RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 The effects of decision timing for pricing and marketing efforts in a supply chain with competing manufacturers
A1 Karray, Salma
A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar
K1 OR in marketing
K1 Marketing efforts and pricing
K1 Decision timing
K1 Game theory
K1 Competition
K1 12 Matemáticas
AB This paper investigates the impact of decision timing for pricing and marketing efforts in a supply chain led by competing manufacturers. We develop and solve six games to consider the scenarios (games) where prices and marketing efforts (ME) are decided simultaneously, and when they are not (i.e., ME is set either before or after prices). We examine these three scenarios for the benchmark case of a bilateral monopolistic channel, then extend the analysis to a supply chain with competing manufacturers. We identify the optimal decision timing by comparing equilibrium profits and strategies across games in each supply chain setup. We find that a monopolistic manufacturer always prefers that prices and ME be decided simultaneously. However, this result does not hold when product competition is taken into account. The optimal decision timing for competing manufacturers depends on the retailer's and manufacturers' ME effectiveness levels as well as on competition intensity. Specifically, when ME are not very effective, a simultaneous decision scenario is preferred because it provides the advantage of higher profit margins or sales. However, for highly effective ME, manufacturers prefer to decouple ME and pricing decisions. The retailer's optimal scenario is either to make all decisions simultaneously or to choose prices prior to ME. This means that supply chain firms can face conflict due to the decision timing for prices and ME.
PB Wiley
SN 0969-6016
YR 2021
FD 2021
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51143
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51143
LA eng
NO International Transactions in Operational Research, 2021.
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 12-sep-2024