 2020
FD 2020
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/45244
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/45244
LA eng
NO Journal of Economic Theory, 185, 104957.
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 21-dic-2024