RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
A1 Sandholm, William H.
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel
A1 Izquierdo, Luis R.
AB We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests eachof his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy beingagainst a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff washighest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stablestate is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions ofagents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game.Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play.
PB The Econometric Society
SN 1933-6837
YR 2019
FD 2019
LK http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/45245
UL http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/45245
LA eng
NO Theoretical Economics 14 (2019), 1347–1385
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 22-dic-2024